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Thesis Abstract
Wartime Threats and Displacement Decisions: 
Civilian Self-Protection Strategies in the Battle for Abidjan 
This thesis fits into the wider topic of how war impacts civilians, focusing on the little-
understood mediating factor of how civilians protect themselves from wartime threat. 
The research context is a short battle in PK18, a remote northern suburb of Abidjan, Côte 
d’Ivoire. The Invisible Commando rebel group was fighting to oust President Gbagbo 
following his refusal to accept electoral defeat in late 2010. Many civilians fled in late 
February  2011 due to four days of intense fighting between Gbagbo loyalists and the 
Invisible Commandos. A survey  of 715 households was conducted in late 2012, as well 
as key  informant interviews, and semi-structured interviews with households and ex-
combatants. This very  localised mixed-methods approach to a short period of wartime 
violence provides the opportunity to study  the interaction of armed group decisions and 
civilian decisions, centred around the concepts of threat and protection.
On the basis of this data, four empirical chapters analyse different aspects of threat  and 
protection. The third chapter studies armed groups actions that result in the production 
and reduction of threat. The fourth looks primarily  at  civilian protective responses to 
threat in PK18, and also at how the protective motivation affected  the Invisible 
Commandos through mobilisation and demobilisation. Using quantitative data at the 
intra-household level, the fifth chapter describes in detail one particular protection 
strategy - that  of displacement. The sixth chapter then investigates why  households 
choose particular displacement strategies, analysing the importance of three causal 
channels from violence to displacement - direct threat, indirect threat and impact.  The 
thesis concludes that displacement, like other civilian protection strategies, results from 
complex decisions in managing competing threats and scarce protection resources. 
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
One of the most visible outcomes of war is civilian displacement, often on a massive 
scale. In 2013, the highest levels of displacement on record were observed, with 51.2 
million people displaced, 33.3 million of those internally  displaced (UNHCR 2014, 
IDMC 2014). Displacement presents not only  a huge policy  challenge, but also one for 
academics who seek to understand why  people stay  and leave during conflicts, and, 
more frequently, the impacts of displacement on the displaced themselves and host 
populations. This thesis falls into the first of these areas, an area that is both under-
conceptualised and under-researched empirically, with only  a handful of household-
level papers most of which use Nepalese or Colombian data. 
Asking why people flee is often the starting point for displacement choice research, but 
as Lischer (2014) and others have argued, it may  be more instructive to take why 
people stay as the starting point. It is not surprising that people flee from violence; it is 
rather more surprising that some people do not. If there was a simplistic relationship 
with violence, displacement would be homogenous in given contexts, which is not the 
case (Czaika and Kis Katos 2009). A literature has emerged researching the causes of 
variation in displacement outcomes (Adhikari 2012, 2013, Engel and Ibáñez 2007, 
Davenport et al. 2003),  which forms the core literature on which this thesis builds, but 
this literature has to date failed to place displacement choice either empirically  or 
conceptually  within a larger range of strategies for coping during wars, with the notable 
exceptions of Steele (2011), Lindley (2009) and, recently, Mironova et al. (2014). 
Displacement may be understood, I shall argue, in whole or in part as an attempt to 
protect the households’ members. In order to understand wartime displacement, then, 
it is necessary first to ask: how does war affect people? Despite a large and growing 
range of literatures addressing the impacts of war there remains no theoretical micro-
foundation for understanding how the processes underlying the impacts of war are 
created. This thesis will comprise an attempt to draw together, at an extremely 
localised level of analysis, the violent actions perpetrated by  combatants with the 
responses of civilians in order to build theoretical and empirical understanding of how 
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war affects civilians. This provides the foundation for extending the existing migration-
based displacement models (see Engel and Ibáñez 2007).
War may, of course, affect people in a many different and complex ways. Psychological 
impacts are not discussed here, nor long term impacts of any  kind, including damage 
to institutions and systems of national governance. I concentrate on household level 
decision-making, although decisions made by firms and other organisations during 
conflict may  be based on similar principles. War is also a loosely  defined concept and, 
while I make reference to civilians’ wartime decisions, the analysis centres on political 
violence and its consequences rather than other aspects of war. So my  interest is in 
violence - indeed only  what may  be considered a narrow definition of violence - and 
while the context here is one that may  broadly  be considered to have been a civil war 
the important delimiting factor is not whether or not a war is being conducted, but 
rather the extent of the threat of violence. It is not difficult to conceive of non-war 
situations the threat of violence may exist (Kalyvas 2014), but I make no attempt here 
to address such situations and I frame the research as being on the topic of wartime 
violence and wartime decision-making, as generally understood. So from how  wars 
affect people, I have narrowed the context to how wartime violence affects households 
and household decision-making. In the following conceptual section the scope will be 
reduced to decisions focused on protecting household individuals and assets from 
threats; these shall be referred to as ‘protection decisions’ or ‘protection strategies’, a 
term differentiated from coping strategies and other terminology  in related literatures. A 
further restriction is that the analysis is rooted in understanding displacement 
decisions, so it is on these that the analysis is centred while incorporating other 
protection decisions.
This thesis focuses on the relationships between armed groups and civilians in civil 
wars, focusing on central themes of violence, threat, protection and displacement. 
There are six main contributions to the literature within the body  of work presented 
here. First, the thesis seeks to contribute by illustrating conceptually  and empirically 
how displacement decisions are embedded in a wider context of wartime self-
protection decisions. The thesis also relates these civilian decisions to decisions made 
by  armed groups, and the process by which armed actors create the threat conditions 
to which civilians respond. This second contribution relates to a third: I detail using my 
own data a little known period of recent Ivorian political history  - the rise and fall of the 
Invisible Commando rebel group in Abidjan. The fourth contribution is an original 
methodology and questionnaire design for the study  of displacement decisions that can 
12
provide detailed decision information at the intra-household level. The fifth contribution 
is the use of this data to provide the first in-depth description of the process of 
displacement that highlights the importance of splitting the household to manage 
threats. The sixth contribution is an analysis of the reasons for heterogeneity  in 
displacement outcomes that contributes to the few already  conducted in the literature 
in a number of ways, including the use of a non-binary  dependent variable, a novel 
assessment of threat, and a more conceptually-informed analysis of endogeneity 
concerns. 
This introduction chapter now turns to present three of the main concepts in turn, then 
outlines a conceptual framework that draws them together. I discuss the mechanisms 
of wartime impact using this framework. Then the recent historical context of Abidjan 
that provided the setting for the data collection is summarised.  Finally, the structure of 
the thesis as a whole is presented with the underlying research questions for each 
chapter.
13
1.1 Concepts and Literature
The literature on household decision-making during wars is relatively sparse. There are 
four relevant literatures: that on crime and the threat of victimisation particularly, the 
livelihoods literature and the related protection policy  literature, the literature on risks 
and shocks, and the literature on household micro-dynamics of conflict. I address the 
relevant sections of these literatures, presenting an argument that the role of assets 
and their protection has been understudied and under-conceptualised in most attempts 
to understand mechanisms of impact of conflict to date. I then take some examples 
from a fifth relevant literature, the often politically-motivated field of terrorism research, 
to illustrate how most aspects of this framework have already  been thought through 
and researched in an area of study where ‘we’ in the West are the ones making 
decisions when faced with political violence.
I outline in this section a conceptual model of household decision-making during 
conflict in response to wartime threats. In doing so I discuss three key factors within 
that decision: assets, threat, and protection. I define those and other key  terms along 
the way, before describing a framework of how these are related to each other. In brief, 
assets are the individuals and physical assets of households that may be killed, injured 
or destroyed by  acts of violence. The threat of violence causes households to follow 
various strategies to protect themselves, which may  produce indirect threats such as 
lack of financial access to food.
Assets
There is little cross-over between the qualitative livelihoods literature and the micro-
economic literature on displacement and conflict, but these literatures deal with similar 
issues, even in similar ways. This thesis focuses on decisions made by households 
under threat and this intra-household level of analysis, perhaps more than other micro-
economic work, may  benefit from insights provided by  the livelihoods literature. While 
broadly  I follow conceptual frameworks from the micro-economic displacement choice 
literature, I borrow the conceptual framework based on assets from the sustainable 
livelihoods framework (SLF) (Chambers and Conway  1992) adapted by  Korf (2004), 
and rooted in the work of Sen (1981). The adapted SLF (Korf 2004) includes six forms 
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of assets attributable to individuals: natural, physical, human, social, political and 
financial. The additional advantages of the SLF for the purpose of understanding 
household decision-making come primarily  from the recognition of these assets and 
their value beyond their economic returns. Assumptions in economics centre around 
households maximising their financial returns to labour and other assets. While I do not 
deviate from these assumptions in the general sense, this thesis will suggest that their 
are situations during wars where the prevention of destruction of assets is an important 
factor in decision making, and such situations are less well conceptualised within 
existing economic frameworks. Economic models usually  are based on maximising 
returns to capital, which sensibly  entails establishing the source of those returns 
(human capital, or social capital). However, while the killing of an individual within the 
household destroys human, social and other capital embodied in that individual, the 
reason for protecting that individual transcends the expected future returns embodied 
in the individual. In addition, the means of protecting individuals and physical assets 
involve actions to be taken by  individuals, and issues such as mobility  which are better 
addressed according to individual assets rather than household aggregate capital.
There is further crossover between the literatures in their conception of civilian actors 
in wartime, and while the traditional SLF does not cope well with conflict settings, 
extensions to the framework, such as the inclusion of political assets, have made them 
more applicable (Kulatunga and Lakshman 2013). As Korf summarises: “The major 
strength of the [SLF] framework is that it does not perceive people as vulnerable and 
helpless victims, but as dynamic actors, who adapt...and cope with shocks...” (2004: 
277). This echoes the emergence within the mainstream analysis of conflict the 
recognition of the importance of civilian agency  in actively  managing their security 
during wars (see e.g. Kalyvas 2006). Focusing on assets enables the construction of a 
conceptual framework that, while rooted in the qualitative SLF, retains the rationalist 
approach of the micro-level displacement literature that is the main field to which this 
thesis seeks to contribute. 
I define violence as the destruction or removal of physical or human assets by armed 
groups. Looting and theft and extortion are therefore included as acts of violence. 
However, the possibility of ‘destruction’ of, for instance, social capital, as distinct from 
the individual or individuals in which it is embodied, is not included in my definition. The 
definition of violence might usefully  be extended to encompass destruction of other 
forms of SLF assets, but I focus only  on the tangible assets as embodied in individuals 
and their physical assets: so of the six types of assets in the adapted SLF my  focus will 
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be primarily  on the physical and human assets belonging to households. ‘Human 
assets’, which I shall also refer to as individuals throughout the thesis, also embody 
some part of the household’s social and political assets. Physical capital, or physical 
assets, which I shall also refer to throughout as goods, possessions or belongings, also 
includes the households’ natural and financial assets. One important type of asset not 
covered by  the SLF are protective assets. These are assets that may  be employed to 
provide protection to other assets. each individual may have the capacity  to provide 
protection from the threat to him or herself as well as to other individuals within the 
household, so not only  is threat potentially  specific to each individual or asset, but 
protection is too. I shall return to discuss these in greater detail below.
Returning to the definition, it is of course possible that violence is perpetrated by 
individuals other than those in armed groups. While I do not exclude this possibility 
here, it is not my  focus. In most situations violence by individuals would be described 
as crime rather than political violence (though of course criminal acts may also be 
conducted by  groups). Criminal actions may  be more likely  in situations of widespread 
political violence due, amongst other factors, to the frequent absence of law 
enforcement. In terms of the framework, there is little reason to think that decision-
making would be very different in response to threat of criminal violence rather than 
political violence so long as those threats were comparable, though the range of 
protection strategies open to households might also be very  be different. My  focus, 
however, is on political violence and it is this that I refer to as violence throughout 
unless specified otherwise.
The definition of violence provided highlights how an asset-centred conceptual 
framework also joins the supply  side and ‘demand side’ of violence. Violence is 
exercised by armed actors against individuals and physical assets, and the choice of 
asset to target is based on factors internal to the group and its context. All violence is 
exercised against assets (including individuals), and all  violence has an impact on the 
households or others to which that asset belonged or was part of. All violent relations 
between armed groups and civilians are mediated through actual violence or the threat 
of violence against assets.  
To summarise: assets are individuals or physical assets belonging to households (or 
businesses or communities). They  have a value to other members of the household 
rooted not just in the returns that may  be expected from them, but in emotional and 
other values, and the other forms of household capital which they embody. 
16
Threat
Violence involves the destruction of assets and killing of individuals by  armed groups, 
but this represents only  a small fraction of those impacted by  conflict (Rockmore 2011, 
Chapter 6 of this thesis). The mechanisms by  which violence impacts civilians are 
poorly understood, and little consensus has emerged on the terminology  or substance 
of the mechanisms. 
Justino (2012) reviews the micro-level conflict literature to identify  channels by  which 
conflict causes poverty. She identifies three mechanisms: reduced productive capacity 
(differentiating short-term effects such as destroyed productive assets from long-term 
effects such as lower educational attainment), markets (price shocks and labour 
markets); and institutions (social cohesion as well as local governance). In the same 
paper Justino also recognises that these effects are mediated by  the coping responses 
of civilians. An earlier paper by  the same author discusses the indirect and direct 
means by which conflict affects civilians (Justino 2009), following similar conclusions in 
Keen (2001) and Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001). Justino’s wider body of work in 
supporting understanding of impact mechanisms in the wider micro-level conflict 
literature has been influential, and it is in Justino (2009b) that these mechanisms are 
most comprehensively  outlined. In that paper, direct effects of violence on civilians are 
threefold: changes in household composition (through disease etc as well as killing), 
destruction of assets and forced displacement. I shall argue here that the framework 
outlined in that paper may  be refined and clarified through disaggregation by whether 
civilians or armed groups exercise agency  in the impact. Amongst other implications, 
this clarification will suggest that displacement, rather than being a direct effect of 
violence, is more usefully  classified as a strategy used by  civilians to avoid the impact 
of violence.
At the root of the ambiguity  in violence impact mechanisms is that there is no clear 
definition of what impact is. I start from a very  narrow definition of impact of violence, 
namely  the asset cost to the household caused by physical loss or damage to 
household assets, including individual household members. I define cost as being 
related to assets so as to avoid any  losses of returns to labour or capital being 
included. For instance, the killing of a household member represents the cost to the 
household in terms of the loss of value of that household member including the value 
of emotional connections, love, companionship  and so on as well as the loss of 
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financial and other labour returns provided by the individual. Physical assets may 
similarly  have an emotional value, albeit usually  not so significant, as well as their 
functional value. I also refer to the cost imposed on the household as an economic unit 
rather than individuals, and I discount potentially  important but complex factors such as 
physical pain, trauma, hunger and so on, for which classification as a cost or otherwise 
is not straightforward. 
Impacts may  usefully  be divided into immediate and long-term according to when the 
impact has a cost. Child stunting caused by  war-induced malnutrition is a long-term 
impact, while physical injury  is an immediate impact. The same impact may  be both 
immediate and long-term. I focus on immediate impacts here as they are both more 
relevant to the short-term context studied and, most likely, more important decision 
factors in high threat environments. It should also be noted that the cost is not 
necessarily  imposed on the household by  external actors, but the loss may be a 
constrained decision made by the household itself. For instance, the household may 
choose malnutrition rather than risk leaving the house to find food during intense 
fighting. Even when the cost is imposed externally, the household may  have some 
agency  as to which violence, where and when, by  which actor, and to which household 
assets or individuals; all this being largely  a function of the household’s agency  over 
mobility  of its constituent individuals as well as other protection strategies, to which I 
turn in the next section. Financial and other costs, then, are excluded from impact in 
framework used by  this thesis. That is not to say  they  are discounted altogether: the 
deliberate forgoing of income, for instance, is included within the range of protection 
strategies available to households, and serious market shocks are included in the 
concept of indirect threat.
This asset-centred conception of impact goes against the grain of the shocks literature 
that forms the conceptual framework for much conflict impact research. As McPeak 
(2004, 2006) suggests, asset risk is largely  unexplored in this literature, which 
concentrates on transitory  income shocks. As he argues: “While focusing exclusively 
on income shocks may be reasonable in some cases, it is not applicable to all 
contexts. Exogenous shocks such as droughts, floods, fires, disease, theft, or warfare 
threaten household well being not only  through a transitory  food availability  crisis, but 
also through the prospect that assets accumulated over many  years will be suddenly 
swept away  by  such events” (2004: 263). While we may  disagree on the extent to 
which warfare is an exogenous shock, the point is well made. Sandmo (1970) identifies 
theoretically  heterogenous impacts of capital risk and income risk on consumption and 
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savings; there is reason then to think that not only  will asset shocks and income shocks 
have different ex post effects, but that the ex ante response will also differ. Rather than 
taking income shocks as the starting point, this thesis will help to describe the process 
of production of wartime income shocks, and argue that this process is largely rooted in 
civilian response the threat of asset shocks. Indeed, part of the reason conflict is often 
considered a shock, rather than a process, may be due to the difficulty  in capturing the 
process dynamics in survey research (Brück et al. 2010: 12-13) rather than solid 
conceptual foundation.
Violent acts represent the imposition of impact by external actors. But, as discussed 
above, this is not usually  the main cause of impact during war. Households react to the 
probability of violence, and the impact (or expected asset cost) of that violence, which I 
shall term direct threat. Risk is a term often used in the literature regarding the 
probability  of hazardous events, and this has moved over to the micro-economics of 
conflict (see, e.g. Verpoorten 2009, Rockmore 2011), but I prefer threat for three 
reasons. First, violence is deliberately  produced by  armed actors often in cooperation 
with civilians. So there is agency in the production of violence that is absent in the 
conception of risk of other hazards: as Justino (2012: 10) argues, “...violent conflicts 
such as civil wars are distinguished from other shocks by their deliberately  destructive 
nature...” Second, armed actors can use threat, as well as violence, instrumentally. 
(See, e.g. Kalyvas 2006, and Chapter 3 for more discussion.) Threat may  be produced 
by  armed actors in two ways: through information conveyed by  acts of violence 
themselves, or through verbal or other non-violent communications of the prospect of 
violence. Third, direct threat relates not just to civilian perceptions but also to the armed 
actors’ decisions, so on the supply  side of violence to refer to its prospect as ‘risk’ is 
problematic in the same way  that it is problematic to refer to a person’s own ‘risk’ of 
jumping off a cliff. This is echoed in discussion in the terrorism literature. Brown and 
Cox (2011) suggest that modelling terrorism risk with probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) is problematic. They  argue there is no proof that, as some have suggested: 
‘...the same type of conditional probability  assessment applies as well to terrorism risk 
analysis as to [PRA] of natural hazards and engineered systems” (2011: 196)1. One 
reason they  give is that there is information used by  the attacker to decide how to 
allocate violence, and that information is unknown to the potential victim. For these 
three reasons, as I discuss both the armed actor and civilian sides, I prefer threat to 
risk. 
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1 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage with the very wide literature on probability and 
decision theory that this discussion might merit. Here I simply want to specify some of the 
difficulties of using risk with respect to political violence.
I have said that I refer to civilian side and armed actor sides of threat. These I refer to 
as perceived and objective threat respectively. The objective threat is produced by the 
armed group on the basis of its targeting criteria, targeting capacity  and propensity  for 
violence.  I detail these in Chapter Three but essentially  these are which group  or class 
of assets is targeted for violence, the ability  of the armed group to exercise violence 
against that class of assets, and the net benefits of using violence as opposed to other 
strategies to achieve their objectives. Of course the three are closely intertwined and 
may frequently  be co-dependent. For instance, targeting criteria for which houses to 
loot may  be broadened if the benefits of looting are found to be substantial. These 
three components of direct threat are essentially  military  factors that function within the 
broader spectrum of organisational capacity  and territorial contestation that shape 
behaviour of armed actors. The literature on armed groups use of violence generally 
focuses on these broader issues of capacity  (Weinstein 2006) and contestation 
(Kalyvas 2006) but is selective in their underlying rationale of violence and the 
mechanisms by  which these are translated into threats to civilians. Focusing on the 
military mediating factors enables a broader view that incorporates the various 
rationales underlying the objective threat. The objective threat pertains to a targeting 
criteria-defined class of assets in a given location at a given time. 
Civilian-side, or perceived threat, is the civilians’ understanding of this objective threat 
to their particular household members and physical assets. The threat is specific to 
each physical asset and individual - targeting may well differentiate within the 
household. For example certain high value assets may be sought for looting by  armed 
groups while others are left, or only  young men of fighting age may  be assaulted. The 
perceived threat is based on the information available to the household regarding the 
objective threat, and the uncertainty they  have about about that information. So 
perceived threat may be expressed formulaically as:
(1)
Here V refers to violence, and I refers to impact, or asset cost as discussed previously. 
The probability  is the perceived probability, so is based on the available information 
and includes uncertainty. This direct threat, like risk, cannot have an impact on the 
household’s members or assets, so is somewhat ephemeral. The only  possible 
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consequence of direct threat is behaviour change. But this behaviour change, on the 
part of the household itself or on the part of other households, may  result in another 
form of threat of loss or damage to the household and its assets. For individuals, the 
threat of loss stems from the possibility  of death from starvation, dehydration, disease 
or other illness. Malnutrition and disease (and arguably lack of education etc) may 
result in long-term damage to individuals, especially  children. In the longer term, 
physical assets such as buildings, cars and so on may  degrade because of problems 
maintaining them during the war, while cattle and other livestock suffer the same short-
term issues as humans. This distinct form of threat stems from the lack of access and 
availability of goods and services. 
This second form of threat I refer to as indirect threat, which is the prospect of 
household asset costs incurred though lack of access to or availability of essential 
goods and services. Indirect threat, unlike direct threat, may have impacts. This is 
because direct threat is rooted in external agency, while indirect threats are based on 
the households’ own agency  amidst the structural constraints they  face. For a 
household, direct threats may or may not be perpetrated, while indirect threats will 
inevitably cause impact if not addressed. To take an example, if food is not available in 
a given location this will inevitably lead to starvation and it is for the household to 
decide whether to leave to try  to find food. If a household member is injured and they 
have no money  to pay for treatment, it is for the household to decide whether to risk 
finding work in a dangerous environment in order to pay  for the treatment. Of course 
there are very  serious structural constraints in both these cases, but, assuming the 
required goods and services are available somewhere, it is for the household to decide 
how they are impacted by indirect threat.
Protection Strategies
Humans, like other animals, instinctively  protect themselves from danger: an instinct 
that has been subject of analysis in fields including psycho analysis (for example, 
Khantzian and Mack 1983). People also protect others especially  family  members. 
Solomon and George (1996) suggests there is a ‘caregiving behavioural system’ that 
evolves in humans during childhood and adolescence, before being completed through 
interaction with the child such that: “situations of danger...should activate the caregiving 
behavioural system”. In the social sciences, and international development-related 
literatures particularly, much of the academic literature is related to policy  interest in the 
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rather vague concept of humanitarian protection in emergencies, though with the 
emerging understanding that the first protectors of civilians are civilians themselves 
(Bonwick 2006).
Frameworks for understanding the range of strategies, including protection, adopted by 
at-risk populations agree that they  may  be short term or long term (Kulatunga and 
Lakshman 2013, Korf 2004). Long term strategies are also referred to as ‘adaptive’ 
strategies, while the short term strategies are also known as coping strategies, 
especially  in the environmental hazards literature. Often, wartime strategies are framed 
as coping strategies (for example Verpoorten 2009), mirroring peacetime research on 
consumption smoothing following income shocks. But Jaspars, et al. (2007) suggest 
that those short term strategies employed in response specifically  to violence may be 
referred to as protection strategies. But this definition is, I think, lacking specificity. The 
contextual cause of behaviour is irrelevant conceptually, and the distinction may  be 
made more robustly  in the nature of the activity: where responses are to protect assets 
from loss or damage, these are protection strategies; where responses are to secure 
income, these are coping strategies. The economics literature on insecurity  of property 
rights makes a similar distinction, with ‘guard labour’ being a distinct option from 
productive labour (Besley and Ghatak 2008), albeit in contexts where the labour 
resources are not themselves subject to threat.
Of course there is some cross-over: at some level of poverty, the need to secure 
income may be necessary  to avoid starvation and in this sense, coping strategies may 
also be protection strategies when income is required to protect assets. Jaspars et al. 
(2007) consider economic subsistence strategies as distinct from protection strategies, 
and in doing so follow Vincent and Sorenson (2001). Korf (2004) similarly  differentiates 
between managing personal risk and managing ‘household economics’, but within the 
managing personal risk includes taking risks for economic survival. This latter includes 
examples such as collecting firewood, and trespassing in restricted marine areas in 
order to catch fish. The conception of protection strategies used in this thesis follows 
Korf’s example in that it includes accessing essential goods and services as a 
protection strategy. But there is a need, reflected in the various frameworks, to 
differentiate protection strategies from other ‘livelihood’ strategies that predominate in 
the absence of threat. Of course this definition becomes very  broad, given the 
prevalence of global food insecurity  amongst the poor. So I consider seeking income to 
be a protection strategy  only where, as well as there being the need for income to 
avoid asset loss, there are significant risks associated with the process of generating 
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income. This could be performing dangerous work, such as prostitution or working for 
an armed group, or it could be working in an insecure environment where commuting 
or working outside increases threat exposure. 
Protection is not unique to conflict situations and to threat. Moving cattle away from a 
volcanic eruption, watching over sheep on a hillside, installing a burglar alarm or fire 
alarm in the home, supervising children in a playground: all these are protection 
activities, although the latter two move away  from the contexts we usually  expect. I do 
so in order to illustrate a point: it is not clear in Kulatunga and Lakshman’s (2013) 
summary  what an ‘at risk population’ is. There are undoubted threats to children 
playing unsupervised, albeit at a low probability, so in some sense they are a 
population at risk. We might differentiate in a general sense between everyday 
protection activities in low risk environments, and protection strategies in higher risk 
environments, when more thought goes into ensuring protection. But the important 
point for this analysis is the stage at which asset protection predominates decision-
making. The easiest way  to do this is again through observation of behavioural 
response. When protection of assets from direct threat is prioritised over generating 
income, this represents a profound shift in decision-making and behaviour. This 
condition, which I shall refer to as the ‘asset protection assumption’, occurs in 
situations characterised by  high levels of threat, and may  be very short-term. Moving 
cattle away  from the volcano, to return to the previous example, may disrupt generating 
returns from those cattle. If so, the asset protection assumption holds while protection 
activities are prioritised over income generating activities. Moving cattle seasonally  to 
ensure they  can be fed also protects the assets, this time from indirect threat. But to do 
so does not disrupt income, rather it avoids income being diminished over time as poor 
quality  food leads to reduced cattle output. In this latter case, although the protection of 
assets is part of the decision, the asset protection assumption does not hold because 
the threat is indirect. 
So the asset protection assumption holds when protecting assets from direct threat is 
prioritised over seeking income, the latter being either on a day  to day basis or part of a 
set of coping strategies. Protecting assets from indirect threat is usually  a corollary  of 
securing income, as in the example provided, while protecting assets from direct threat 
is more likely  to involve income trade-offs. As we may assume people are utility 
maximising, those who seek income will be doing on a day-to-day  basis those activities 
that meet these needs. Direct threat represents a change to these conditions, and 
protection and coping strategies will be different. Protection from indirect threat, 
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however, will generally  involve protection and coping strategies being aligned. This 
may be illustrated with further examples. Fleeing from an area where markets have 
collapsed, work is scarce and food is unavailable is clearly  protecting the individuals in 
the household from starvation but would also be the expected coping response. If the 
labour market has collapsed and a household is threatened with starvation due to their 
lack of financial access to food that is available, then leaving the area in search of work 
is both a protection strategy and a coping strategy. If the food market has collapsed 
and is unavailable, the household will have to leave to find food even though they 
might still anticipate that their labour returns would be better in situ due to existing 
networks. The latter may  also be true of spikes in food prices. Here then the 
differentiating factor is the necessarily  short-term perspective of protection strategies, 
which in some cases runs contrary  to the longer-term priorities of coping strategies. 
Perhaps the most detailed assessment of protection strategies is in Kulatunga and 
Lakshman (2013). They  find evidence in Sri Lanka supporting their suggestion that 
livelihood and coping strategies are intertwined, and that threat factors impact on both.
Because threat is different from risk, the way  of responding to it is different. Justino 
(2012: 11) suggests that the deliberate destruction of livelihood assets frequently 
observed may  make coping with wars particularly  difficult. And indeed that is true for 
coping strategies, but for protection strategies the nature of threat presents an 
opportunity  that does not exist with exogenous shocks. Bonwick (2006) defines 
protection strategies as comprising avoidance, containment, and confrontation 
strategies. I also follow this same framework of three broad strategic options for 
protection, with some modifications, when I come to classify  and illustrate protection 
strategies in Chapter Four. This represents something of a departure from much of the 
literature on civil wars, which has tended to compartmentalise various strategies, with 
the literature on mobilisation, for example, being generally  quite distinct and using 
different conceptual frameworks than the literature on displacement. For now, I define 
protection strategies as short-term actions taken by civilians in order to mitigate threats 
of violence or indirect threats. 
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework diagram: impact mechanisms of violence
The diagram represents how actions of armed groups impact civilians, with impact 
defined as a cost to the asset portfolio2. Coping strategies are not in the model 
because of the asset protection assumption. The diagram should be read with respect 
to the time period t0 being the action of an armed group on the left hand side. while the 
effects and actions on the civilian actor side incorporate all subsequent time periods. 
For this reason the armed actor’s action cannot be affected by civilian actions or asset 
effects3. Also not reflected is the possibility  of civilian actors becoming armed actors 
and visa versa, which I address in Chapter 4. Further, armed actors are restricted to 
violent and threatening actions rather than public good provision or other activities in 
which they may be engaged.
1. Violent  actions have an impact  on an asset. The violent action destroys or 
removes an asset from the household or business, including the killing or injury  of 
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2 Non-asset costs (i.e. income losses) are included within the protection actions only where 
these costs are incurred to serve a protective function.
3 Of course this diagram does not intend to preclude the possibility that violence is allocated 
according to protection actions or perceived threat. Indeed, it is very likely that violence is 
allocated in this way. But for simplicity, the diagram only deals with the (asset) consequences of 
violence, not the allocation of violence. For this reason, the diagram does not represent the 
interaction between armed actors and civilians with respect to direct threat that represents one 
of the key themes of the thesis.
household members4. 
2. Violent  actions also affect  the direct threat: Violent actions communicate 
information about the direct threat to other assets than the one destroyed or 
removed. From this information, civilians may  re-evaluate direct threat to other 
assets, either up or down. The effect described here is that on the perceived 
(civilian-side) threat, not the objective (armed actor side) threat. As with impact, the 
effect is one-way: changes in direct threat do not have an impact on violent actions 
because the direct threat is defined with respect to civilian assets. 
3. Non-violent  actions also affect  direct  threat: non-violent actions may be used as 
a less costly  means of generating direct threat, where generating such threat is the 
objective of violence. 
4. Protection actions and direct  threat:  (a) Protection actions are taken in order to 
reduce direct threat to a particular asset (b) however protection actions may expose 
(the same or other) household assets to (the same or other) direct threat. 
5. Protection actions and indirect  threat: (a) Protection actions are taken in order to 
reduce indirect threat to a particular asset (b) however protection actions may 
expose (the same or other) household assets to (the same or other) indirect threat.
6. Protection actions and impact: (a) protection actions lead to impact on the asset 
portfolio of households through the exchange of household assets for reduction of 
threat, forced sale of assets to reduce indirect threat. (b) where assets had a 
protective function either against direct or indirect threat, their destruction changes 
the protection actions available to the household.
7. Impact  and indirect  threat: (a) indirect threat leads to impact through loss of or 
damage to household physical assets and members due to inability  to access 
essential goods and services, which may  result in whole or in part from the lack of 
availability  thereof (b) indirect threat also follows from impact in that in that 
destruction or damage to assets may  directly  affect indirect threat without mediation 
through a change in protection actions. Included in this are destruction of essential 
goods and services, whether those be subsistence assets belonging to the 
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4 Arguably the perpetration of violence may change the perpetrator’s choices regarding future 
violence, but I refer here to an individual violent action.
household or elements of the supply  chain or service providers. Killing local medical 
workers, destroying crops, looting food aid convoys and so on are all examples of 
such actions.  
The strength of the diagram is in highlighting the role of civilian agency  in the 
production of direct threat, indirect threat and impact. This helps to distinguish the 
channels by  which acts of wartime violence result in impact. I now summarise the 
mechanisms by  which violence affects impact according to this framework, then 
describe how three of the papers in the literature approach these channels or 
mechanisms. 
Mechanisms
Having outlined the framework of mechanisms I shall be working with, it is easier to 
identify  the state of existing knowledge regarding these mechanisms. There should be 
three types of impact on individuals and other household assets. First, the violent 
actions of armed groups against the assets of the household. Second, the sale or 
exchange of household assets as part of a protection strategy. And third, the impact of 
lack of access and availability  of essential goods and services. In this latter category, 
the major impacts during wars are malnutrition and disease, caused by lack of access 
to food, clean water, adequate shelter, sanitary  living conditions and medical services. 
Often these follow  from the initial protection strategy of displacement, but the important 
emphasis provided by  this framework is that these are in all cases either mediated by 
civilian decisions (protection strategies - relationship 5b) or follow from impact 
(relationship 7b). In the case of protection strategies these may  be the decisions of the 
household itself, or the decisions of other households and businesses that culminate in 
market-level effects. So how have these channels or mechanisms been represented in 
the literature to date? To answer this in part I now describe three key  papers on impact 
mechanisms.
Minoiu and Shemyakina (2014) test empirically  the mitigating impact of various 
mechanisms on height for age scores during the first Ivorian Civil War. They  test four 
links, creating indices for: displacement; economic losses (assets or revenue); health 
impairment; and violence against household members. The outcome of height for age 
scores is a long-term impact, caused by  malnutrition attributable to either access or 
availability  of food. So the test is of the determinants of impact attributable to access 
and availability, and the four mechanisms tested all were found to negatively  effect 
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height for age scores. Unsurprisingly, they  also find very high correlation between the 
various mechanism indices. It might be interesting to reframe the indices according to 
the mechanisms outlined in this chapter; to do so could provide more detail on the 
distinct channels. Economic losses, for instance, are impacts (assets) and protection 
costs (revenues) imposed by armed actors, markets and the household’s own 
decisions. Displacement is a protection strategy that may  have benefits as well as 
costs. 
Verpoorten (2009) finds that cattle in Rwanda, often used as a buffer stock for coping 
with shocks, were seemingly  used much more than usual as a protection strategy 
during the genocide (if buffer stock sales are not to avoid threat, they are not protection 
strategies). In 1994, 44% of cattle sales were to fund food purchases, quadruple the 
peacetime rate. That year alone, 50%  of the cattle were sold, even though the prices 
were very low  and food prices very  high, reducing the efficiency  of the strategy. 
However, Tutsi households did not sell livestock, even though they  faced higher threat 
and greater war-related shocks. The author argues this is due to the lack of safety - 
either it was too insecure for these households to sell cattle, or their cattle was in any 
case looted. This highlights the role of variation in threat in shaping the strategic 
options of households during wars. 
Finally, Brück and Schindler (2009) describe mechanisms by  which conflict affects 
inputs for household farm production. They propose four ways in which these 
mechanisms may  operate, conflict impact on labour endowments, land endowments, 
capital and production technology, listing distinct mechanisms under each. I take the 
example of capital, for which they specify  four means by  which war may have an 
impact: through (i) looting, pillage, and destruction of capital assets due to absence of 
property  rights enforcement; (ii) capital flight to protect capital; (iii) reduced investment 
due to insecurity; and (iv) reduced efficiency of production due to input market failure 
and interruption of (veterinary  and other) service provision. These correspond broadly 
to the framework outlined5, but include both short-run and long-run impacts, asset 
impacts and revenue impacts, and protection and coping strategies, including some, 
such as capital flight, that do not lead to any asset impact. 
These examples serve to highlight the overlap of coping strategies and protection 
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5 (i) looting etc is clearly violent actions and impact, (ii) capital flight is a protection strategy, that 
does not lead to impact as no assets are lost, (iii) reduced investment is again a protection 
strategy but may be classified as a long run impact, and (iv) inefficient production is reduced 
returns
strategies in the small existing literature that engages directly  with ‘channels’ or 
mechanisms. To look at asset impacts, especially short-run impacts, rather than more 
broadly  defined ‘impacts’ that may  include revenue, consumption and long-term 
investment, enables greater clarity  to be drawn on the mechanisms by  which these 
asset impacts are caused. That is not to say that revenue impacts are unimportant - of 
course in calculating the costs of conflict these must be included - but in understanding 
the mechanisms for the purpose of analysing decision-making I shall argue that the 
narrow focus on asset impacts is beneficial. At the very  least, it helps to build some 
conceptual clarity  in one aspect of wartime impact that may  be improved upon in 
future. I am hopeful, though, that by disaggregating coping and protection strategies 
important aspects of civilian wartime decision-making may  be unveiled. Which is true 
depends rather on two inter-related factors: the extent to which the ‘asset protection 
assumption’ holds, and the timeframes involved.  
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1.2 Context and Armed Groups
For much of its post-independence history, Côte d’Ivoire was one of the economic 
success stories of Africa. In the 1970s and 80s with relatively  effective governance and 
booming exports of cocoa and coffee, Côte d’Ivoire attracted large scale immigration 
from other countries in the region, encouraged by  the state in order to supply  the 
labour required to work in agriculture. But in the 1990s the economy began to stagnate, 
causing inter-ethnic tensions to emerge that were exploited by  a new generation of 
political leaders emerging to take over when the 33 year rule of Houphouët-Boigny 
came to an end.
The first Ivorian Civil War started in 2002 when troops in the north of the country 
mutinied on 19 September. The failure of the rebel forces to secure Abidjan led to a 
stalemate in which the north of the country  was run by  the rebels while the south 
remained under the authority  of the state run by  President Laurent Gbagbo. Long-
delayed elections to end the impasse were eventually  held in the autumn of 2010 and 
were supposed to reunite the country. But when the close-run second round in October 
2010 confirmed Alassane Ouattara as President (ICG March 2011), Gbagbo disputed 
the outcome and refused to leave his post. There followed several months of tension, 
with escalating violence especially  in the West of Côte d’Ivoire as the rebel army 
moved down from the north towards the capital, the national army  (FDS - Forces de 
défense et de sécurité) divided with many supporting Gbagbo, and pro-Gbabgo youth 
militias mobilised in Abidjan. A French-led UN force patrolled the capital and defended 
Ouattara but had no mandate to intervene effectively  until UN Resolution 1975 was 
passed at the end of March 2011. 
Amidst this tense stand-off, in December 2010 a shadowy  Abidjan-based rebel group 
began fighting against Gbagbo. Known as the Invisible Commandos (IC), they  fought a 
guerrilla campaign from PK18, a remote suburb in the north of Abidjan. Before 
describing the Commandos and PK18, I outline briefly  the other main armed actors. 
The Forces Nouvelles (FN) were the rebel army  that had controlled the north of the 
country  for the last decade. They were led by  Guillaume Soro, the Prime Minister and 
an ally  of Ouattara. On 18 March 2011 they were merged into a new army, the Forces 
Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) alongside parts of the FDS that had defected to 
Ouattara’s side. The FN formed the majority  of the new FRCI, and the new force, like 
the FN, suffered from a weak decentralised command structure (ICG August 2011). For 
simplicity  I refer to Ouattara’s military support during the crisis as being the FRCI 
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throughout the thesis. Also on the side of the FRCI were the French, and French-led 
UN forces in Côte d’Ivoire although they played little offensive military role until the very 
end of the Crisis.
Unless otherwise stated, FDS in this thesis refers to the majority  within the FDS that 
stayed loyal to Gbagbo while parts of the state army  splintered to support Ouattara. 
The FDS operated from several bases across Abidjan, including ‘Camp Commando’ in 
Abobo. Also on Gbagbo’s side were CECOS, a special security  command police force, 
some number of Liberian mercenaries, and the Jeunes Patriotes (young patriots) youth 
militia. These young patriots, primarily  southern Christian male youths strongly 
supportive of Gbagbo, were mobilised by  their leader, Gbagbo ally  Charles Blé Goudé, 
and were eventually  armed by  the Gbagbo side to help shore up the forces attempting 
to keep him in power. 
Somewhere between these two coalitions were the Invisible Commandos. Fighting like 
the FRCI to oust Gbagbo, they were led by  a long-standing rival of FRCI leader Soro. 
They  came seemingly  from nowhere to become one of the most effective fighting 
forces in Abidjan during the early  days of the crisis, and they  took control of PK18 by 
early  March, declaring it the ‘Autonomous Republic of PK18’ (Daily  Telegraph 2011), 
before disappearing just as quickly. In this introduction I give an overview of PK18 and 
the Commandos, including the decisive Battle of Black Saturday  around which this 
thesis is centred. The Commandos’ relationships with the civilian population I leave to 
Chapter 3, and their emergence, recruitment and sudden demise I leave to Chapter 4. 
Little of the story of the Commandos is widely  known or published in academic 
literature, so detailed research was required to build the contextual understanding 
required for analysis of civilian decision-making.
The Invisible Commandos
Following a failed attempt on the life of Prime Minister Guillaume Soro in 2007, and the 
‘Christmas in Abidjan’ coup plot later that year, a small group of former rebel soldiers 
were exiled to Benin. They  were a group close to Ibrahim (commonly referred to as 'IB') 
Coulibaly, who had many years before been a bodyguard for Alassanne Ouattara while 
he served as Prime Minister. IB had risen rapidly  from bodyguard to a position of 
influence thanks in part to his involvement in the 1999 coup d'etat. However his 
involvement in later coup attempts was much less successful. He directed military 
31
operations in the attempted coup of 2002 which failed, and led to the division of Côte 
d’Ivoire with the rebels controlling the north of the country. IB was absent as they  took 
control, and in the power vacuum Guillaume Soro took control of the north and unified 
the rebel forces. Clashes between IB's men and Soro's in 2004 in the northern rebel 
capital of Bouake led to a permanent rift between the two that left IB in political exile. In 
2008 IB was tried and convicted in absentia in France and he was served with an 
international arrest warrant. But two years later preparations began for another attempt 
to regain political power. According to one of the ex-combatants I interviewed in 
Abidjan, this core group returned from exile in 2009 under IB's instruction in order to 
plot to overthrow Laurent Gbagbo following the 2010 elections – whatever the result. 
Some of the group based themselves initially  in Bingerville, close to Abidjan on its 
eastern side but they settled eventually in PK18 at the start of the Crisis.
One civilian account of why  the IC  attained that name, heavily  influenced by the mystic 
beliefs prevalent amongst many in Côte d’Ivoire, told how several Commandos, led by 
IB, showed themselves to Gbagbo-loyalist forces in order to encourage an armoured 
vehicle to pursue them. Once the Commandos had been cornered in a cul-de-sac, they 
used mystic powers to disappear and reappear behind the armoured vehicle, trapping 
it and permitting it to be destroyed. Other accounts focus less on overtly  mystic 
explanations and more on how  their local knowledge and effective use of guerrilla 
tactics made them 'invisible' to the extent that they were very difficult to find and attack.
There were about 12 loosely organised collectives across Abobo referred to as the 
Invisible Commandos (Ben Rassoul 2012). The main faction, that discussed in this 
chapter, was based in PK18. They  were led by  Inza Karamoko, also known as 
‘Commander Fongnon’ (meaning ‘wind’ in Dioula), and also known as ‘Colonel Bauer’, 
from the television series ‘24’, who was previously  a Com’zone Commander of 
Dabakala, east of the rebel capital Bouaké (Ben Rassoul 2012). He was the military 
commander of the Invisible Commandos, and appeared in press interviews prior to IB 
joining his forces in Abidjan.
PK18 
PK18 (Point Kilometre 18, reflecting its distance from a location in central Abidjan), is 
one of several unusually-named quartiers of the northern Abidjan suburb of Abobo. 
Abobo is a sprawling working class suburb, home to 1.5 million of Abidjan’s 6.4 million 
inhabitants, many  of whom are immigrants or Northerners. Abobo contains major 
transport hubs of Abidjan, including its train station which connects to the north of the 
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country  and Burkina Faso, where much of the immigrant population is from. Abobo 
forms much of the northern part of Abidjan and as it is located north and east of the 
Banco Forest it is relatively isolated from the rest of Abidjan. The most remote part of 
Abobo is PK18. The satellite image below shows PK18 outlined in white, through 
Abobo and north of the large expanse of Banco National Forest.
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Figure 1.2: Satellite image showing PK18 outlined in white north of Banco 
National Forest.
The image shows the remoteness of PK18 from the centre of Abidjan, the central 
business district of Plateau by  the lagoon. The Presidential Palace is in Plateau, south 
of the UNOCI base, but Gbagbo’s residence was east along the lagoon. A few miles 
further east is the Golf Hotel, where Ouattara’s camp set up during the Crisis.
Abobo was, during the crisis, considered a pro-Ouattara stronghold. Certainly  it was 
home to many  ethnic northerners and immigrants viewed as Ouattara supporters, and 
was, overall, supportive of Ouattara in the 2010 elections. But Abobo cannot be viewed 
simplistically  as being in opposition to Gbagbo; it had also previously  elected Simone 
Gbagbo – the wife of Ouattara's rival – to office and the loyalties of the population there 
were far from being unanimous. Still, it was an attractive location for an armed group 
opposed to Gbagbo because, apart from the presence of potentially-sympathetic 
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ethnicities in the local population, there were, more importantly, a significant number of 
ex-members of northern rebels living in that area of Abidjan. As a result of having 
associates who had been resident and working in PK18 for years, many  as taxi drivers, 
the Invisible Commandos had a level of pre-existing knowledge of who in the 
community  was sympathetic to or working for the Gbagbo regime. The presence of ex-
soldiers also meant there was a pool of potential recruits with previous experience of 
handling weapons and social contacts in the rebel forces. The imported local 
knowledge enabled the Commandos effectively  to combine the military  effectiveness of 
trained soldiers with local knowledge to target policemen and other members of the 
state apparatus to build up their weapons supply in the early days of their operations.
Many Abobo residents consider their quartier to be different to the rest of Abidjan; that it 
is in some way less part of of the state. The Mairie has limited influence and there are 
frequent demonstrations and resistance to state authority. Perhaps in order to 
compensate for this, state institutions have been built in Abobo, including Camp 
Commando – a military  base – and Cite de Police – a modern, luxurious and 
tarmacked housing development in built amongst the mud and shanty  housing of PK18 
to house police officers. The MACA prison is also not far away  on the southern fringes. 
Despite these measures, the relative weakness of state institutions in Abobo generally 
and PK18 in particular may  have had some role in attracting the Commandos to the 
area.
The physical characteristics of PK18 mirror the independent character of its population. 
Abobo sits on the northern and eastern fringes of the Banco National Forest, which 
forms a natural barrier between the area and central Abidjan. PK18 is particularly 
remote and its haphazard network of narrow mud tracks makes it difficult to navigate. 
While two roads run through it – one from Abobo to Anyama, and the other up the 
western side of Banco up to the north, these roads were not connected to each other 
with tarmac until after the crisis, so progress into the interior of PK18 was difficult. The 
satellite image shows how, while it is urban and part of the capital, immediately  north 
and west from PK18 is rural. 
Despite its isolation, as the main aim of the Invisible Commandos was to oust Gbagbo, 
the importance of the location of PK18 was also its proximity  to central Abidjan and 
Gbagbo’s forces. Troops stationed in the capital would be influential because of their 
potential to engage government troops and attack key state apparatus, without actually 
posing a large threat basing themselves anywhere that entails control of such 
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apparatus. So PK18 was far enough away  from the opposition forces and the key 
strategic assets to make attaining control realistic, but sufficiently  close for rebel 
control, once established, to provide a base from which to present a real threat to 
Gbagbo’s control of the capital.
Black Saturday (Samedi Noir)
Central to this thesis are the events of the week running up to the Battle of Black 
Saturday. This was an intense fight between Gbagbo loyalist troops (CECOS and FDS) 
and the Invisible Commandos. The main sequence of events is presented in the table 
below and then described.
Monday 21 Tuesday 22 Wednesday 
23
Thursday 
24
Friday 25 Black 
Saturday
Sunday 27
No fighting Ambush of 
CECOS 
forces. 
Shelling & 
Fighting
Shelling & 
Fighting
Shelling & 
Fighting
No fighting Ground 
incursion 
and shelling
Fighting 
moves 
away from 
PK18
Figure 1.3: PK18 Main conflict events in late February 2011
The map below  shows some key  locations in this early episode of fighting in what 
became known as the Battle for Abidjan. The IC had set up their main military  base 
under General Bauer at a very small hotel not far from the N'Dotre junction to the west 
of PK18. It was a little west of a school that later became their training facility  for new 
recruits. The road running east-west through the centre of PK18 was, at the time, not 
tarmaced and this made it difficult terrain for armed vehicles to enter. Checkpoints and 
other barriers that began on the small side streets of PK18 were quickly  established on 
this main road, particularly  at Pharmacie Safi midway between N'Dotre and Agripac. 
The zone of influence around Pharmacie Safi was relatively  uncontested, but the area 
closer to their main base at N'Dotre was very  heavily  shelled in the week running up to 
Black Saturday, with Gbagbo's tanks firing from the road that runs north to N'Dotre from 
the Western edge of the Banco Forest. The main access road on the eastern edge of 
PK18 had always had a government forces checkpoint at Agripac, the junction between 
the cross road and the main Abobo-Anyama road. 
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Banco Forest
Anakoua 
Kouté
AgripacSafiN’Dotre Diallio
Cité  de 
Police
Unicafé
Training 
Camp
Figure 1.4: Satellite image showing PK18 and surrounds [approx. area outlined in 
white in Figure 1.2], including major checkpoints and other important locations.
Agripac checkpoint formed a centre for Gbagbo's influence in PK18, but the FDS rarely 
moved past this point. Even during the massive incursion of Black Saturday, the 
considerable force sent to defeat the IC apparently  did not dare to move far past the 
Agripac checkpoint:
The Wednesday6 before that Saturday, we had killed an army officer in 
combat, and the Saturday, it was like a revenge that the FDS were coming to 
take. They were heavily armed (22 tanks and nearly 3000 men) and led an 
assault on PK18. They succeeded in pushing us back and we had to desert 
the checkpoints that we had. We retreated as far as Unicafe. The FDS 
stopped their assault at Agripac, and they did not progress any further. But 
still they fired shells towards our position. We had to call on the old men with 
mystic power to help us out of the situation. There were five mystics there. 
Their actions made the shells stop exploding when they landed. That helped 
us a lot. And we began to plan ambushes against the FDS to the point that 
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6 Media reports suggest this ambush occurred on the Tuesday. The testimony from this 
combatant also suggested Black Saturday was a week later than it eventually transpired to have 
been. This demonstrates some of the challenges of this ‘nano-level’ research in intense conflicts 
with relatively weak media coverage and human rights monitoring. (Of course these might also 
be considered relatively strong depending on the frame of reference).
they were forced to retreat back to Abobo centre. That was how we regained 
our checkpoints and retook the ground.
Senior ex-combatant
The account reflects the deep belief in mysticism held by  many  in the Commandos as 
well as their opponents and the civilian population. Once the battle turned late on Black 
Saturday, the IC took advantage of weapons caches south of the Agripac checkpoint to 
rapidly  turn the battle against the government forces and push them much further east 
towards the centre of Abobo.
So exactly  what happened on Black Saturday is not entirely clear, but it does seem that 
despite a concerted effort to remove the Invisible Commandos through a ground and 
artillery  offensive, the IC came out ultimately  victorious and from that period controlled 
PK18 unchallenged, with the FDS being pushed back to the area in and around Camp 
Commando in the centre of Abobo. 'Samedi Noir' was well known by  the residents of 
PK18 and Abobo, but did not seem widely  known in other areas of Abidjan and, despite 
it being a key  turning point in the Battle for Abidjan, was not widely  reported in the 
media as a conflict event. Nevertheless, media documentation of clashes and mass 
outflows of civilians on the Saturday and Sunday  are evident, and the events 
triangulate with the testimony  of an Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) representative 
working in Abobo and with interviews with civilians in PK18. On 28 February, MSF set 
up their Abobo hospital. MSF could not access PK18 because of intense fighting there 
at the time, and on the 28th February they  started receiving wounded individuals from 
that area. That day  115 patients were received, some with bullet wounds (45%  of the 
115), and shrapnel or knife wounds (MSF pers. comm. 2012).
So through this battle of Black Saturday, the IC emphasised their control over the 
centre of PK18 and pushed the FDS further away from the periphery. They gained 
control of the key  checkpoints on arterial roads at Agripac and N'Dotre so were better 
able to prevent the FDS from firing shells at the population.
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1.3 Structure
The thesis addresses the questions raised in the introduction in four empirical 
chapters, following on from the next, second, chapter which describes the methodology 
used. Briefly, Chapter 3 outlines the range of actions of armed groups, while the 
Chapter 4 outlines the range of actions of civilians. Chapter 5 describes the protection 
action of displacement specifically  and in isolation, before the Chapter 6 analyses the 
causes of displacement. Chapter 7 concludes. I now outline in more detail the structure 
of the empirical chapters.
Chapter 3 focuses on the actions of armed actors: both violent and non-violent actions. 
The chapter analyses the context in which these actions took place, and seeks to 
examine the rationale for the use of violence, and the process of production of threat. 
The fourth chapter examines the actions of civilians. There is some cross-over between 
civilian and armed group actions, in that one protective action of civilians is to become 
armed actors. I deal with this issue in Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 describes the 
interrelationships in PK18 between protection actions and direct and indirect threat, 
and the way protection actions may produce impact on the household.
Chapters 5 and 6 then move on to quantitative analysis of the determinants of choice 
of protection actions. Chapter 5 focuses on the protection action of displacement, so 
looks within the conceptual framework’s ‘blue box’ of protection actions to describe in 
detail one action without analysing the external relationships or relationships between 
boxes. The process of decision-making in displacement is analysed conceptually  and 
then empirically. Several aspects of PK18 displacement decisions are described, 
including intra-household decision-making. Displacement is found to be non-binary  at 
the intra-household level. The argument is made that at least four displacement 
outcomes may  usefully  be categorised, and that displacement process as well as 
outcomes are important. The nature of households in these categories are then 
described, with particular focus on two socio-economic variables: the asset index and 
education. Education varies little across the categories, but in this descriptive analysis 
the asset index appears to be positively  associated with the displacement process of 
splitting that leads to staged or partial displacement. 
Chapter 5 is about the patterns of displacement in PK18, including intra-household 
patterns, whereas Chapter 6 then goes on to try  to explain these patterns. The 
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introduction describes endogenous relationships in displacement choice research, 
which make establishing causality  between violence and displacement difficult. The two 
main forms of endogeneity  are exposure and threat variation. Building on the 
framework from the Introduction and Chapter 4, three channels are identified by  which 
protection actions (including displacement) are related to violence: threat, indirect 
threat, and impact. A three-zone theoretical model of displacement is adapted from that 
expressed in Engel and Ibáñez (2007). A new approach to the assessment of threat 
focuses on the relative importance of selective threats and threats to assets. Relative 
to those who all left simultanously: (1) the staged displaced were more likely to say  that 
selective threats at home were an important reason for displacement; (2) the partial 
displaced were more likely  to to say  that looting was important reason for staying, and 
(3) the ‘all stay‘ were less likely  to say that looting or selective threats en route were 
important in their reason to stay. Possible explanations for the important role of the 
asset index in displacement are analysed.   
As a whole, the thesis represents a conceptual and empirical analysis of the production 
of threats in war, civilian self-protection strategies in war, and how displacement 
functions as one of those protection strategies. To achieve this required unique data, 
and I turn now to describe the methods used in producing the dataset. 
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Chapter 2: 
Methodology
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2.1 Introduction
Following the outline description of the Ivorian and Abidjan context in the introduction, 
this chapter introduces the research design for the proceeding four data chapters. I 
introduce the various methodologies used in the literature, explain the choices made 
here and then briefly  describe the process by  which the data collection effort was 
conducted. The analysis uses data collected in October and November 2011, almost 
entirely  in PK18. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews with households, key 
informants and ex-combatants provided detailed information on patterns of violence 
and displacement. A survey  of 715 households was then undertaken that focused on 
displacement decisions, including intra-household variation in those decisions. The 
timing, route and destinations were collected for all displacement groups within 
households – groups being one or more people within the household leaving for the 
same destination at the same time and by the same route.
In the introduction I outlined some of the progress made in researching civil wars at the 
micro, subnational level. Research at the micro-level has been praised because it 
helps overcome some of the difficulties found with cross national research. Kalyvas 
suggests that: "compared to the macro-level, a subnational focus offers the possibility 
of improving data quality, testing micro-foundations and causal mechanisms, 
maximising the fit between concepts and data, and controlling for many variables that 
can be held constant." (2008:397). Blattman and Miguel (2010) similarly  endorse such 
a micro-approach. However, I will argue here some of these difficulties remain at the 
subnational level and progress can be made by  researching at even more localised 
levels: that I shall refer to as ‘nano level’7. For instance, Kalyvas (2008) points out that 
over aggregation remains a key  concern even in micro-level research: "a combination 
of insufficient theorisation, superficial engagement with the case at hand and reliance 
on off the shelf datasets leads to the use of variables that are insufficiently  or 
inadequately disaggregated" (2008: 398).
The specific problem in displacement research that I seek to overcome in this work is 
the lack of understanding of the mechanisms by  which the incidence of violence affects 
human behaviour. Macro-level theories have addressed this issue through several 
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7 Levels of analysis are typically divided in macro, where the unit is the nation state; meso, 
where the unit is armed groups or other organisations; and micro, where the household or 
individual is the unit. ‘Nano level’ is used here to refer to what is effectively highly localised 
micro-level research. 
avenues: in, for instance, the study of participation in armed groups, impact of war on 
poverty, and impact of poverty  on war. Yet at the micro-level, there is no overarching 
theory  on how civilian decision-making during wars is impacted by violence. In 
displacement research scholars are working with adapted migration theories without 
detailed understanding of how these may  be affected by  different contexts of violence. 
When this lack of theory  is combined with the spatial and temporal aggregation of 
violence and civilian decision-making inherent in much micro-level research, it remains 
difficult to understand the relationship between violence and decision-making, even if 
we can say with increasing certainty that such a relationship exists.
This paper uses a variation of what I shall call the ‘whole population strategy’ for 
displacement research, implemented at the nano level. I shall explain and justify  first 
the choice of whole population strategy, then move on to explanation and reasoning of 
the scale of analysis, followed by a detailed description of the process by  which the 
data was gathered including ethical issues.
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2.2 Outline of research strategy
At the cross-country level, analysis of displacement has often used cross-national refugee flows 
per annum, or national IDP statistics (Davenport et al. 2003, Moore and Shellman 2006, 
Melander and Oberg 2007). This strategy has also been used at the micro level – Czaika and 
Kis Katos (2009) look at migration flows between different regions in Aceh. In these 
approaches, there is no possibility of comparison of the displaced and non-displaced to analyse 
distinctions between them, only comparison of different national or regional characteristics. At 
the subnational level there are two strategies available for researching displacement 
heterogeneity, which allow for overcoming the challenge of comparing displaced and non-
displaced households: case matching strategies, and whole population strategies.
Whole population strategies involve sampling an entire population and establishing whether 
each household was affected in some way by displacement. A nationally-representative survey 
conducted after a war, and after refugees have returned, and IDPs returned or resettled, may 
capture variation in displacement decisions during the conflict that may be compared with 
aggregate or household data on violence during the same period, so establishing some 
association between violence and displacement. There is a requirement that a significant 
proportion of the population of both displaced and non-displaced be present within the area that 
is sampled. This condition may be more likely to be met at the national level but, in conditions 
where there is a high level of displacement and return to smaller localised areas, the whole 
population strategy may also be used. Indeed it is only at this localised level that there is any 
significant work using this methodology – that being a working paper by Brück et al.  (2012).
On the other hand, case matching strategies involve sampling in a region where people are 
displaced, and then sampling in the sites from where these households originated. One of the 
original studies on household displacement heterogeneity – Engel and Ibáñez (2007) – uses 
this method. Adhikari (2013) uses the same method but develops it further, using a much larger 
sample size and, due to the context, including the displaced and returned in the sample.
Both these methods exclude certain parts of the population. Whole population strategies do not 
include any households who have been displaced and have remained outside the sampling 
area. Case matching strategies suffer from the same problem, in that if people leave to areas 
that are not the receptor locations used in the sampling strategy they are excluded. Depending 
on the displacement context and on the scale of analysis each may result in different degrees of 
bias. Particularly in contexts where displacement has been short-term, case matching strategies 
may not capture the complexity of displacement outcomes. Whole population strategies have 
been, to date, under-utilised, and displacement research has focused primarily on situations of 
long-term displacement. The research effort that underlies this thesis seeks to redress the 
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balance somewhat by focusing on the context of displacement and return, using whole 
population strategies in one small area.
The ‘Nano-level’
The data collection effort here focuses on an area just 3 kilometres from east to west and 1.5 
kilometres from north to south. Micro-level displacement studies typically analyse displacement 
heterogeneity across whole countries, so to do so over just a few blocks of part of one suburb  of 
a city represents a novel approach in the literature, which requires some explanation. I shall 
return to this issue in more detail in Chapter 6, so the discussion here is rather superficial. 
Briefly, violence that affects civilians and their decisions during wars may be measured in 
several ways: by asking each household about their own experience of violence; by using troop 
presence or incidence of violence at some aggregate level (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011, 
Engel and Ibáñez 2007) by asking each household about their knowledge of others’ experience 
of violence in their area (Brück et al. 2012); by measuring violence at the community level, 
either directly or through aggregation of the same dataset (Czaika and Kis Katos 2009); by 
matching violence datasets to households (or whichever unit displacement is measured at) – 
probably at some level of regional aggregation of violence (Adhikari 2012); or by combining 
several of these approaches (Adhikari 2013).What is missing with most of these approaches is 
some degree of certainty as to whether and how the violence has impacted on people’s lives. 
That there were killings or other violent incidents in an area of thousands of square kilometres 
does not necessarily confer threat to any individual within that area. 
Overcoming this link from violence to some measure of threat is a challenge. Brück et al. 
(2012) make use of the theory of horizontal inequalities to proxy for the likelihood of a 
household facing violence. Adhikari (2013) asks households directly how afraid they were. 
These represent significant advances, but remain imperfect.(See Chapter 6 for more details). 
Moving from a micro- to a nano-level, which might loosely be defined as a single episode or 
event of violence occurring across a limited space, might help  in three ways: first, it may be 
established that all households within that space are affected by a significant threat of violence; 
second, that the direction of causality may more easily be attributed; third that knowledge of the 
conflict dynamics as they affected households, and the types of threat present, may more easily 
be understood. It should be emphasised though that the nano-level is likely to suffer from other 
problems. For instance, data may not be available to systematically compare levels of violence 
across different parts of the area; and it may not be clear a priori whether there is variation in 
displacement outcomes in such an area, so there are obstacles to finding the right context.
One example of the ‘nano-level’ might be a large building hit by a shell but not destroyed. 
Everyone in the building, if present, experiences the same event and has reason to feel 
considerably threatened by such a violent incident. Hence variation in outcomes may be 
attributed to factors other than threat heterogeneity. That said, some will be closer to the impact 
of the shell than others, so some variation in threat will occur. In this case, attribution of such 
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additional in-case variation might easily be done objectively by measuring distance to the 
impact of the shell, but this benefit of the particularly small scale may be offset against the 
possibility that the whole population of the building left shortly after impact. Finding the balance 
between the benefit of a very localised scale, while retaining variation in the outcome variable of 
interest, is one challenge faced in this research.
Overall, the narrow focus of such an approach enables an emphasis on building theory, 
combining qualitative and quantitative evidence and concentrating on the effects of one main 
event in a conflict rather than the aggregated effects of all conflict events.
Recall data
Many micro level survey datasets from civil wars use recall data. There are clear restrictions on 
data availability and ability to conduct research during wars that means other forms of data are 
not available and are difficult to obtain. The use of recall data underlies some of the seminal 
contributions to micro-level conflict studies, including Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), as well 
as the baseline conflict effects in Humphreys et al.  (2012).
Research designed to overcome the absence of theoretical models as well as the absence of 
empirical evidence necessitates an approach where various forms of evidence may be used in 
an inductive process to help  build towards the establishment of theory while retaining some 
prospect of external validity. One way to do this is through the construction of a detailed 
understanding of civilian responses to a very short, intense period of violence bounded spatially 
and temporally, using both qualitative and quantitative methods.
Wars may comprise a series of episodes of violence spread out over space and time. Civil war 
may last a number of years and across a whole country. Micro-level studies often take districts 
the country and individual years within the period of conflict as the level of aggregation for 
incidence of violence. So using recall data may be problematic where patterns of conflict were 
repeated over years, or where many incidents of sequential displacement occurred, which may 
blur recollection of timings and locations of violence and displacement actions, and make 
establishing whether displacement was ex ante or ex post impossible. Violent incidents within 
wars, then, may be more a more promising setting than the war as a whole for understanding 
civilian response to violence and threat.
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2.3 Research Design
The initial research questions are focused around understanding displacement heterogeneity, 
but the research design necessitated building an understanding of the context that required 
collection of data in itself - due both to the lack of published information on the wider conflict and 
the nano scale of the context. As such there were two broad phases to the collection of data for 
the research: first the collection of data regarding the context, and second, based on the 
context, the design and implementation of a survey focused on displacement decisions. There 
were overlaps between the two phases: the survey also provided further information about the 
context, and the initial context data provided useful data on displacement decisions.
Choice of context
Five factors underlie the selection of PK18 for data collection, and contribute to the strength of 
the data gathered for researching displacement. First, the context permits some potential to 
control for threat heterogeneity driving displacement heterogeneity. The conceptual framework 
outlined briefly in the introduction highlighted the complexity of isolating economic impacts of 
violence from threat. The ideal threat context for research on socio-economic determinants of 
displacement would be either entirely random or (similarly) entirely homogenous, but at a level 
which is sufficient to drive some to leave while others stay. PK18 was subject to intense 
shelling, which if not random is certainly targeted spatially rather than based on personal 
characteristics, be they behavioural or proxies for behaviour. The intensity of the violence also 
meant that the degree of threat faced was high, but displacement response was not 
homogenous.
Second, the context is one of displacement and return. In a rare set of circumstances, the threat 
diminished very quickly after the end of hostilities: both fighting parties in PK18, the Invisible 
Commandos and Gbagbo’s forces, were defeated by a third group  – troops loyal to current 
Prime Minister Soro and current President Ouattara – in a matter of weeks following the main 
period of fighting. This new government undertook to protect all its citizens and was to a large 
extent trusted by Ivorians. Their troops had had no involvement in the fighting in PK18 that 
caused displacement. The context of displacement and swift return permits whole population 
sampling. This avoids bias based on destination selection found in some case-matching 
research, although the possibility exists that other new forms of bias are introduced.
Third, Abidjan is the economic hub of Côte d’Ivoire. As such, the economic incentives for leaving 
are at best short term: this helps to explain the context of displacement and return, but beyond 
that also isolates the decision as one based on household characteristics, costs and threat, 
rather than one based on desire to increase economic returns by moving to areas of greater 
economic opportunity. Many conflicts in the literature that produce displacement, including 
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Nepal and Colombia, involve rural violence that serves to produce additional push factors for 
ongoing rural-urban migration. The research context here does not suffer from the same issues.
Fourth, relatedly, the ‘short, sharp’ conflict means that short term threat avoidance was the 
focus of the displacement decision. The conflict was ongoing across Côte d’Ivoire, but only for a 
short time. There was insufficient time for long term effects of conflict on economic activity to be 
felt in one place any more than others. Long-term conflict may erode economic activity and so 
produce migration forces that did not previously exist.
Fifth are practical and ethical issues. Because of the context promoting displacement and 
return, outlined in the second point above, it was safe to do research within a short period of the 
end of the conflict, not just for the research investigators but for participants. And as the conflict 
was short, recent, and had clearly defined patterns of violence, it was supportive of accurate 
recall data regarding behaviour during the conflict.
I spent two months in Abidjan, from the start of October to the end of November 2012 . This 
period of nine weeks was selected as being sufficient to build contextual understanding and 
conduct a survey, while not spending more money than budgeted for the fieldwork. Prior to 
leaving for Abidjan, I developed contextual understanding through reading local media reports 
and blogs from during the crisis, and Abobo la Guerre, a book written by Lesley Varenne, a 
French journalist present in PK18 during the crisis. Reports by Human Rights Watch and 
International crisis group were also useful.
A research assistant was recruited to assist with both phases of the research. This was to assist 
both with contacts and contextual information as well as to overcome linguistic barriers – while I 
do speak some French the local dialect is quite difficult even for fluent French speakers to 
understand initially. I contacted several individuals who had been used as stringers by 
journalists during the crisis and the selected research assistant was recommended as reliable. I 
chose Isidore Kouadio because of the recommendation and because of his being also fluent in 
English. It happened that he also came from PK18, the area eventually selected for analysis. He 
had a Masters degree from the US and was comfortable conducting interviews and approaching 
people for information, including during very tense periods during the crisis. He was Christian 
but from a Northern family so in some way transcended the divisions within Ivorian society.
Several options were considered for building a survey team including training local youths 
myself. However while in Abidjan, INGO contacts suggested I contact the survey team at 
MESAD, a youth-focused development NGO  in Abobo. MESAD were recommended as having 
effectively conducted surveys in various areas of Abobo for UN agencies and INGOs. I met the 
survey manager at MESAD to discuss the possibility of working with his enumerators. He 
suggested that team of 10 would be best for the task of conducting 500 questionnaires in PK18, 
and that he had a team of trained enumerators of the right size available. Because of this and 
their track record I decided to conduct the survey using MESAD’s enumerator team.
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Phase 1: Interviews
Data collection began with key informant interviews to understand threat and displacement 
dynamics within PK18 during the crisis. I spoke to journalists from the BBC, Reuters, senior 
staff in UNOCI, staff from UNHCR, several local and expatriate staff members from each of the 
number of international NGOs including Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Terre des Hommes. Local organisations consulted 
included a local peace focused research organisation and MESAD. While these interviews were 
being conducted I was beginning to narrow my focus on PK18. It was noteworthy that staff 
members in these organisations tended not to know specifics of what happened during the 
crisis in Abobo.
These were followed up  with four ex-combatant interviews (all Invisible Commandos), 25 
structured telephone household interviews, mostly inside PK18, and five other semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews. More detail on these interviews is provided in Chapter Four. Many of 
these interviewees were personal contacts of my research assistant, or contacts of contacts. 
One of the ex-combatants was the brother of a contact at a research organisation in Abidjan, 
and another a former student of theirs. Several other informal discussions with taxi-driver ex-
combatants were held but as these were informal and my research assistant was not present to 
confirm understanding, they are not included in the analysis here.
These interviews enabled a relatively detailed picture of the temporal sequence of the fighting to 
be established, though precise spatial dynamics of conflict and displacement proved difficult to 
confirm. In order to capture variation in possible displacement outcomes sites were selected 
across PK18 for the survey.
Phase 2: Survey
The questionnaire design (see Appendix 1 for full questionnaire) was informed by Macartan 
Humphreys’ impressive data collection efforts in Sierra Leone (of ex-combatants) and DRC 
(civilians). In line with those, the design used the method of using a timeline of conflict events to 
promote recollection on the part of respondents as to the date of actions taken. The main 
difference being that events in Abidjan were over a four month period (and for most events 
within one week) ending 18 months previously, rather than over a decade ending three years 
previously in the case of Sierra Leone. As such, recollection in this case may be expected to be 
markedly better than in comparable studies, and in line with this more detail is requested from 
respondents as to the dates of their actions.
Design: Displacement heterogeneity
The design of the questionnaire was based in the contextual understanding developed during 
phase 1. The questionnaire was to capture displacement heterogeneity, several features of 
which had come to light: the propensity of households to split and move in separate groups; the 
massive scale of displacement which led to some concern that there may not have been 
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variation in displacement action (some people in PK18 told us that everyone left8); and the 
possible roles of different household members in making decisions about displacement.
The main component of the questionnaire was a module which recorded movements made by 
household members during the crisis, based on the household roster. Each member of the 
household was allocated to a group if they had displaced together – the same time on the same 
day by the same route to the same destination. For each group, information was recorded on 
the date of departure. Because we were seeking to understand whether displacement had 
occurred before or after incidents of violence, it was important to know the exact day each 
group  had left. Because we already knew that the majority of displacement had occurred within 
the week of Black Saturday, that week was broken down into individual days in a table, that 
corresponded to a conflict timeline the enumerators were familiar with. Much earlier or later 
displacements were captured by approximate date (the conflict timeline the enumerators were 
trained in included not just the main pattern of PK18 violence but also other earlier and later 
significant dates in the crisis that were widely known). Discussing conflict experience with 
civilians during the interviews provided confidence that people remembered exactly when they 
left relative to other conflict events. The survey also included a module on groups’ routes out of 
PK18, their final destinations, and the cost of displacement.
Design: Threat
Phase 1 also identified looting as being an important threat to households, as well as the 
possible importance of threats en route to a destination and issues with food and water. As 
such, three main modules were designed to gather data on these. An asset index was extended 
to establish whether each of the assets owned by the household before the crisis was looted or 
destroyed during the crisis, and whether the household was forced to sell any of the assets 
during the crisis. A threat ranking module asked respondents which of five pre-specified threats 
that might cause them to think of leaving were important in their decision, and which of five pre-
specified threats that might cause them to think of staying were important in their decision. 
Space was left for up  to three additional important factors to be added to the list of threats for 
staying or leaving. They were then asked to rank the top  five important factors within ‘threats 
promoting leaving’ and five within ‘threats promoting staying’, with one being the most important. 
These threats included only different threats of violence, although it was already appreciated 
that for many lack of food was a major issue during the crisis that might have had a role in 
displacement. At the time it was thought, however, that it might be difficult for respondents to 
compare – for instance – the relative roles of potential starvation and potential death by shelling 
as a cause of displacement. Hence food security issues were separated, although many listed 
food as an additional factor in the three empty spaces in the threat module. Households were 
then asked in a series of questions about food security including availability of food in markets, 
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8 It was not entirely clear prior to implementing the survey that there would be sufficient variation in 
displacement outcomes for displacement actions to be the dependent variable, which may have had to be 
timing of displacement if very few did not ultimately leave.
whether food was affordable, whether they rationed food and water supply [see Appendix 1 p6 
for more details].
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2.4 Survey Implementation
Training
Two days of training were arranged for the enumerators. This training focused firstly on the 
questionnaire, ensuring that they knew and understood the questions. As we discussed each 
question in turn all together, some changes were agreed to be made for the final version for 
printing. The second focus of the training was how to select blocks, buildings, and households. 
Various randomisation techniques were discussed and a simple method based on random 
number sheets selected. My research assistant was present on the ground for the first day of 
the implementation of the survey.
At the end of the second day of training, two enumerators and my research assistant conducted 
five interviews near the Agripac checkpoint to pilot the questionnaire. All three were present for 
the five questionnaires, and I discussed the process afterwards in depth with my research 
assistant. No significant issues were found with the overall design, but it was agreed to remove 
one question on political allegiance from the questionnaire due to some awkwardness this 
created.
Presence in the Field
I was advised by the survey manager and others with experience working in the area that to be 
present in PK18 during the implementation of the survey would raise suspicions about what the 
survey was for. It was better for the survey team to conduct the survey without my being 
present, as they were an organisation with a reputation in the area so people would know who 
they were and not be suspicious about their intentions. This corresponded with my own brief 
experience when approaching strangers to conduct interviews in PK18.
This of course presented issues with my capacity to control quality in a timely manner. I met the 
survey manager after the first two days of the survey being conducted, as a security issue 
prevented meeting after the first day. A few issues were identified with the completion of surveys 
on the first day, and the enumerators concerned were sent back to the households to re-do 
these questionnaires. I met the survey manager after the third, fourth and fifth days and the 
problems had been addressed. In the following week, once I had looked through questionnaires 
in more detail, any issues with the completion of the questionnaires were raised and 
enumerators clarified or corrected the work. The main issues were with three enumerators and 
fewer than 30 questionnaires, and were rectified in the week following the first enumeration 
week.
Sampling
The first round of the survey sampled 505 households, 100 in each of five purposively selected 
areas across PK18, and five pilot surveys conducted near Agripac checkpoint. The five areas 
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were selected on the basis of location relative to key checkpoints, with two near N’Dotre in the 
west, two in the centre between Safi  and Agripac, and one the other side of Agripac. In each of 
these areas, of around 0.5 km2, 10 blocks were randomly selected, and four buildings randomly 
selected within each block. Block selection was done by the teams on the day so one member 
of the survey team with some experience of maps marked the blocks selected on satellite 
images of the area. Two or three households were randomly selected within each building, to 
total 10 household interviews within each of 10 blocks in each area. Households were required 
to have been in that building in PK18 six months prior to the crisis. Interviews were held with the 
household head whenever possible, or otherwise with a spouse or other senior household 
member.
Figure 2.1 below is a satellite image showing the blocks selected in the sampling process in five 
areas: one area is in the north-east of the image, and the other four are north-east, south-east, 
south west and north west from Diallio checkpoint. The area south-east from Diallio was re-
sampled for the second phase.
Figure 2.1: Satellite image showing PK18, important locations and survey blocks.
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Figure 2.2: Satellite image showing detail of blocks delimited by mud tracks on each 
side. Buildings are clearly visible within each block.
Second stage
Preliminary coding of the survey responses revealed that the two central areas demonstrated 
greater variation in displacement patterns, with more households staying in whole or in part. 
One of these central areas, north of the goudron (tarmac road, the main east-west road through 
PK18), had proved problematic for research so the other area, south of the goudron, was 
therefore selected for additional sampling of households. Sampling of an additional 210 
households used the same block selection method but with exclusion of blocks already selected 
in the first round and in a slightly broadened area. Three of the enumerators were not used for 
the second stage of the survey. 11 blocks were surveyed on one day, and 10 on a second day.
Several changes were made to the questionnaire for implementation in the second stage of 210 
additional households. Additional open-ended questions were added, including one on civilian 
inter-relationships during the crisis; and an open question asking respondents to describe the 
process of how the decision was made. Questions on how long the respondent’s family had 
lived in the house, and how long they had lived in PK18 were erroneously omitted from the first 
round of the survey and were included for the second. To make space for these, some modules 
removed, including the intra-household bargaining module which had been replaced by the 
open question. The adapted questionnaire is included as Appendix II. At the end of the survey I 
spent time with the enumerators gathering their thoughts on the reasons for displacement 
heterogeneity based on their experience speaking to people in the different areas.
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Administration and Ethics
The research was conducted in Côte d’Ivoire under the remit of the wider research program of 
Agency and Governance in Civil Wars, with Côte d’Ivoire government approval granted. As the 
research covered a recent conflict and very sensitive issues great care was taken to ensure no 
harm was caused through the research process or by the outcomes of the research.
The fieldwork was funded as part of the Côte d’Ivoire section of the global Agency and 
Governance in Civil Wars project. The main section of this research was conducted by Dr. Yvan 
Guichaoua on the education system under the period of rebel rule in the north of the country 
following the First Ivorian Civil War. The project was funded by DFID/ESRC.
The survey implementation partner was selected in great part due to the recommendations 
given by international NGO partners. Marc Gnahore, the manager, was trained in psycho-social 
support provision and had worked in implementing such programmes in the community. As 
MESAD had experience providing counselling, as part of the implementation agreement all 
survey respondents were offered the possibility to follow up  with MESAD if they wanted to 
discuss anything further.
It was emphasised to enumerators during training that they should stop  the interview 
immediately if there was a chance the interviewee might become upset or otherwise experience 
possible negative consequences of participation. Two surveys were incomplete as a result of 
this: one was terminated because the enumerator considered that the respondent was likely to 
become upset if the interview continued; second was incomplete because the respondent’s 
husband returned home and was unhappy that his wife was talking about their wartime 
experience. In general, my experience and one that the enumerators shared, was that people 
wanted to talk about what had happened and wanted to share their experience, as long as the 
information was anonymous. I ensured MESAD were able to provide a forum for the survey 
enumerators to gain any assistance or support required, and made the same efforts with my 
research assistant.
Research permissions were taken orally on the advice of MESAD and others with survey 
experience in the area. No names were taken, and building locations were not recorded so 
identification even with the full dataset and local knowledge would be difficult in most cases. A 
short piece was read to each participant prior to starting the interview to explain what the 
research was for. Phone numbers were taken and five survey respondents were phoned to 
check that the correct process had been followed.
Interview permissions were also granted orally. People were genuinely inquisitive as to the 
nature of the research and this was explained fully prior to the start of each interview. Great 
care was taken to explain the importance of research ethics to the research assistant, who had 
previously worked in journalism so his approach required some adjustment prior to commencing 
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interviews. I gave out my business card to all face-to-face interviewees, and all telephone 
interviewees were able to contact my research assistant on an ongoing basis if required.
Data entry was undertaken in Spring 2013 by myself and two volunteer assistants, both fluent in 
French. One volunteer entered all of the open ended questions, while myself and the second 
volunteer entered the quantitative data, working together so as to ensure consistency. Data 
were entered directly into a spreadsheet designed to highlight errors with the entry. A random 
sample of 20 questionnaires were checked following data entry and no significant problems 
found. The open-ended and quantitative spreadsheets were later merged. Excel sheets were 
imported into Stata, which was used for data analysis.
55
2.5 Conclusion
I have outlined a research design for understanding civilian decision-making during violent 
conflict. Research at the highly localised micro level (or nano level) has potential for maximising 
some of the benefits of mixed methods research. A detailed understanding of armed groups and 
meso-level factors and conflict events may be combined with the micro-level survey data in 
order to provide the opportunity to analyse mechanisms as well as outcomes. The next four 
chapters analyse the dataset constructed during and following the fieldwork.
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Chapter 3:
Armed Groups and the 
Production of Direct Threat.
Abstract
This chapter outlines how armed actors’ actions shape the threat environment within 
which civilians make decisions. It is about the process of production of threat and, to a 
lesser extent, its reduction. Existing literature studies why  violence is used against 
civilians but this literature does not analyse how actions of armed groups affect civilian 
wartime strategies. Despite this, within the recognition of civilian agency  that underlie 
work such as Kalyvas (2006), some assumptions - based in the case of Kalyvas on 
extensive anecdotal evidence -  are made as to civilian strategies in war and how violence 
may affect them. Further, other, non-violent options available to armed groups to achieve 
their objectives are under-studied, as are possible interlinkages between these options. 
This chapter examines the processes of production and reduction of threat through the 
actions of armed groups. 
The empirical section of the chapter analyses civilian-side perspectives and impacts of 
four types of action taken by  armed groups in PK18. Violence against armed groups, 
non-violent  communication, violence against civilians and violence against assets were 
analysed using primarily  civilian-side interview data. The analysis illustrated the nature 
of the relationships between these various actions and threat consequences for civilians. 
Two actions, violence against armed groups and non-violent communication, were also 
analysed for their role in protecting PK18 civilians. 
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines how armed actors’ actions shape the threat environment within 
which civilians make decisions. It is about the process of production of threat and, to a 
lesser extent, its reduction. Existing literature studies why  violence is used against 
civilians but this literature does not analyse how actions of armed groups affect civilian 
wartime strategies. Despite this, within the recognition of civilian agency  that underlie 
work such as Kalyvas (2006), some assumptions - based in the case of Kalyvas on 
extensive anecdotal evidence - are made as to civilian strategies in war and how 
violence may  affect them. Further, other, non-violent options available to armed groups 
to achieve their objectives are under-studied, as are possible interlinkages between 
these options. This chapter examines the processes of production and reduction of 
threat through the actions of armed groups. The agency  of civilians is central to this, 
but the implications for civilian decision-making I leave to the next chapter.
I build on the Introduction Chapter to present a definition of the concept of direct threat 
that provides the link between incidence of violence and civilian response. Existing 
conceptions of threat are not substantively  or explicitly  differentiated from risk, and 
focus on the civilian side. This chapter analyses the armed group side in order to better 
understand interactions between armed groups and civilians and the strategic options 
of the latter to protect themselves. Rather than the reasons for the use of violence by 
armed groups, the subject under analysis becomes the implications of this use of 
violence for the civilian population. Understanding the implications of the use of 
violence may help bridge the way  towards researching the effectiveness of armed 
groups’ use of violence, an area of study  advocated as the next logical stage for 
progression in the field in the review article by Valentino (2014). It is difficult to study 
the effectiveness in any  overall sense without understanding first what the range of 
effects on the civilian population are. What we have thus far are the broad range of 
studies on the reasons for using violence, and some rather narrow  evaluations of the 
effectiveness according, including Lyall (2009) who suggests that indiscriminate state 
violence may reduce insurgent attacks from the villages subjected to violence. Also, 
while causes of the use of violence may  be studied in isolation - for instance the 
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rationale of one particular group’s use of violence - examining how threat is produced 
in a given context involves understanding the role of all armed actors and their 
interaction. This chapter may  help in the building of foundations for researching the 
broader effectiveness of various forms of violence and other armed group actions, as 
well as the subsequent chapters of this thesis which focus on civilian responses to 
threat. 
The next section outlines the relevant literature and describes the component concepts 
of threat building on the conceptions in that literature. These are targeting criteria, 
targeting capacity  and the propensity  to use violence. These in turn are shaped by 
meso-level factors of the location of the armed group and other organisational factors. 
The third section describes the PK18 data used, which comes mostly  from semi-
structured household interviews and unstructured ex-combatant interviews. The 
analysis is then split into two sections. The fourth section of the chapter analyses the 
production of threat, focusing on four actions of armed groups in PK18 and how these 
intersect with the five conceptual determinants of threat. The fifth section analyses the 
reduction of threat by  armed groups in PK18, using evidence on two of the four actions 
of armed groups. The sixth section concludes. 
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3.2 Concepts and Literature
There is a growing literature seeking to explain why  violence is used against civilians in 
war, summarised in a recent review article by  Valentino (2014). Valentino categorises 
recent contributions into two narratives: war and politics. War-focused explanations of 
violence against civilians recognise the important role of civilians in supporting war 
efforts, especially  of insurgents, and the various strategic implications that follow from 
this finding explain use of violence. Politics focused explanations similarly  emphasise 
strategic benefits of violence against civilians, but concentrate on the role of elites in 
leveraging ethnic differences to cement their political position. The focus here is 
primarily  on the former, as the research is at a very  localised level and a short time 
frame, but as discussed in the introduction the violence certainly occurred within a 
national context in which ethnic tensions had been deliberately  escalated by  politicians 
to maintain their positions.   
Within the wartime strategic motivations for violence against civilians, Valentino 
suggests that four arguments predominate. First, government violence against civilians 
may be explained by  the aim to undermine the resource base of the rebels, (Valentino 
et al. 2004). Second, rebel violence against civilians may  be an attempt to pressure the 
government by inflicting costs on their constituency  (Hultman 2012), a strategy  that 
includes what is commonly  defined as terrorism. Third, both rebels or governments 
may target civilians in order to change their behaviour - both to encourage support and 
dissuade cooperation with the opposition (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2009). 
The fourth motivation outlined by  Valentino (2014) is the organisational incentive and 
capacity  of an armed group to manage the behaviour of its troops, as in Weinstein 
(2006) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2006). Yet this last motivation is not itself a 
motivation, but rather the ability  to constrain the motivations of its troops. These must 
be assumed to be functional motivations for violence, rewarded by  looted goods, sex or 
other returns to violence.
In contributing to this literature, this chapter examines the motivations for the use of 
violence in PK18. The focus goes beyond explaining the use of violence, however, to 
connecting the role of the use of violence to the production of direct threat to civilians 
and to other non-violent actions by armed groups. I also detail how violence and other 
actions by  armed groups may  protect civilians. I articulated in the thesis introduction 
some of the links between violence and threat. The concept of direct threat is 
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comprised of three elements: targeting criteria,  targeting capacity, and propensity for 
violence. The purpose of this chapter is to build from the existing literature on the 
allocation of violence into a broad model of threat production that seeks to understand 
how civilians protect themselves from that violence. Addressing the rationales 
underlying the violence is extremely  useful, but I argue that going beyond this in order 
to build a more complex and comprehensive picture of threat is important. It can help 
us understand why the rationale for militia use of violence may matter to civilians.
These three armed-group-side determinants of direct threat are each influenced by  the 
interrelated wider issues of organisational capacity  of the armed group, and control and 
contestation, both of which are familiar from the literature (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 
2006). Before going on to detail these further, the next section fills out the three 
concepts - criteria, capacity and propensity  - briefly  outlined in the introduction, while 
relating these to existing concepts in the literature. 
Targeting criteria
The criteria used by perpetrators of violence to select their targets are usually 
considered selective or indiscriminate (Zhukov  2013, Kalyvas 2006). According to 
Kalyvas (2006) violence aims to change behaviour, and is selective when the 
behaviour deserving of punishment is identified at the individual level. By  contrast 
when violence is indiscriminate: “the concept of individual guilt is replaced by the 
concept of guilt by association” (2006: 142). Kalyvas goes on to describe indiscriminate 
violence as ‘random’ and ‘completely  unpredictable’ (2006: 143), and provides 
anecdotal evidence that in some instances this is indeed the case. This view  of 
indiscriminate violence being random is, in my  view, problematic, as is the view that 
violence is necessarily  directed against civilians in order to change behaviour. Both of 
these issues are addressed in Steele (2011), extending from Kalyvas (2006) to suggest 
three forms of targeting: criteria may  be indiscriminate, collective (based on some 
shared characteristic) or selective. This sub-divides indiscriminate violence into 
collective and indiscriminate, effectively  ascribing the ‘guilt by  association’ to collective 
identity. However the problematic ‘indiscriminate’ violence remains, inferring the 
absence of targeting criteria. So for ‘indiscriminate’ violence I substitute ‘spatial 
targeting’, which is when ‘guilt by association’ is based on location. Even the most 
‘random’ of violence, for instance the drunken shelling in Lyall (2009), is first defined 
spatially  even if an argument may  be made that allocation is somewhat random within 
that space. I also prefer ‘behavioural’ to what is usually  called ‘selective’ targeting 
criteria. If perceived behaviour is not the criteria for selection then it is some 
61
characteristic of identity or location, so is collective or spatial respectively. It is 
important to note that targeting criteria may  be set at different levels within the armed 
group, and may be, within the armed group, internally  consistent or variable both in 
their design and in their execution. Variability  in targeting criteria may  reflect the 
targeting capacity  and propensity  for violence described below. Targeting criteria may 
also overlap. For example, the observed behaviour of a person of a given ethnicity  in a 
given location being viewed as suspicious and met with violence.
I shall describe each of these in more detail, first behavioural, then collective, then 
spatial targeting criteria. Some overlap may be noted between these and the 
motivations of violence in the literature outlined above - it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the targeting criteria of violence may  reflect the motivation for using it. First, 
behavioural targeting is allocated based on the perceived behaviour of the subject of 
violence. Disobedience, support for opposition, use of violence, breach of curfew  and 
so on may all be behaviours that elicit violence according to these targeting criteria.
Second: collective targeting is often based on characteristics or identities that proxy 
more or less closely  for behaviours. To illustrate: targeting of uniformed armed groups 
in conventional warfare may usually  be assumed to be collective, based on the identity 
portrayed through the wearing of the uniform. In this case the identity  is strongly 
associated with the behaviour of being engaged in combat. But commonly  in 
asymmetric conflicts, irregular armed groups may  be indistinguishable from the local 
population. So other perceived identities may be used to proxy  for behaviour. For 
instance, where these conflicts have an ethnic dimension, the ethnicity  of individuals 
may be assumed to reflect behaviour, such as co-operation with the armed groups 
associated with that ethnicity. Collective targeting may  also be used without being a 
proxy for behaviour - in genocide for example the perceived behaviours of the targeted 
ethnicity  are subsumed into the ethnic identity  of the target - the intention is less to 
punish particular behaviours but rather to exterminate those of the particular ethnicity. I 
return to this in the propensity  for violence section below. Collective targeting is a 
concept from Steele (2011) who analyses the strategic use of violence to displace 
those likely to vote for the opposition.
Third, and similarly, in spatial targeting location may  proxy  for behaviour or for identity. 
Where identity  cannot be observed due to the distance from which the weapon is being 
deployed, the targeting criteria are spatial. Where an individual is targeted based on 
behaviour or identity, but deployment of the weapon has margins of error that result in 
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violence being perpetrated against others, they have similarly  been targeted spatially, 
according to their location in proximity to the behavioural target.
Targeting capacity
The majority  of the literature on the allocation of violence focus on the capacity  of 
armed groups to target violence according to their chosen criteria. Targeting capacity  is 
a function of the  choice of weaponry  and information (regarding location, personal 
characteristics or behaviour): so knowing what or whom the target is, and being 
capable militarily  of using violence against these targets and not other human or capital 
assets.
Information is the most prevalent aspect of targeting capacity  in the literature, 
stemming from Kalyvas' (2006) influential theory of territorial contestation and control in 
explaining wartime violence against civilians. One particular contribution of the theory 
was to emphasise the importance of the agency of civilians, who are not just passive 
victims of violence but influential actors in their own right who can use the presence of 
armed groups to serve their own ends. For Kalyvas, importance of the role of 
information is central, insomuch as this is the main resource that civilians have – they 
may know who amongst the civilian population is supporting the opposition and so 
denounce them to the controlling armed group, enabling that armed group to target 
violence effectively. 
An important part of targeting capacity, less prominent in the literature, is the form of 
weaponry  used. Take, for example, the following comment from a former Crew 
Commander of the Israeli Artillery  Corps, regarding the use of shelling in Gaza. 
Shelling also featured heavily as a threat in PK18.
 The truth is artillery shells cannot be aimed precisely and are not meant to hit 
 specific targets. A standard 40 kilogram shell is nothing but a large 
 fragmentation grenade. When it explodes, it is meant to kill anyone within a 
 50-meter radius and to wound anyone within a further 100 meters. 
 Furthermore, the humidity in the air, the heat of the barrel, and the direction of 
 the wind can all cause unguided shells to land 30 or even 100 meters from 
 where they were aimed. That is a huge margin of error in somewhere as 
 densely packed as Gaza.9
63
9 Barir (2014)
An armed group can only  target according to the technology it has at its disposal. If 
shells are its only  means of allocating violence, then there is necessarily  a strong 
spatial element to the targeting criteria. More precise weapons in conjunction with 
remote visualisation might enable exclusively  behavioural targeting criteria to be used 
even from distance. 
Propensity for violence
Violence propensity  is the likelihood that the armed group chooses to destroy, remove 
or degrade civilian assets, as opposed to the use of other strategies such as education, 
building relationships, persuasion or coercion, in order to achieve its objectives. 
Propensity to use violence here is equal to the net benefit of using violence, that is to 
say  the economic, strategic or other benefits of violence less the economic, strategic or 
other costs of imposing that violence. It is important to note that civilian responses to 
violence will affect calculations as to its efficacy. The inclusion of  propensity  to 
violence in the composition of threat recognises that violence is allocated rationally  in 
order to secure benefits, which is a central assumption of the main consensus in the 
political violence literature (Valentino 2014).
Organisational Capacity
Organisational capacity  features prominently  in the literature, with Weinstein’s (2006) 
research on how the motivations, funding sources and relative civilian dependency  of 
armed groups may affect its determination and capacity  to instill discipline regarding 
the targeting of civilians. That is to say, where discipline is lacking, targeting criteria, 
rather than being determined centrally  for the purposes of the armed group, may be set 
not only by individual units but by  individuals acting on their own motivations. This may 
be suggestive of a financial motivation for violence, as those lower down the chain of 
command may be less likely  to take independent violent action for strategic or political 
benefit. 
There is evidence that organisational capacity  affects propensity  for violence: 
weakness on the part of rebel armed groups may  increase their propensity  to use 
violence against civilians due to their inability  to fight powerful government forces 
directly  (Pape 2005, in Valentino 2014). Wood (2010) suggests that cooperation of 
civilians may be elicited through select incentives and violence. As the latter is more 
feasible for weak rebel organisations, they  are more likely to resort to violence to elicit 
support.
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Location and Motivation - contestation and control
The propensity  for violence, targeting capacity  and targeting criteria are all also related 
to the location and motivation of the perpetrating armed group, including the relative 
location of other armed groups and the relationships between armed groups. This is 
commonly  referred to as contestation and control, following Kalyvas (2006). So the 
processes of production of threat to civilians are closely related to processes of 
production of threat from one armed group  towards another. The Kalyvas argument is 
based on targeting capacity  - behaviour targeted violence is effective, but is only 
possible with information from civilians. Such information is provided only  to those that 
exercise effective control of an area so can protect co-operating civilians. 
Focusing on the deeper relational factors that underlie the establishment of rebel 
strongholds, Bosi (2013) discusses the importance of 'safe territories' that provide 
armed rebel groups with the physical space within which “social networks develop over 
time and shape formal and informal infrastructures of support that maintain dense 
affective, familial, and personal relations between armed activists and their local 
constituencies” (2013: 81). By  establishing control over territory, an armed group may 
develop 'infrastructures of support' that may  help  them challenge the state. This 
suggests a stronger, long-term tie between armed groups and civilian constituencies 
than that suggested in Kalyvas' (2006) theoretical model, which assumes civilians ally 
themselves with whichever military  force is the stronger, regardless of factors such as 
identity or ethnicity. 
Of course the importance of location factors is often defined in relation to the 
opposition forces. But this represents an assumption about fighting between armed 
groups that is not always seen in reality. For example Keen (2005) documents the 
cooperation and coexistence of armed groups profiting from natural resources during 
the Sierra Leone civil war. The overall political and other motivations of each armed 
group in the context will be part of the determinants of how and when the group fights 
against other armed actors, and how it uses violence against civilians. 
Having outlined the composition of direct threat and its meso-level determinants, and 
some of the key  literature on the topic, this chapter now turns to explain the data that 
were used to build a comprehensive overview of civilian perceptions of and reactions to 
armed group behaviours during the crisis.
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3.3 Data
The data analysed for this chapter and Chapter 4 stem in large part from interviews 
with ex-combatants in the Invisible Commandos and 32 structured and semi-structured 
interviews with civilians. These data were collected in five phases, which were 
undertaken broadly  sequentially  although there was certainly  overlap except in the 
case of phases three and four. All phases were underpinned by  online research of local 
and international media reports in French and English, and the only  major western 
published source on the topic, Varenne (2012). 
Phase One: Key informant interviews
Interviews with key informants helped to build an overall picture of the crisis and 
displacement during the crisis. I had repeated discussions with four international Save 
the Children staff, three staff at UNHCR, three at Terre des Hommes and one at 
Norwegian Refugee Council. I also had a meeting with three staff at UNOCI, individual 
meetings with two local International NGO  staff, a meeting with two staff at CERAP (an 
Ivorian conflict research and education NGO), one local independent researcher, and a 
meeting with a representative of the International Displacement Monitoring Centre. 
Other than with UNOCI all of these discussions were with the participants as 
individuals rather than as representatives of their organisations. These were useful for 
building an overall picture of the crisis to prepare for the other phases, and for 
understanding displacement issues, but typically  international staff knew relatively  little 
about what happened in Abobo during the Crisis beyond the major incidents reported in 
news media. They, like journalists, were very restricted in their movements and most 
were evacuated. The local employees at the INGO lived in Abobo and PK18 and knew 
much more detail about what was happening on the ground. The discussions were for 
the most part informal, although respondents were informed about the nature of my 
research and their role in it, and the discussions provided contextual background rather 
than data. The two local INGO staff were interviewed more formally  and their 
responses noted down. They  are considered civilian interviewees. Discussions with the 
survey  manager and other staff at MESAD, who conducted the survey, and my 
research assistant, also formed part of phase one.
Phase Two: Ex-combatant interviews
Four interviews were held with ex-combatants. Two were through connections I had 
made in phase one, and two through connections of my  research assistant. One of 
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these interviews produced very  little usable data and so is largely  unused in this 
analysis, and a second was with a member of a youth militia outside PK18 and is also 
largely  unused. These interviews were semi-structured, and focused on the course of 
events, control of territory, the Commandos as an organisation, and civilian 
relationships. The two interviews used here were held outside Abobo, at the request of 
the interviewees, due to some stigma over their involvement. They  were, however, 
enthusiastic to share their experience.
Phase Three: Abobo structured interviews
In phases three, four and five, questions were not asked about ethnicity  as to do so 
would raise suspicion. As the subjects were primarily  direct contacts, or friends of 
contacts of my  research assistant, there may  have been some ethnic bias in the 
composition of those interviewed. Similarly, names were not asked for or recorded. In 
these phases, as in phase 2, answers to questions were recorded in writing by  my 
research assistant. He was used to writing quickly and accurately due to his 
profession, but did not write in shorthand so the quotes presented throughout are 
presented as translations of accurate summaries (in French) of what people said rather 
than their exact words. Recording interviews would have been problematic given the 
sensitivity of much of the discussion, and practically difficult for telephone interviews.
Seventeen structured household interviews were conducted with residents of Abobo 
(not just PK18, although some did live there). The information from these interviews fed 
into the selection of PK18 specifically  as the research area. The structure followed was 
relatively  loose, and questions asked as appropriate within the framework of those 
provided, rather than each question being articulated in full. These were conducted by 
phone and in person by my  research assistant using a template of questions that 
focused on armed group control, overall displacement patterns in the area and 
household displacement experience. (see Appendix III for full template for phase three 
and four)
Phase Four: PK18 structured interviews
Eight structured household interviews were conducted by  my  research assistant by 
phone and in person using the same approach but these were exclusively  in PK18 and 
used a more detailed set of questions. The analysis focuses largely  on these interviews 
and those in phase 5 due to the greater detail and geographic specificity. A template 
was used that also included questions on household relationships with armed actors, 
perceptions of armed actors, detailed information on checkpoints, shelling, looting, 
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communication from armed actors, information sources and threat. (Again, see 
Appendix III for full template)
Phase Five: PK18 semi-structured interviews
Five more open interviews were conducted with residents of PK18. Two were 
conducted with unknown civilians that I approached with my research assistant, 
interviewed together in one of their homes as they  were neighbours sitting together 
outside their home when we approached. The interest that my  presence garnered was 
clear, and as we were in an area not well known to my  research assistant he was also 
uncomfortable. This experience supported the reasoning for my not being with the 
survey  teams when that was implemented. In other areas, our presence was explained 
casually  to his acquaintances as we walked through PK18; he was known to work with 
western journalists and so my  presence was not unexpected. But where both of us 
were strangers, trying to talk about the Crisis was difficult, at least in part due to my 
presence. In PK18 we interviewed his father, the father of one of his friends, and a 
representative of a church, all of which went smoothly. The interviews focused on the 
same themes as in phase four.
These five phases were followed by  the survey, which has been described in the 
methodology and more details of which are included in Chapters 5 and 6. Selected 
data are used from open-ended questions of the survey  to illustrate certain points, but 
the analysis overall derives from thematic analysis of the interview data.
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3.4 Producing Threat
The analysis section of this chapter focuses on four overlapping types of activity  of 
armed groups and their implications for the threat environment within which civilians 
make decisions. The four actions are: actions against other groups, non-violent 
communication, violence against individuals, and violence against assets. These 
actions do not represent the extent of armed group behaviours, but are important 
actions observed in PK18 with implications for how civilians make decisions. I discuss 
first in this section how  these actions produce threat, then in the next section detail 
some examples as to how they  reduce threat. Threat throughout refers to direct threat 
unless specified otherwise.
I analyse the actions primarily from the perspective of civilians. Before proceeding 
further, though, I shall fill out some of the contextual detail regarding the armed actors 
who were producing the threats. Direct threats are a function of the targeting criteria, 
targeting capacity  and violence propensity  of an armed group, and civilians perceive 
these threats through the information available to them about this objective threat, with 
a degree of uncertainty. Direct threats in PK18 came from a range of armed groups, 
especially  the FDS4 who controlled the periphery of PK18, and the Invisible 
Commandos who, increasingly, controlled the centre. Beyond these two formal armed 
groups, there were vigilante groups acting on both sides, those on the Gbagbo side 
coming primarily  from Anakoua-Kouté on the southern periphery  of PK18, and those 
against Gbagbo dominating the interior of PK18. 
It is important to note that the strategic production of threat was, in PK18, reflective of 
armed actors’ wider motivations. The motivation of the Gbagbo side was to retain 
control of Abidjan and the monopoly  of violence within Abidjan, so that Gbagbo could 
not be removed from power by  force. They  had incentive to use violence against the IC 
who represented a threat both to them personally and to their monopoly of violence.
The motivation of the IC was more complex, and I return to this in the next chapter, In 
one sense they  were a group united in a clear objective: to oust Laurent Gbgabo. Yet 
they also served, unwittingly  for many  recruits, as a vehicle to bring IB Coulibaly back 
from political exile into a position of power. So while the IC had an incentive to use 
violence against Gbagbo’s troops, they  also had an incentive to protect the PK18 
population, both for strategic purposes (so they  were not isolated) and for political 
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purposes - so IB could demonstrate his capacity  to lead by building a local civilian 
constituency  in Abobo and PK1810. This ulterior motivation also served as an incentive 
to fight as effectively  and quickly as possible, so as to make the maximum military  gain 
before the arrival of the main FN/FRCI rebel army from the north. Both sides also had 
motivation to use violence against civilians who were collaborating with the opposition 
by sharing information or storing weapons. 
Violence against armed actors
I now turn to violent acts between armed groups and the changing patterns of control 
and how these threaten civilians. Violence against civilians and against armed groups 
may not easily  be distinguished and so it is here. To avoid confusion, my focus is on 
threat towards civilians that is incidental to the purpose of the violence. In this case that 
was spatially-targeted violence, especially  FDS violence after they  had lost control of 
PK18. The IC established control of PK18 for the latter stages of the crisis, particularly 
in the interior. But the FDS – the state army  at the time – was known and trusted by 
most Ivorians and remained present on the periphery until the end of February.
Basically, the FDS is the Defence Forces and provider of security in Côte 
d'Ivoire, it is normal and regular army of the country. We have friends or 
relatives who are part of the army, so we had confidence in it. But this 
confidence deteriorated when after the second round of elections, the army 
was divided to follow each clan, then leaders in the army became a militia 
leader for each clan. Every inhabitant trusted the FDS clan it supports.
Civilian interviewee 27 October
As the state army, prior to the elections and their division the FDS had moved quite 
freely in Abobo and PK18, and as described above, well into the crisis FDS soldiers 
lived amongst the population, as well as policemen and other state security  employees. 
Following the split, the pro-Gbabgo FDS, as a result of the presence of the IC, was 
frequently  present on the arterial roads on the east and west of PK18, and stationed at 
the Agripac checkpoint. 
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10 Of course, those members of the IC and new recruits who were local to PK18 also had the 
incentive to protect the population because they were their friends, family and neighbours.
In the early  phases of the emergence of the IC, the FDS would still enter parts of PK18 
close to these arterial roads in order to search for weapons. The organisational and 
targeting capacity  of the Commandos was very  limited - although they  had experienced 
and trained soldiers and local contacts they  had very  few weapons. The lowest 
estimate of their initial weapon stocks was only  one borrowed Kalashnikov  (Ben 
Rassoul 2012) although the senior combatant I interviewed suggested they  also had 
two calibre 12 rifles and two pistols. It was through Gbagbo’s side’s failed attempts to 
maintain control of Abobo and PK18, however, that the IC gained weapons. First, the 
legacy of state attempts to control Abobo - the police residences - were initially  the 
source for weapons, and as these had in large part been deserted they  were easily 
taken. Second, ongoing attempts to maintain control through patrols in armoured 
vehicles and attempting to find the leader of the Commandos provided ambush targets 
for the IC  which they  attacked successfully. They  acquired increasingly  heavy  weapons 
and armed vehicles through attempts by  the stronger armed force to destroy  them. In 
time the Invisible Commandos, became a significant military  force that posed a real 
threat to the Gbagbo regime.  
Unsurprisingly  the IC  success brought increased FDS presence to the periphery  in 
order to contain and defeat them. As the capacity  of the IC  increased the FDS lost the 
ability  to travel in safety  beyond their checkpoints, this created the boundaries of the 
enclave and the feeling that PK18 was 'under siege'1. Of course the FDS being pushed 
to the periphery  meant it was now the IC that could search for weapons in people’s 
homes, while the FDS lost the capacity  to target individuals as they lacked information. 
If information was being passed to them from the interior, this was probably  reduced by 
the targeting of FDS and policemen who had their homes inside PK18. 
The main fighting in PK18 followed an ambush of CECOS11 (special police forces loyal 
to Gbagbo) vehicles on the 22 February, on the main road of Abobo Derriere Pont12 at 
Carrefour Diallio (refer to Figure 1.4). The killing of at least 10 (ICG March 2011, 
Abidjan.net 2011) in this incident ensured that the Gbagbo loyalist forces addressed 
the threat of the Invisible Commandos. That day and for the following two days, there 
was intense fighting between the IC  and FDS, including extensive use of heavy 
weapons and shelling. On the Friday  there was some respite, but the next day  became 
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11 CECOS is the security operations command. or Centre de Commandement des Opérations 
de Sécurité. 
12 Behind the bridge  - the main area of PK18 to the west of Agripac and the adjacent 
railway bridge
known locally  as Black Saturday  for the intensity  of the fighting, as described in the 
introduction.
These four days of particularly  intense conflict across a five day  period produced the 
greatest overall threat to civilians. While it is difficult to define exactly  where fighting 
occurred, the overall impression of the survey  enumerators after conducting the survey 
was that the mid-week battles were around the east-west road through Derriere Pont 
especially  between N’Dotre and Diallio, while Black Saturday  fighting extended further 
east, especially  between Agripac and Unicafe. For this short period PK18 was a front 
line between Gbagbo loyalists and the rebels. While violence was targeted to some 
extent, troops on both sides themselves faced severe threat. Kalyvas (2006: 69) in 
summarising how new forms of war have been thought to result in violence speaks of 
“the acute feeling of vulnerability  that combatants experience in the context of irregular 
war...” to which he attributes the killing of civilians, due either to inability  or deliberate 
failure to differentiate civilians and rebels. My  argument is similar, though attributable I 
think to any  situation where armed actors are under severe immediate threat; such 
threat to the armed force may  have two effects. First, threat may well broaden the 
targeting criteria, and increase the propensity  to use violence, when the payoff of using 
violence includes the immediate possibility  of saving one’s own life or the life of 
comrades. In this way, contestation between armed groups increases the use of 
‘indiscriminate’ violence against civilians due to self-protection instincts of troops under 
fire.
A second reason for increased ‘indiscriminate’ violence is that under these conditions 
of pitch battle, forces may  seek to avoid personal threat exposure due either to 
strategic or personal reasons. This was observed on Black Saturday  when FDS troops 
refused to go beyond the Agripac checkpoint to take on the Commandos, and instead 
shelled their presumed positions from the checkpoint (interview with senior ex-
combatant, 2012), allowing the IC time to regroup and eventually  win the battle while 
also increasing threat to civilians in the area. And hence being under threat from 
another armed force restricts targeting capacity  because when located further away, or 
behind shelter, armed actors may  lose the capacity  to target based on identity  or 
behaviour as they  cannot see their targets, and longer range weapons may be 
inherently inaccurate. 
Both these impacts suggest that targeting criteria are likely to become spatial under 
high levels of contestation, and as a result threat is produced for civilians in the area 
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due to what might be called respectively ‘trigger happy’ effects and ‘shooting blind’ 
effects of threat to the perpetrators of violence. This increase in ‘indiscriminate’ threat 
to civilians then stems from the self-protection of armed actors rather than the 
unwillingness of civilians to share information as in the Kalyvas model. This makes 
some sense given the PK18 context. Certainly  in those few days of intense fighting, 
civilians were for the most part hiding inside rather than seeking interaction with 
combatants. It may be that, for certain periods in some contexts, avoiding 
indiscriminate violence drives the failure to share information rather than the ‘hedging 
bets’ motivation in Kalyvas (2006). In such cases it might be that indiscriminate 
violence causes civilians’ failure to communicate information as well as the other way 
round.
Non-violent communication
“There are some of the CI who we knew because they were from the 
neighbourhood youth. But there are many who do not live in the 
neighbourhood so we had never seen before. Well, personally I did not trust 
them, I was even afraid of them. Because these young people do not 
necessarily know us and as we were not Dioula (ethnicity), there was fear 
that they are attacking us. This perception has changed over time, I still did 
not trust them, but I was not really scared, because they never created 
problems for me or tried to hurt me.”
Civilian interviewee 26 October
I do not know the IC at first....but later found that some youth who lived at PK 
18 had joined. I say this because there were youths I had seen in the 
neighbourhood who had weapons and walked with members of the IC. At 
the beginning of the crisis, we must say we were afraid of their presence 
because they had frightening appearances. Many wore amulets (charms) 
and hoods so we were afraid of this situation and I did not dare go out. But 
when the food began to run out, we had to leave, so we met them but none 
of them came to us to ask anything. We did not necessarily trust their 
presence but at least did not feel worried...
Civilian interviewee 23 October
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These responses were typical of the attitudes in households which, like the majority  in 
PK18 residents, did not have close ties to the IC but were also not targeted by  them. 
The statements demonstrate that, unsurprisingly, some degree of threat may be 
created purely  through presence of an armed group; a threat that may be augmented 
by  the appearance of that group. In PK18 there was suspicion and fear initially, of 
course in large part because they  bore arms, but also because they  wore ‘fetiches’ and 
balaclavas to hide their identities. The group was unknown, and the individual 
members were also unknown. As increasing numbers of local youths joined up to fight 
with the IC, and as they stopped hiding their faces once they had established control of 
the area, a familiarity  emerged between some of these civilians and the IC. This was 
assisted by  the need civilians had to leave their homes in order to source food and 
water, which entailed passing IC checkpoints.
It was important that the IC was made up of fighters who were local, and those who 
were not from the area. Civilians' experience of, and relationship  with the IC  was 
shaped by  their pre-existing knowledge of those who joined. As such the local origins 
of many  of the IC formed the 'baseline' opinion of their relationship with civilians. But as 
many of the interviewees pointed out, the IC did not seek much interaction with the 
civilian population in the early  stages. They  had a very limited policing role, and their 
efforts were focused primarily  on fighting troops outside PK18, initially  on the arterial 
roads where Gbagbo's troops maintained a presence and then on other areas of Abobo 
and Abidjan. As such for the most part the interaction that shaped change in attitudes 
over time towards the IC were restricted to observation of their behaviour patrolling 
PK18 and at checkpoints.
But the IC did make some public announcements. While their media presence was 
limited initially, there was a France 24 interview with Commander Bauer shortly  after 
Black Saturday  in which he stated their aim to oust Gbagbo. Prior to that, the IC 
communicated with the local population directly  using vehicle-mounted loudspeakers, 
announcing their victories and stating the dangers of leaving. The overall idea seems to 
have been to generate the impression that threats outside PK18 were greater than 
those inside. The communications were primarily about threats from other armed 
forces rather than from the IC themselves so I return to this in the protection section 
below.
The communications of the Gbagbo regime had the opposite intent. They  declared 
PK18 a 'red zone' and calling on those loyal to the regime to leave or be considered an 
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enemy, transparently  specifying that their targeting criteria would be spatially  defined. 
These communications, by mass-sending of text messages, through the media and 
disseminated through personal networks, provided information about the threat faced. 
For instance:
 Personally, I have friends of the Gbagbo clan who came to tell me that the 
 situation would get worse and I had to go out with my family. They themselves 
 have received information during their various political meetings and wanted to 
 warn me.
Civilian interview 29 October
 We were regularly sent SMS like "if you're an Ivorian and you love your country, 
 support Gbagbo ..." or "Gbagbo militiamen shot a pregnant woman because 
 she was Dioula ...". 
Civilian interview 27 Oct 2012
The bulk of the publicity  in the media and through text messages countering Gbagbo’s 
narrative were from Ouattara and the FRCI rather than from the Commandos. Clearly 
there were strategic objectives to the communication of threat information, trying to 
change perceptions of their own party  and the others, as well as trying to shape civilian 
actions. But with non-violent communication there is the issue of threat credibility. 
People may  or may  not believe that you will carry  out your stated intention to use 
violence:
 I stayed because I did not believe these rumors of the destruction of Abobo. 
 For me it was something that could not be done and that people were 
 exaggerating. For me, a normal person cannot make the decision to destroy an 
 entire town without qualms. I did not think it possible.
Civilian interview 29 Oct 2012
If destruction or removal of people or assets is the objective, threat communication is 
not necessary and may be counter-productive. But if a change in perceived threat is 
the objective, non-violent communication may be lower cost than violence. However, it 
may be necessary  to also exercise violence in order to communicate intentions to use 
violence with more credibility.
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Violence against civilians
Violence has two immediate effects - damage to the subject of violence, and 
communication of the direct threat; I focus here on the threat effects in line with the 
theme of the chapter. The IC, over time, took control of the whole of PK18. This control, 
alongside the rich information they  had from loyal locals, including particularly  those of 
Dioula ethnicity, and long-standing presence in the area from many  in their own ranks, 
gave them a high level of targeting capacity. The IC’s targeting criteria seem to have 
been related particularly  to membership of state institutions – especially  the military  – 
or other demonstrable affiliation to the Gbagbo regime, so criteria were sometimes 
behavioural and sometimes collective. In line with Kalyvas' prediction of denunciations 
to emerge with control of an area, civilians provided information to the IC and even 
acted themselves to punish those perceived to be allied to Gbagbo.
Many of (the 'pro-Gbagbo') were the first to go after the announcement of 
the intended destruction of Abobo... Those who remained were targeted by 
'pro-Ouattara' civilians and the CI during the searches, because they said 
they were hiding weapons. Individuals who were identified were searched 
by people, usually neighbours with whom they lived. Sometimes these 
people were targeted because they were Bete (ethnicity), others were not 
strongly Bete but had displayed their positions during the presidential 
elections in Côte d'Ivoire. It was very clear that the pro-Gbagbo risked their 
lives by remaining in Abobo during the crisis.
Civilian interviewee 23 October
So suspicion was placed on those with ethnic or political ties to the regime. This 
resulted in searches, a process of establishing whether political behaviour or identity 
corresponded to active involvement with the FDS. Another (somewhat unusual) 
incident highlights the links between behaviour and identity: 
 I was threatened with death because I walked around wearing a Gbagbo 
t- shirt, so I had  to leave.
Survey respondent
Here the behaviour of demonstrating political identity  was the reason that this 
respondent was threatened, though actual violence was not used in this case. Of 
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course most people went out of their way  to hide any  political affiliation (especially 
Gbagbo affiliation in Abobo once the FDS lost control), so limiting the information 
available to combatants and other civilians. However certain civilians were unable to 
hide their affiliations due to local knowledge of their identity.
I am military (FDS) and I am in an area where there are many Dioula. The 
Invisible Commandos killed my dog and sprayed his blood on my door. I 
understood that I was a dead body for them so I left with my family.
Survey respondent
Here an act of violence was used to communicate that the Invisible Commandos’ 
targeting criteria included the household in question, and that they had the capacity  to 
target them. Violence, more powerfully  than other forms of threat communication, 
demonstrates propensity  for violence: that they  are willing to kill the dog may  suggest 
they are willing to kill or injure humans. Clearly  in this instance, if the objective of 
violence was for the household to leave, the violence was ‘successful’. But the capacity 
to target effectively  on behaviour seems not to have been consistent: information 
seems in at least some cases to have been imperfect. In cases of targeting where the 
subjects were not members of the military  or police the Commandos demonstrated less 
certainty in their use of violence.
 The relationship with CI was very difficult at the beginning. We had raids from 
 soldiers ...who accused us of hiding... a cache of weapons... They came to 
 threaten people living here several times on this issue. They broke the 
 doors ...and conducted searches and never found anything. ... I myself was 
 taken by these men...they accused me of helping the FDS and hiding 
 weapons. I was tied up and beaten for several hours to try to extract 
 information before being released.
Civilian interviewee 29 October
This Christian member of the community  was targeted seemingly  due to his religion 
rather than his behaviour. Such collective targeting proxies for behaviour in the 
absence of information, and so it seems here, although it is possible that information, 
accurate or otherwise, was also behind the targeting. Violence was used as an attempt 
to obtain information. Threat is of course a central component of torture - violence is 
used alongside verbal communication of intent for additional violence. Torture was 
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widely  used by  the Invisible Commandos (HRW 2011), a view confirmed in interviewing 
an ex-combatant in the IC  who said they  tortured people in PK18 in order to extract 
information about the positions of military opponents and the locations of weapons.
Despite the undoubted frequent use of torture and maltreatment, the collective 
targeting of Christians or ethnicities associated with Gbagbo was not systematic nor 
the primary  reason for displacement. Yet despite the establishment of control, targeting 
in many  cases comprised at least some element of identity  rather than being purely 
behavioural. Where violence is allocated according to behaviours, we might expect the 
violence to be made known to others and the reasons for the violence to be 
communicated - i.e. for there to be public pronouncements alongside public violence. 
That way  the behaviours that will be punished will become known to others, and 
compliance becomes a viable strategy  for civilians to protect themselves. Where 
identity  predominates as targeting criteria, concealment of identity  and negotiation of 
identity  may present alternative options to avoid threat, but changing identity  is more 
difficult than changing behaviour. I return to these in the following chapter. 
Violence against physical assets
Looting was rife in PK18, both of businesses and of private homes. The threat of 
looting was of great significance to households, and while acts of looting are acts of 
violence according to the definition used in this thesis, the nature of the threat is quite 
different in terms of its impact on civilian behaviour. The targeted households were 
initially  the same police and FDS houses that were targeted for weapons. However the 
majority of the looting occurred after Black Saturday once the population had left.
The IC's were more concerned with Gbagbo's departure, they said they 
would not tolerate thieves but nothing was done to prevent looting.
Civilian interviewee 27 October 2012
...the IC looted shops and some houses abandoned by their owners were 
emptied of their contents. Nobody did anything to stop the looting. 
Civilian interviewee 30 October 2012
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There is little clarity  about the organisational level within the Commandos at which 
various forms of looting were permitted. Both ex-IC  members interviewed as well as a 
number of civilians said that it was the houses and businesses of known collaborators 
that were raided by  the IC for weapons and food. But this does not account for the 142 
(20%) of the 715 surveyed households who, across ethnic and religious divides, lost at 
least one of the items on the asset portfolio in the survey, including TVs, radios, DVD 
players, cooking pots, fridges and other household items3. Amongst these households, 
on average 68%  of pre-crisis assets listed on the questionnaire were looted. In many  of 
the households that were looted, typically  everything listed on the asset portfolio was 
taken except mobile phones. Such opportunistic looting was denied by the two IC 
members, one of whom claimed that looting was punishable by shooting on sight. 
If that is true, and if this looting was conducted, as seems likely, by members or 
affiliates of the IC  this reflects the weak capacity  of the organisation to enforce its own 
rules. There was some suggestion that looting increased following the Commandos' 
break of the Maca prison, which is not counterintuitive. Other civilian interviews 
suggested that the IC attempted to police PK18 but as their fighting responsibilities 
increased and moved away from PK18 they  were less able to fulfil this policing role. If 
the claims that looting was not centrally  tolerated are not true, this reflects a different 
form of weak organisational capacity. If they  required either personal enrichment or 
organisational financing from looting this reflects an absence of other, less detrimental, 
funding streams. In either case there was a great deal of looting, and in the few cases 
where the victims felt that they  knew who had perpetrated the looting, they  attributed it 
either to 'jeunes du quartier' or to the Invisible Commandos, and said that looting was 
perpetrated during March or April after the establishment of control and the departure 
of most of the civilian population. No looting by any other forces was apparent in the 
data. 
The targeting criteria used for physical assets are also interesting. Certainly the 
patterns of looting indicate some ethnic targeting (54% of those survey  respondents 
looted were of southern ethnicity, against 37% of all respondents) and, while looting 
was more common in the south-central areas of PK18 going towards Anankoua Kouté, 
the distribution of looting incidents did not otherwise vary  greatly  across sites. It seems 
the IC  and other perpetrators of looting based their targeting criteria on the response of 
civilians to the direct threat to life, as many  houses were targeted on the basis of their 
being empty. In part this was because many  of those who left initially  were those loyal 
to Gbagbo, but once a house is empty  it may of course be difficult to know the political 
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allegiance of the previous occupiers, especially  if neighbours are hiding or have also 
left. Overall, while there is evidence of targeting criteria, the overall pattern of looting 
observed does not suggest that the prospect of being looted or otherwise would be in 
any way transparent to civilians.
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3.5 Reducing Threat
I have outlined how four types of actions of armed groups produce threat to civilian 
populations. But the actions of armed groups also protect civilians, reducing threats 
that they face both from their own actions and other groups’ actions. This section 
outlines the protective role of armed groups in PK18 with a focus on two of the 
previous types of action: violence against armed actors and non-violent 
communication.
In the previous section I described how the combat between the Invisible Commandos 
and the FDS had increased threat to the civilian population. This combat emerged 
because of the presence of the Invisible Commandos in PK18, and their attacks 
against Gbagbo loyalist troops in the area. Yet while the presence of the Commandos 
undoubtedly increased spatially-targeted threats to the PK18 population, and identity-
based and behavioural threats to certain minorities within the population, it also 
protected the majority  of civilians of ‘northern’ identities in PK18  from collective and 
behavioural threats. Such threats came, generally  speaking, from mobilised youth 
militias and, to a lesser extent, mercenaries operating through much of the rest of 
Abidjan which was under Gbagbo-loyalist control. While such groups operated around 
the periphery  of PK18, especially  from the Ebrie Village of Anonkoua-Kouté on the 
south-eastern edge, and attacked PK18 civilians surveyed near the area, such groups 
were rare in PK18 and Abobo generally. This was due in part to the overall ethnic 
composition and political tendencies of the population, and also in part to the 
emergence and eventual controlling presence of the Invisible Commandos. 
 Having found that many soldiers had deserted, FDS have been aided by the 
 militia, and it was these people who were very dangerous for the population. I 
 am not from the north but the militia were many massacres among the Dioula. 
 When they met a Dioula, they assumed them to be a Ouattara supporter or an 
 IC and they might be killed without justification. These militias were many in 
 Yopougon but very few in Abobo.
Civilian Interviewee 23 October
On taking control of PK18, Anonkoua-Kouté was attacked and human rights abuses 
were alleged to have taken place there perpetrated by  the Commandos (HRW). 
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Although this narrative is disputed in Varenne (2012), it is certain that the village was 
attacked around the time of Black Saturday  and this effectively  removed the threat that 
had been posed by  informal armed groups operating from the village that affected 
northern civilians in the southern fringes of PK18. 
At a yet more localised level, the presence of armed groups may  both produce and 
reduce threat. In the following example, the actions of (probably  informal) armed 
groups produced a threat to a church and the displaced people sheltering there. The 
senior commander of the most powerful and formal armed actor was approached to 
provide security:
 ...After numerous raids by armed men on the church, we went to see ... IB 
 himself to secure the church and the people living there. We received their 
 agreement and two guards were stationed outside the church for protection. 
 We were even given a freephone number where we can call in case of 
 problems.
Civilian interviewee 29 October
This illustrates complexity  in armed groups’ provision of protection through their 
presence, and this is true also of the second mode of protection, information sharing. I 
have discussed how the role of information in civil wars has been found to be important 
in the capacity  of armed groups to target civilians effectively. Such information is in the 
hands of civilians, who exercise agency  in deciding with whom to share that 
information. But the example of the IC operations in PK18 suggests that it is important 
that armed groups also have information, and exercise agency  in sharing that 
information with civilians. First, the armed groups may  know when and where they will 
engage with enemy  forces, and can share that information with civilians. Civilians are 
often hiding inside, so lack information about when and where violence will occur. 
Armed groups are more likely  to have information on what is happening outside; they 
not only control their own violence but also may have knowledge of other groups’ likely 
use of violence.
 When the bombing began, people were afraid because of the intensity of the 
 fighting... After the CI gave us a signal that announced when we should not 
 leave the house, there were three shots (two machine guns and firing heavy 
 weapons) that can announce the fighting. This is usually people could leave in 
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 the morning to get supplies to the market and once heard the third shot, they 
 hurried to the church or to their homes.
Civilian interviewee 29 October
Armed actor to civilian information sharing may be formal or informal. Many  households 
had contacts in the FDS and police who were able to warn them when attacks were to 
be made against PK18. Such information may well be seen as protective. However it is 
difficult to distinguish threat communication intended to threaten from information 
sharing to protect civilians by  informing them of threat. For instance, telling civilians of 
an impending attack on an area and encouraging them to leave might loosely  be 
termed a protective action, but the removal of civilians serves a strategic purpose in 
isolating rebels from the civilian population. Commando actions in protecting civilians 
staying in PK18 could be seen as more benevolent, but of course these also served a 
strategic purpose in helping the IC avoid isolation. Differentiation between threat 
communication and protective information sharing seems possible based only  on the 
intent of the action which is indeterminable. All that may  be said with confidence is that 
accurate information regarding the nature of threat may  help civilians avoid that threat. 
It might be suggested that accurate threat information provided by  one armed group 
regarding the actions of a competing armed group might be considered purely 
protective in nature. 
Overall, the presence of the IC had a complex impact on the violence that civilians in 
PK18 were exposed to. For suspected pro-Gbabgo activists, the presence of the IC 
resulted in a serious threat to life and selective targeting for use of torture and killing 
was not uncommon. But for many residents, the emergence of PK18 as a 'safe 
territory' for the IC meant that the threats of selective violence that eventually  emerged 
from pro-Gbabgo militias in other areas of Abidjan were absent in PK18. But the violent 
conflict involved in attaining this safe territory  presented a very  serious non-selective 
threat to everyone in PK18, and 85% of households ultimately  displaced in whole or in 
part. I return to such civilian responses to the changing environment in the next 
chapter.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented an account of how armed group actions shaped the civilian 
threat environment in the context of the emergence of the Invisible Commandos and 
their 'Autonomous Republic of PK18'. The main question the chapter addresses is how 
the actions and violence of armed groups shape the setting within which civilians make 
decisions. The chapter began by  setting out the conceptual framework for armed actor-
side production of threat, through the targeting criteria, targeting capacity  and 
propensity  for violence of armed groups. These, in turn, are shaped by  the interrelated 
factors of contestation and control, and organisational capacity  of the group. Taken 
together, these provided an overview of the meso-to-micro links in terms of the shaping 
of threat to civilians. Some aspects of the organisational capacity  of the Invisible 
Commandos were briefly discussed, and this is extended in the next chapter with 
reference to mobilisation processes that form part of the reverse, micro-to-meso, link.
The data analysis examined civilian-side perspectives and impacts of four types of 
action taken by  armed groups in PK18: violence against armed groups, non-violent 
communication, violence against civilians and violence against assets were analysed 
using primarily  civilian-side data. The analysis illustrated the nature of the relationships 
between these various actions and threat consequences for civilians. Two actions, 
violence against armed groups and non-violent communication, were also analysed for 
their role in protecting PK18 civilians. 
The chapter has served the purpose more of illustrating a framework than building an 
argument, yet still some conclusions may  be drawn. First, armed groups may  engage 
in various forms of violence and other communication that produce threat. Narrow 
views of violence as being motivated by desire to change behaviour, generate profit, or 
attain strategic advantage miss the fact that armed groups may  be motivated by  all 
three simultaneously. Even one act of violence may  serve the three purposes. Rather 
than speaking of motivation, then, it may  be more instructive to analyse targeting 
criteria, targeting capacity  and propensity  for violence. The three concepts integrate 
important aspects of existing theories at the micro level into one framework, linked to 
the meso level with organisational and strategic factors. And, especially  where 
understanding civilian response is the intention, it is necessary  to build this deeper 
understanding of the dynamics of armed groups’ use of violent and non-violent 
strategies.
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Second, some useful insight into the nature of threats faced may be attained through 
observation of four behaviours of armed groups that generate threat: violence (against 
each other, civilians, and physical assets) and non-violent communication. Third, 
armed groups may serve a protective function in at least two ways - the communication 
of threat information and other useful information to civilians in order that they  might 
better avoid it, and the use of violence and threat against other groups that threaten the 
civilians. 
Fourth, and lastly, civilians in PK18 faced a range of direct threats. The targeting 
criteria for important threats to life (shelling by the FDS) were spatially-defined, 
targeted supposedly  at IC targets, which meant that all households within this small 
area were likely  to have perceived a degree of direct threat to life. This was made more 
complex for some by behavioural or identity  based threats from the IC and ‘civilian’ 
militia on both sides. Additionally, there was the threat of looting and communication of 
threat information by  both sides both for the purpose of protection and propaganda. 
These together comprise the armed-actor-determined side of the threat environment, 
within which civilians made decisions to protect themselves. It is to these decisions I 
turn in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4: 
Civilian Responses and Indirect 
Threat
Abstract
Understanding the impact of wartime violence on civilians has been a central aim of 
much of the research effort focused on civil wars (see e.g. Miniou and Shemanynaka 
2013, Serneels and Verpoorten 2013) and various emerging literatures seek to explain 
responses to violence or the threat of violence that mediate its impact (see e.g. Kalyvas 
2006, Guichaoua 2009). But still relatively little is known empirically  about the range of 
civilian protection strategies within conflict, and there have been few attempts within the 
civil wars literature to map conceptually  the connections between threat and civilian 
response. This chapter seeks to answer the question of what strategies are available to 
civilians, and what the implications are of selecting those strategies, both for themselves 
and for armed groups. 
This chapter builds on the conceptual framework in the introduction, and the previous 
chapter on the production of threat, to detail the range of strategies which households 
may use in order to protect themselves from direct threats. In outlining the literature, I 
argue that existing conceptions of household protection strategies may usefully  be 
categorised as avoidance, compliance, and instrumental strategies, and these strategies 
may have trade-offs in terms of exposure to different direct threats or exposure to 
indirect threat. The first two analytical sections discuss these civilian protection 
strategies and trade-offs respectively, using evidence from the experience of PK18 
residents and ex-combatants. The third analytical section discusses the strategy of 
mobilisation for protection, and discusses the role of threat and protection in shaping 
the rise and fall of the Invisible Commandos. 
The chapter finds that civilians have scarce resources that may  be used to reduce threat 
in situ, or they  may  displace. Whether managing threat in situ, or fleeing from threat, they 
face serious trade-offs in both direct and indirect threats. For those with social 
connections to armed groups mobilisation may  be one option to overcome the various 
threat dilemmas.
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4.1 Introduction
In the last decade or so the importance of civilian agency  in understanding civil wars 
has gained prominence in the civil wars literature, while substantial research effort has 
continued to be invested in understanding the impacts of war on civilians. Yet the 
importance of agency  in mediating the impact of war on civilian welfare has not been 
investigated. This paper seeks to contribute to the redress of this omission. In doing so 
I ask two questions: what are the strategies that households use to protect themselves 
from wartime violence? And what are their implications? 
Wartime violence has well-documented impacts on civilian welfare, and also drives 
civilians to make decisions to protect their assets, often most visibly  through 
displacement of household members away from the threat of violence. Such protection 
strategies of civilians have a substantial role in mediating how wars ultimately  impact 
on civilian welfare. Significant research efforts have been dedicated to analysis of 
welfare impacts of conflict that are rooted wholly  or partially  in this mediating impact of 
protection strategies (for instance the literatures on welfare impacts of wartime 
displacement reviewed in Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013). While specific protection 
strategies such as displacement (Adhikari 2012, Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011, 
Steele 2011, Lozano-Grazia et al. 2009, Lindley  2009, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009, 
Engel and Ibáñez 2007), collective action (Arjona 2014), and cooperating with armed 
groups (Kalyvas 2006, Utas 2005) have increasingly  received research attention, these 
protection responses, and therefore the causal mechanisms by which conflict impacts 
on civilian households, are rarely  addressed holistically  or considered as being part of 
a perhaps interlinked set of strategic wartime decisions. This chapter seeks to 
contribute to the literature by  presenting a description of protection strategies used by 
households in Abidjan during the 2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. In particular, 
the chapter describes the composition of the threats faced by  households and to 
describe the relationship between threats and protection strategies.
This chapter also makes a contribution through the use of a dataset from a research 
context dissimilar to those usually found in the literature. Qualitative researchers have 
focused on the life histories of individuals through protracted conflicts (Utas 2005) and 
social structures during war (Wood 2008, Lubkemann 2008), and, even at the 'micro' 
level of conflict research, economists tend to analyse regional or national level 
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datasets. A gap exists between these two levels of analysis. The data collection effort 
that underlies this paper focused on an attempt to comprehend detailed conflict 
dynamics within a subsection of one suburb – a quartier called PK18 in the Abobo 
suburb  of Abidjan, which hosted a rebel group called the Invisible Commandos for a 
few months during the fight to oust President Laurent Gbagbo. Semi-structured 
interviews with 17 households and three ex-combatants sought to build a detailed 
picture of conflict dynamics in an area of just a few square kilometres. In an attempt to 
understand displacement decisions, 505 households were then surveyed across five 
purposively  selected areas of PK18, and then a further 210 households selected from 
one of the five areas, of about 0.25 km2. In the latter 210 questionnaires, additional 
open questions were included about strategies for dealing with wartime threats. This 
presents a rare opportunity  to analyse civilian decision-making within a high-intensity 
conflict using quantitative data but at a 'nano' level. This narrow focus applies 
temporally  as well as spatially, as the intense period of fighting that prompted almost all 
of the displacement lasted less than a week. Additional merit in the data may  be found 
in its origin in sub-Saharan Africa, something of a rarity in a field dominated by  studies 
of violence and civilian response in Latin America and Asia.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the second section outlines the relevant literatures, 
focusing particularly  on key  concept of protection. Using the same data as the previous 
chapters, the subsequent three analytical sections discuss the empirical findings from 
PK18 covering three areas: civilian strategies for reducing threat; the trade-off 
implications of these strategies; and lastly  participation - the strategy  of not being a 
civilian. The sixth section concludes.
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4.2 Literature and Concepts
Protection is an increasingly  important concept in the humanitarian policy  arena (see 
for examples Baines and Paddon 2012, Bellamy and Williams 2011). A paper by 
Bonwick (2006) brings together the policy  interest in protecting civilians with the reality 
that civilians follow strategies to protect themselves, and outlines the three categories 
of strategies civilians use to protect themselves: threat avoidance, submission to 
threat, and resistance to threat. Generally  though, academic focus on civilian self-
protection strategies tends to be on specific strategies such as displacement studied in 
isolation, with some exceptions that I return to below. First I shall outline a framework 
for the holistic understanding of protection strategies, for which I broadly  follow 
Bonwick’s categorisation, though developing some aspects for the sake of clarity. 
Within that framework I outline the available literature and cite sections of Bonwick’s 
corresponding categories.
My framework is rooted in the concept of threat outlined in the introduction. The 
objective threat created by  armed groups pertains to a particular class of individuals or 
capital assets in a given location at a given time. A household has a perception of this 
threat, based on information and uncertainty  as to the objective threat, and the 
characteristics of the individuals and capital assets of the household. Three strategies 
may be derived from this understanding of threat: civilians may  try  to change the 
characteristics of the individual or asset such that it is not within the targeted class; 
they may avoid the location and time of the threat; or they  may  try  to change the nature 
of the threat. These may  be termed compliance, avoidance and instrumental strategies 
respectively. The ability  of the household to pursue any  of these strategies depends 
first on information and uncertainty  as to the nature of the threat - obtaining information 
and certainty is an important component of all protection strategies. 
Avoidance strategies have been subject to research in at least two fields. First, 
displacement research almost always frames displacement as being in part due to the 
avoidance of violence.  Displacement decisions research usually  takes as its starting 
point the analysis of the respective role of protection and economic incentives to 
displace, and findings tend to suggest that both have a role in driving the decision to 
displace away  from conflict-affected areas (Davenport et al. 2003; Moore and Shellman 
2004; Moore and Shellman 2007; Rubin & Moore 2007; Bohra-Mishra & Massey 2011; 
Lozano-Grazia et al. 2009; Steele 2011; Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009; Engel and Ibáñez 
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2007). Avoiding threats by staying indoors has been less frequently analysed in 
displacement research, though it forms part of the ‘threat of victimisation’ crime 
literature. In response to fear of crime, people may  pursue avoidance behaviours and 
defensive behaviours (Ferraro 1995, in Rader et al. 2007), the former involving 
changing patterns of movement and behaviour, for instance avoiding certain streets at 
night, staying indoors more often and so on. These behaviours have been found to not 
only  to stem from fear but also to have a circular impact on fear of crime, with 
avoidance strategies intensifying fear (Liska et al., in Rader et al. 2007), perhaps due 
to the increase in information and uncertainty  that may  follow from staying indoors. 
Bonwick (2006: 274) describes avoidance strategies thus:
Their first line of defence may be to avoid the threat. At its most basic, this means 
running away. Around 25 million people are internally displaced, and a further 17 
million are refugees beyond their own borders. However, flight is not the only option. 
People change their movements; they avoid taking particular routes, or travelling at 
night. In northern Uganda, thousands of ‘night commuters’ seek refuge in shelters in 
main towns every night, because staying in their villages is too dangerous. 
Communities develop early-warning systems, networks of information to warn them of 
danger before it arrives. People hide their assets so as not to draw attention to 
themselves. In Colombia, many villagers, trapped between the army, the guerrilla 
forces, and the paramilitaries, feel that they will be safer if they do not associate with 
anyone, in particular with humanitarian agencies or human-rights groups.
Compliance strategies are those where the nature of individuals and physical assets 
are changed such that they  no longer fall within the targeting criteria of the armed 
group. Such strategies are easiest when the targeting criteria are based on behaviour, 
as they  are in Kalyvas' (2006) theory, which is focused around civilians acting to protect 
themselves during conflict. The choices civilians make to cooperate with armed groups 
(“defection” or “collaboration”) and to share information about the behaviour of other 
civilians (“denunciation”) is driven in part by  the desire to avoid threat of violence by  the 
dominant armed group by  ensuring there is no doubt about their allegiance. 
Participation in an armed group is a compliance strategy  when motivated by desire to 
reduce threat from the recruiting group. Research such as that of Utas (2005) and 
Debos (2011) has illustrated the protective benefits as well as risks of various levels of 
association with armed groups, though such actions may  also have instrumental effects 
on threat. Displacement could similarly  be considered a compliance strategy if 
following specific orders to displace but as displacement even in such cases involves 
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moving away from the location of the threat, for simplicity I classify  displacement as 
avoidance in all cases. Bonwick (2006: 274-5) describes compliance strategies as 
submitting to the threat:
...people also submit to the threats. Taxes, official or unofficial, are paid...There is a 
vast literature on gender-based violence which frequently talks of marriage with ‘the 
commander’: a relationship which on the part of the woman is voluntary only in the 
narrowest sense, but is seen as ‘less bad’ than any other option available. In 
Afghanistan, joining the militias is often the only way of making a decent living and 
providing a modicum of safety for oneself and one’s family. And in many, many places, 
people simply do what they are told to do by those who hold the power and the guns.
Under the definition I have used, and assuming the absence of forced recruitment, 
Bonwick’s ‘joining the militias’ for safety  is not a compliance strategy but rather an 
instrumental strategy to reduce threat. 
Instrumental strategies are those where the threat is tackled directly, and civilians’ 
efforts made to change the targeting criteria, targeting capacity  or propensity  for 
violence that comprise the threat. ‘Defensive’ strategies in the crime literature (Ferraro 
1995, in Rader et al. 2007) represent examples of the latter - buying a guard dog, gun 
or security  system reduces propensity  for theft of property  by  increasing the potential 
cost of attempting theft13. Other ways of adjusting propensity  for violence, where such 
violence is spatially  targeted, include non-displacement from that area. The cost of 
destroying a targeted building may  be increased if it is full of civilians. Improving 
targeting capacity  is the other motivation, along with compliance, for Kalyvas’ (2006) 
defection, collaboration and denunciation behaviours - here the motivation is to 
strengthen one armed group relative to another which is a threat by, for instance, 
helping them target civilians who support the opposition. Of course this also has the 
impact of decreasing targeting capacity  of the opposition. White flags and other 
(perhaps verbal) signifiers of civilian status may also serve as instrumental strategies 
by  providing information to the armed group that supports their capacity  to fulfill their 
targeting criteria. Changing the targeting criteria themselves may  be more challenging 
and requires engagement with the armed group either directly  or through third parties, 
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13 Criminal acts tend to target the low-cost, and so these defensive strategies may also be 
considered compliance in that they exclude the household in question from, for instance, 
households targeted because they have no alarm system. Where efforts to increase the costs to 
perpetrators of violence have the effect of exclusion from the targeted group, these are 
considered instrumental strategies.
for instance those that might enforce international legal frameworks governing 
legitimate targets during war. For instance, Bonwick (2006: 271) suggests that people 
may stay safe during wars by: 
...reducing the level of threat, for example through persuading military commanders to 
control their troops...
This is clearly  a strategy  of pressuring senior members of an armed group to better 
enforce their own targeting criteria. This is reminiscent of Schaeffer’s model of threat 
reduction through ‘accommodation and compromise’. Yet a subtle distinction is evident: 
it is evident that Schaeffer’s suggestion is more appropriate where violence is targeted 
behaviourally, and Bonwick’s where violence stems from weak organisational capacity. 
This points to one of the central arguments of this chapter: that optimal protection 
strategies depend on the nature of the threat faced. On instrumental strategies, 
Bonwick (2006: 275) also suggests:
... sometimes people will confront the threats that they face, and fight back. Many of 
the tens of thousands of armed gangs that dominate the inner-city areas of Haiti 
originated as self-defence units for communities that felt under threat. They are now as 
much a part of the problem as they are a part of the solution.
 
Households may  work together to gain the capacity  to threaten violence against others, 
including existing armed groups. Guichaoua (2009) discusses how the Oodua People's 
Congress militia was formed in part to provide protection to its members in an insecure 
environment. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) examine how relative risks to non-
combatants explain how the collective action problem in mobilisation is overcome. The 
militias emerging at present in violence-affected regions of Mexico are gaining 
international media attention and such militias also emerge in wartime. Arjona (2014) 
and Kaplan (2013) emphasise the importance of civilian institutions in explaining the 
capacity for civilians to work together to protect themselves during wars.14
So at least three protection strategies – compliance, avoidance, and instrumental – 
have been researched but these have tended to be in isolation: the relationships 
between these strategies and between the strategies and threat have not been 
explored in detail. One exception is Lindley (2009) which examines a situation where 
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14 Of course such collective action, in common with the other strategies, may be motivated in 
whole or part by factors other than protection
the nature of threat changed over time in Mogadishu, meaning that threat avoidance in 
situ was harder and many chose displacement. Another is Steele (2011) which notes 
the differing experience in rural and urban areas of the Colombian municipality  of 
Apartado. Collective and selective violence were attempted in both locations, but in 
rural areas Steele finds that civilians were able to overcome obstacles to collective 
action and resist the perpetrators, and so avoid the need for displacement. 
There remains, then, considerable scope to investigate the relationships between 
these three categories of protection strategies as well as to investigate other protection 
strategies undertaken by  civilians in the context of war. And, as stated above, there is 
also scope to explore the nature of threat itself so as better to understand the role of 
displacement and other protection strategies. The aim of this paper is to highlight these 
two gaps in the literature with a description of threat conditions and protection 
responses in PK18, and I hope to demonstrate the importance of building a more 
complete understanding of threats and responses. But not only  is protection strategy 
selection a question of selecting the most efficient method for reducing threat, there are 
also trade-offs to protection.
The Side Effects of Protection Strategies
Protection strategies emerge in order to reduce threat to specific assets, but in 
attempting to reduce one threat this may  increase threat to other assets. As Justino 
(2013) has noted, there are trade-offs to protection strategies. I mentioned previously 
that collective action or armed group association may  increase threat exposure as well 
as providing protection. For instance in the example provided by  Utas (2005), 
associating with an armed group may  provide protection while that group is dominant, 
but increase threat once that dominance is lost. So the first trade-off is in increased 
prospect of asset destruction or removal stemming from attempted protection 
strategies. A second trade-off involves the prospect of asset deterioration rather than 
the direct destruction or removal discussed so far. Assets need to be maintained in 
order that they  do not deteriorate: for instance humans need at least food, shelter, 
water and access to healthcare. The concepts of access and availability  of such 
essential goods and services are familiar from the famines literature (Sen 1981) and 
although rarely found in the conflict literature they are instructive to illustrate the 
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mechanisms by which violence indirectly  impacts on households15. Access is the 
physical or financial ability  to obtain essential goods and services, while availability, 
included in the access function, relates to the supply  of such goods and services. As 
households and businesses seek to protect their human and capital assets from 
destruction or removal, access and availability  of essential goods and services 
becomes a problem for households, and the prospect of asset deterioration (for 
example malnutrition or disease) emerges. The second trade-off, then, is between the 
direct threats of asset destruction or removal perpetrated by  armed groups and indirect 
threats of asset deterioration that result from asset protection strategies of the 
household itself as well as other households and businesses3. And to reiterate, the first 
trade-off is between various direct threats to one or more assets of the household. I 
shall explore these with reference to examples from PK18 in the proceeding section.
Before moving on though it is instructive to consider the mechanisms by  which threat 
may be reduced by  protection strategies. A reduction in an armed group’s targeting 
capacity  or a change in its targeting criteria each represent instrumental shifts in the 
threat households are exposed to, which may  be attained through collective action or 
cooperation. Displacement represents avoidance rather than any attempt to tackle the 
determinants of threat directly. But displacement is not the only  avoidance strategy, 
threats may  also be avoided through the restriction of personal mobility  – for instance 
by  hiding indoors or by selecting carefully  times to move outside; Lubkemann (2008) 
highlights this often-overlooked conflict outcome of households becoming ‘displaced’ in 
situ. The responsiveness of threat to protection efforts I refer to in this paper as the 
elasticity  of threat. The fourth section describes these concepts in more detail with 
reference to trade-offs in PK18, while the next section introduces threat reduction 
strategies in PK18.
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15 Barrs (2010), in a humanitarian policy report, presents an impressive inventory of the various 
strategies undertaken by civilians, and which highlights the importance of protection beyond 
physical safety, with lack of access to and availability of 'life-critical sustenance' and 'life-critical 
services' being far often more dangerous for conflict-affected populations.
4.3 Reducing Direct Threat
This section discusses the concepts outlined above in an empirical context, and in 
doing so serves two purposes. First, I seek to clarify  some of the concepts outlined 
previously, highlighting part of the range of threats civilians faced in a recent context of 
urban shelling and some of the choices civilians made managing these threats. 
Second, the theoretical outline above has focused on how threat functions regarding 
one asset belonging to a household, and how protection resources of the household 
may be used to protect their assets; while the examples discussed here focus on the 
complexity of threat. Households have multiple assets that are under threat, and assets 
that protect are also threatened. This creates trade-offs in managing threat. The 
description also demonstrates how protection resources operate beyond the household 
level.
Avoidance Strategies
Avoidance strategies in PK18 may  broadly  be split into two categories: in situ 
avoidance and displacement. In situ avoidance involves exploiting spatial and temporal 
variation in threat while remaining in or near the home. Displacement occurs when 
individuals move away  from the home for some duration, though exactly how long and 
how far they  might be away  before being considered displaced may  be subject to some 
debate - debate that should also consider their usual regular patterns of movement16. 
Data were not collected systematically  on other avoidance strategies, although it was 
clear from interviews that people were taking action to avoid threat. One interviewee 
said he did not leave the house for five days. Another said that earlier in the crisis 
women who went to buy  food did so by  back roads in the very  early  morning (and sold 
that food at greatly  inflated prices). Overall the impression is one of populations captive 
in their own homes, particularly during the week of intense fighting:
 People were all confined to their homes, no one had the courage to go 
 outside...
Civilian Interviewee 30 October
Of the households sampled (non-representatively) for the survey, over 85% were 
displaced in whole or in part during the conflict. Of those households, displacement 
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16 In the dataset used here, people self-defined whether individuals within the household were 
displaced or not, as in this context there was little ambiguity.
was typically for a period of several months. The vast majority  of people who left did so 
during the week of intense violence. For many, displacement became the best option 
because their preferred protection strategy  of staying indoors became unsafe due to 
the intensity of the fighting:
 The shelling was so heavy it reached the point that it was no longer safe even 
 being in the house.
Civilian Interviewee 30 October
 We left because the fighting became severe throughout the week. It was 
 impossible for us to stay in our homes any longer. There were too many shots.
Civilian Interviewee 29 October
 Bullets that were fired could pierce the roof.... It was not safe even in our 
 homes.
Civilian Interviewee 29 October
Threat avoidance then was an important part of the portfolio of protection strategies for 
the vast majority, if not all, households. Avoidance in situ was apparently possible for 
many in the period of  insecurity during the crisis that escalated with the first action of 
the IC on 16 December 2010, but a combination of the temporal intensity of  the 
violence, and the fact that the nature of the violence diminished the protection provided 
by the structure of  the home meant that many households moved to threat avoidance 
through displacement.
Compliance Strategies
Civilians in PK18 also undertook compliance protection strategies. There are examples 
of identity-based compliance, where individuals try to conceal physical evidence of 
their political allegiance:
 The pro-Gbagbo ...who were left had problems with the CI. They were usually 
 chased by soldiers and had no peace. Those who have lived in the area all the 
 time of the crisis, have lived in fear. They were very discreet. They lived in 
 hiding and afraid that someone denounces them to the CI. They avoided 
 talking about politics or show their political opinion to others. There are people 
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 who even erase all traces of Gbagbo from their home (photo, newspapers, 
 etc.).
Civilian Interview 26 October
The same was true for some of those against Gbagbo in the early  days of the crisis. 
When the FDS were still able to enter PK18 to search homes for weapons evidence of 
support for Ouattara. One interviewee even described people being suspected based 
on the TV channel they  were watching, so clearly people were very  sensitive to the 
political identity they  portrayed to their neighbours and to the controlling armed groups. 
So while behavioural adaptations were made these tended to be in support of identity 
compliance. There is little evidence that the Commandos required any particular 
behaviour from those in PK18. Active support seems to have been voluntary  rather 
than provided under duress. Local women would cook and provide food for the 
Commandos in the early  days while combat was ongoing in PK18, before the IC 
established food supplies after gaining control. There was no systematic taxation 
system imposed at any stage:
 They never came to me for money, but sometimes when you go through some 
 checkpoints they’re wondering if you can give them money to drink water. You 
 are not obliged to give. If you have and you really think that you are able to 
 contribute, you do, otherwise you do nothing but give you're safe to refuse. 
 And if you give money, you give what you want. It can be 50CFA or 100CFA.
Civilian Interview 26 October
 At first we visited families asking for a nominal sum to buy coffee for the night, 
 it was not therefore obliged who had could not give anything. Some gave us 
 100 FCFA to 200 FCFA... The population also helped us by giving us 
 information about the positions of our enemies. Women volunteered to cook for 
 us every day with provisions that we brought to the camp.
Regular ex-combatant interviewee
From the evidence of many civilians and two ex-combatants it seems that, due to the 
absence of coercion, active support for the Commandos, insofar as it was a protection 
strategy, may  be considered purely an instrumental strategy to support the actions of 
the Commandos rather than compliance. Of course if there were instances of those 
suspected of allegiance with Gbagbo contributing money  or information voluntarily  to 
shape perceptions of their identity  this would be a compliance protection strategy. For 
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business owners, compliance protection strategies were necessary  to prevent looting 
as it seems the Commandos ran, at least at some small scale, a protection racket:
 At first we had food to eat in the camps but then when we started to run out we 
 looted stores to retrieve food (oil, rice etc..). Entrepreneurs who do not want 
 their businesses to be destroyed paid us to protect their premises.
Regular ex-combatant interviewee
Instrumental Strategies
Instrumental strategies may  be focused on changing the threat faced by one armed 
group, or changing the dynamics between two armed groups. In the context of one 
armed group, preventing looting was the most frequently  mentioned instrumental 
strategy. Staying to prevent looting was instrumental in that costs to the perpetrators 
were increased by the presence of a household member. This instrumental strategy 
was quite effective: looting occurred in many cases when houses were empty17. 
 ...at some point, I wanted to leave but my wife didn’t follow me - she was more 
 courageous. She wanted to stay to watch over the house. So I went back with 
 her not to leave her alone.
Civilian Interviewee 29 October
In this household, the wife wanted to protect the house and its contents, while it seems 
the husband may  have stayed in turn in order to offer his wife some measure of 
protection. This protective role of individuals within the household with respect both to 
other individuals and capital assets is one that has not been researched or highlighted, 
yet it appears to be an important factor in intra-household protection strategies. For 
instance in at least one household, the men escorted the women and children to the 
edge of PK18, found them transport, then returned to the house to watch over it. 
Household protection resources and the allocation of protection is complex and little 
researched, yet it is more complex still if two armed groups are involved. Here, the 
instrumental strategy  is to reduce threat faced from one group by  increasing the threat 
to that group by  a second group, as modeled by Kalyvas and others. The instrumental 
strategies in Kalyvas’ model are ‘denunciation’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘defection’. The latter 
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17 As mentioned in a previous footnote, changed targeting criteria based on increased costs of 
perpetrating violence are best classified as successful instrumental strategies rather than 
compliance.
was not observed in the data, but the first and second of these certainly  occurred in 
PK18:
 Those ("pro-Gbagbo")who remained were targeted by people "pro-Ouattara" 
 and CI during the searches, because they said they were hiding weapons. 
 Individuals who were identified were searched by people, usually neighbours 
 with whom they lived. Sometimes these people were targeted because they 
 were Bete, others were not strongly Bete but had displayed their positions 
 during the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire.
Civilian Interviewee 23 October
So neighbours identified and sometimes searched their neighbours purportedly  in order 
to check that they  were not actively  supporting the FDS. There are also many accounts 
from the interviews suggesting civilians collaborated with the Commandos, providing 
them with positions of FDS soldiers. However this view of collaboration was not 
universal, at least during the most intense fighting:
 The intensity of the fighting was that civilians do not have the courage to take 
 action against one of the two forces fighting each other.
Civilian Interviewee 30 October
It is certain though that the CI received significant support from a substantial section of 
the civilian population, and was treated benignly by  much of the rest. Such instrumental 
involvement on the part of civilians in the production of threat returns us to the theme of 
Chapter 3, and represents the overlap between threat production and threat reduction. 
I explore this in depth in this chapter, but first turn to the concept of indirect threat and 
threat competition that often require trade-offs and make managing threats complex.
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4.4 Trade-offs and indirect threat
Indirect Threats
So far I have discussed how protection strategies may  change the direct threats 
civilians face. However protection strategies also have other effects. Here I discuss 
some of the indirect threats produced by  protection strategies in PK18 that represent 
trade-offs in implementing particular protection strategies.
There are three processes of production of indirect (access and availability) threat to a 
household - those that stem from a household’s own protection strategy, those that 
stem from others’ protection strategies, and those that stem from impact. The threats 
are manifested in two ways: as outlined previously, indirect threats involve access or 
availability  issues for goods or services required maintain human life or capital assets 
of the household. I focus on human life indirect threats. 
Availability  is a function of the supply  for a good, comprising: the direct threat to the 
good in the supply  chain; violent acts in the supply  chain; protection responses taken 
by  businesses in the supply  chain; and demand for goods in the community. I shall 
focus this discussion of indirect threats on food, which survey and interview responses 
suggested was the most significant maintenance good or service during the crisis.
On the infrequent occasions journalists entered Abobo during the crisis, they  noted the 
absence of food in the markets. Interviews in PK18 suggest that many businesses, 
including food shops, locked up during the crisis, at least in part in an effort to protect 
their goods from looting. 
 After fighting broke out and became violent. Abobo was constantly bombarded 
 and it frightened the population. Also because of the fighting, the markets were 
 no longer stocked and famine began to set in... The lack of food and fear are 
 the two main reasons for the massive displacement of the population.
Regular ex-combatant
Looting against businesses was prevalent by  the IC after they  controlled PK18. 
Removing the stock from businesses clearly  delays their ability  to trade once relative 
calm is restored, and the failure of the Commandos to protect property  rights of food 
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traders was likely  to delay  investment in new  stock. There were humanitarian 
interventions that provided food in PK18, distributed through the IC and the Catholic 
Church, but these were relatively small contributions and also rather late.
Food supply  was interrupted long before the IC gained control as it was very  difficult to 
move around on the main roads – the main road towards Abidjan featured a range of 
checkpoints manned by  various official or unofficial armed groups. High value assets 
such as food supply  trucks would have been at risk of being requisitioned by  armed 
groups for the contents as well as the vehicle. Demand for food in communities in 
PK18 will certainly  have dropped off as people stayed indoors and left altogether, but 
supply  was a problem long before the mass-exodus of PK18 residents in the week of 
Black Saturday, and for many it was a contributing factor in the decision to leave. 
Taking, second, a household’s own strategies: theoretically, indirect threats may  result 
from any  of the protection strategies taken, whether they  are avoidance strategies, 
compliance strategies or instrumental strategies. In reality, PK18 indirect threats were 
most likely to stem from avoidance strategies. 
Access issues stem from lack of financial or physical access to goods, including their 
availability. Food access issues also factored into decisions to leave. Depleted cash 
reserves and the inability  to earn more money left some households unable to buy 
food. Prices certainly increased, two interview respondents suggested a bag of rice 
cost five times more during the crisis than it had done before. The direct threat to those 
who left their homes to seek food was, at times, very  considerable, an issue I shall 
explore in some depth below. The location of food relative to households in PK18 was 
often quite distant – one interview respondent mentioned groups of women walking 
long distances together through back streets to the central market in Abobo in order to 
access food. I shall now outline these direct and indirect threats in more detail, 
focusing particularly on how they interact and the implications of this for households.
Impact
Protection actions may  also have direct impact on the household, just as violence 
does. The forced sale of assets to pay  for food or to pay  off an armed group, or the 
provision of an older child to fight in the armed group18, have a clear impact on the 
household’s portfolio. Assets are effectively exchanged for a reduction in direct or 
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18 whether this would be counted as the loss of a labour asset would depend where the recruit 
was stationed, if they were paid and could transfer money home, etc.
indirect threat. The forced sale of assets was present in 105 of the 715 households 
surveyed. This was 19% of households where households split or all stayed, and 11% 
of households where everyone left together. The histograms in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show 
that as a proportion of their total number of pre-crisis capital assets, the losses to 
forced sale were unsurprisingly relatively small compared with losses to looting. 
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Figure 4.1: Histogram showing proportion of pre-crisis assets sold during the 
crisis, amongst those who sold assets.
Figure 4.2: Histogram showing proportion of pre-crisis assets looted, amongst 
those whose assets were looted.
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Threat Dilemmas
One conclusion that may  be reached thus far is that households have protection 
resources which they  use to protect themselves and their assets, which echoes 
‘defensive’ strategies from the crime literature all involved the acquisition of protection 
resources (dog, alarm system and gun were the examples provided). For the relatively 
poor residents of PK18, the building they  live in is one such important resource, 
enabling people to hide at least from spatially-targeted violence when the intensity  is 
relatively  low. The individuals within the household may also be protection resources, in 
so much as they are able to negotiate with armed actors, prevent children coming into 
the line of fire, source food for other family members, and so on. 
I have outlined above the complexity  of the nature of various threats faced by 
households. In this section I detail how complex, coexisting threats create strategic 
dilemmas for households in deciding which strategies to pursue in protecting their 
human and capital assets. I do not seek to produce an exhaustive account of threat 
dilemmas, but outline three of the main categories of dilemma as examples of 
competing demands placed on protection resources. First, direct threats to human 
assets in situ competing with direct threats to human assets in the process of 
relocation; second, competing direct threats to human and capital assets; and third, 
competing direct and indirect threats to human assets in situ.
Threat dilemma 1: physical assets vs people
My wife asked me to evacuate the children so we brought them to my 
sister's house and then we returned because of the thieves – when you left 
the house they would steal from you. My wife told me she didn't want to 
leave me behind so she stayed with me.
Survey respondent
Human assets could effectively  protect capital assets from looting; that is to say  the 
threat of looting was elastic to households protecting assets in person. But in remaining 
to protect capital assets the individuals were exposed to direct threats that could be 
avoided by leaving PK18. Many  households were able to overcome part of this 
dilemma by splitting. Of the 715 households surveyed, 37% of households split in this 
way, while 12%  all stayed and 51%  all left together5. Many  of these 'splitting' 
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households were in the central area of PK18, which was less intensively  shelled than 
the peripheral areas especially  near N'Dotre and Agripac checkpoints; and many of 
those splitting seem to have faced a lower level of spatially-targeted, avoidance-
inelastic threat. But the dominant threat concerns were similar across PK18, across all 
survey  areas the ranking of threats in the questionnaire suggested the two threats of 
indiscriminate violence – shelling in the home, and stray  bullets in the home – were first 
and second ranked reasons for thinking of leaving the household (even if they 
ultimately  stayed), while the fear of the home being looted if empty  was the highest 
ranked reason for thinking of staying (even if everyone ultimately  left). This illustrates 
the importance of considering capital assets, not just human assets, in analysing 
displacement decisions.
Threat dilemma 2: threats in situ vs threats en route
It was difficult (to decide whether to leave) because there were people who 
left and who died on the route, so we waited until the fighting had died down 
and we left.
Survey respondent
A second issue in managing threats for households in PK18 was the fear of violence en 
route out of PK18. In PK18 direct threats to life existed in situ (within the house) as well 
as on leaving the house in the local area and en route to other destinations (outside). 
This presents the dilemma of where to position the individual human capital assets of 
the household in order to protect them, when the process of relocation to safer places 
might involve threat equal to or greater than that faced in situ. For those in PK18 in 
February  2011, there were direct threats to human assets in the house, and outside, 
targeted spatially as well as on the basis of individual behaviour or personal 
characteristics. Once out of PK18, the prospect of spatially-targeted violence was 
much reduced as relatively  little fighting was taking place elsewhere in Abidjan or in 
most other areas of the country. But the process of relocation involved leaving the 
shelter of the house and so spatially-targeted violence – for instance stray  bullets and 
shrapnel – was perhaps more likely to cause damage to human assets of the 
household. Additionally, leaving the house involves exposure to armed groups and so 
increases the prospect of being targeted based on individual behaviour or 
characteristics that might be observed by armed groups at checkpoints or on the roads.
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Threat dilemma 3: direct threats in situ vs indirect threats in situ
Once there was no one left my son and I went ourselves to search for food. 
They threatened to kill us one time so we went out rarely but as we have to 
eat we were obliged to go out even though there was no security.
Survey respondent
A third issue in threat management is similar to the second in that it involves a choice 
between staying in the house and moving outside. But here the competing threats are 
indirect and direct threats to human life, faced by  those seeking to manage threats 
within the conflict zone rather than move out of it. As outlined previously, the main 
indirect threat to human assets in PK18 was inability  to access food. The threat 
dilemma is whether to put human assets of the household at risk in order to find food. 
The trip to find food might take a few minutes or a few hours and presents various 
forms of uncertainty, including, first, the lack of information regarding new threats en 
route that may not be evaluated from the house itself, for instance if the route is not 
visible from the house. And second, the uncertainty  as to whether food will be obtained 
despite the risks taken to try to find it.
One interviewee, having sent away  his wife and children, did not leave the house for 
five days. Hiding indoors was a very  prevalent tactic, but depending on domestic 
reserves there emerges eventually  a need to acquire food and, where it has been cut 
off, water. The prospect of lasting material damage to adults through relatively  short 
periods of food deprivation is perhaps minimal: while there is, ultimately, a certain 
prospect of death, the progression of deterioration in the physical condition is a 
process rather than event. If food is reliably  available in the local area despite the 
violence, the dilemma is relatively  straightforward: it is simply a case of the uncertainty 
of violence against the certain slow decline in physical condition. At some point the 
need for food will outweigh the uncertain threat of violence en route to the food.
But managing the threats of lack of food against exposure to violence is made more 
complex when food availability  is unreliable. When the timing and location of food 
availability  are less predictable, and this uncertainty  coincides with the uncertainty  of 
violence, decision-making is more difficult. When food is not found in the usual 
locations, additional time and distance of movement is required to find food, which 
increases threat exposure. At the height of the crisis, local businesses and markets in 
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PK18 were closed and food had to be brought in by households, often acting together, 
from the centre of Abobo. The extent of movement required then presents similar 
issues to the first dilemma outlined above.
The descriptions of three types of threat competition illustrates the complexity  of threat: 
households have multiple assets which they need to protect simultaneously, potentially 
from a number of different direct and indirect threat sources. Acting to protect one asset 
may increase threat to another. Attempting to understand the protection strategies of 
households under threat therefore must include some understanding of what assets 
civilians have, and the factors they consider in deciding which assets to protect. One 
such factor is likely to include the duality  of asset roles – that assets subject to threat 
may also be protecting other assets from threat. The next section discusses the role of 
non-household assets in protecting households.
4.5 Participation
The discussion so far in Chapter 3 and this Chapter 4 has worked on the assumption 
that civilians and armed actors are distinct groups, even if they  may  cooperate. This 
section moves beyond this assumption, and in doing so enables analysis not only  of 
how becoming an armed actor and gaining capacity  to threaten others may be 
protective for individuals, but also links this household level analysis with meso-level 
political dynamics. This second development allows for analysis of the emergence and 
demise of the Invisible Commandos, a large scale civilian mobilisation and 
demobilisation over a period of just five months.
Varenne (2012) concludes that the Invisible Commandos were the self-defense militias 
of Abobo, and indeed in large part this was the case. But there were three main 
categories of 'members' of the Invisible Commandos. First, there were those who were 
the initial instigators of the IC, the core group close to IB. Second, there were former 
rebel fighters of various allegiances who had military  training and social connections to 
the rebel networks. Third, there were untrained youth from the local area who joined 
the Commandos. Beyond these members there were other 'jeunes du quartier' who 
formed checkpoints and operated within the protective sphere of the Commandos 
without being part of the organisation, although in reality  who was a 'commando' and 
who was not is not entirely  clear. The argument here is that at each of these levels of 
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the organisation, protection played some role in the mobilisation process, and that the 
levels of mobilisation and protection are interconnected.
A year after the death of IB, his private secretary gave a media interview which shed 
some light on the emergence of the Commandos. The Commandos in late 2010 were 
in Abidjan but dispersed around the capital, and under suspicion. They  were effectively 
unarmed, but they  had military  training and many  were known to the security 
authorities:
 We had fighters ...in the ten municipalities of Abidjan and Anyama. Since the 
 CECOS had heard that ex-combatants lived in parts of the economic capital, it 
 was deemed appropriate to relocate many of them. We grouped in Abobo PK 
 18 where...Colonel Bauer lived. In other municipalities, CECOS removed our 
 men who never come back. 
Ben Rassoul (2012)
So the Invisible Commandos had been spatially  a quite disparate group but under 
threat from CECOS they  gathered together in one of the most remote parts of Abidjan, 
where one senior member lived. While effectively civilians they  were vulnerable to 
attack when isolated, so what Ben Rassoul (2012) describes as a ‘sleeper cell’ was 
forced into active mobilisation due to the targeted behavioural threat they  faced as 
individuals. According to the same interview they  then became armed actors by  using a 
borrowed Kalashnikov  to surprise those policing the installation of a new director-
general of the RTI (national broadcast media) on 16 December 2010. That day  they 
acquired 9 more Kalashnikovs from the fleeing police, and a few days later obtained 
more from troops coming to find them and so on: “Gradually, we built an arsenal of 
combat.” (Ben Rassoul 2012). This process of attempts to destroy  the commandos 
backfiring and instead strengthening them culminated in the events of Black Saturday 
described previously. 
Just as protection formed part of the mobilisation process for the Commandos as an 
organisation, so it was for its members:
In the Invisible Commandos, there was no recruitment but memberships. People have 
voluntarily agreed to join the movement. There were no wages, youth did not require 
payment or even the promise of payment.
Senior ex-combatant
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There was no pay  for the Commandos, though they  were cooked for by  women 
volunteers, some of whom were known through social networks in the community. 
Some sections of the Commandos sought small, and seemingly  genuinely  voluntary 
contributions at checkpoints and door-to-door to buy  water, tea and coffee. Financial 
motivations were not central, then, to mobilisation. The process of the formation of the 
enclave also made it dangerous to leave because of open fighting in the streets, the 
risks of passing through the loosely  defined and fluid spaces between the IC and the 
FDS, and the targeted violence that many  Dioula feared if leaving Abobo. One ex-IC 
combatant who lived just outside PK18 in an area with many Gbagbo loyalists 
described how this situation led him to participate:
Since 2002, I had contact with the New Forces in Bouaké but I was not a 
fighter. I attended their camp but I did not have access to weapons. During 
the post-election crisis, some dissidents of the New Forces were in Abobo. 
Those I knew in this group told me to be ready and they will sign me to fight. 
But with all the attacks against the people of the north, I decided, with my 
brother to flee Abobo. We failed because the young people who manned the 
checkpoints were checking identity cards, so it was risky for us to cross. 
Having not succeeded, we decided to reconnect with our former Forces 
Nouvelles friends, to see if we can join them. After several refusals (because 
we were too young), we insisted until we managed to join the Invisible 
Commando. Also it should be noted that the injustice suffered by many 
Dioula motivated our choice.
Regular ex-combatant
So because PK18 was becoming a space that provided some measure of protection 
for northerners even during the violent process of establishing full control, this 
encouraged recruitment into the Commandos. This particular combatant's decision 
whether to flee or participate was clearly  strongly  influenced by  existing social 
networks, and he was permitted to join the Commandos in a proper fighting capacity.
An important factor in the mobilisation of local youth was undoubtedly  the control of 
territory  already  beginning to be established by  the Commandos: the actions of the 
Commandos combined with the physical features of PK18 had already  made FDS 
penetration into the interior of PK18 difficult when mobilisation began. Youths formed 
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gangs and checkpoints on the smaller mud tracks with the knowledge that a trained 
military force was backing them up, and possibly  followed the example set by  the 
Commandos themselves with their checkpoints on the main central road of PK18. They 
were able to mobilise to protect themselves against the youth of Anakoua Kouté 
because such mobilisation would not be a behaviour that could be targeted for 
punishment by a more powerful armed actor such as the FDS or CECOS. Other areas 
of Abidjan had opposed Gbagbo in the elections but were nevertheless overrun by  the 
FDS and pro-Gbabgo youth at least in part due to the absence of an effective 
opposition force to provide protection for those willing to mobilise. In addition these 
other communes were less isolated and had better roads which made them much 
easier to control. The youth mobilisation across Abobo supported the development and 
control of the IC central command too, so there was a two way  protective relationship 
between the central mobilisation of the Commandos and the peripheral mobilisation of 
youth militia under their sphere of influence.
Protection and the desire to oust Gbagbo were unifying drivers of mobilisation across 
all levels of the IC. But participation had another important driver for the central group 
of IB loyalists. They  had some motivation, perhaps rooted in long-standing 
relationships, to reunify  as a group, to drive the political agenda of their leader and 
perhaps ultimately  benefit him and themselves should they  be successful. This 
separate motivation at the heart of the Invisible Commandos contributed ultimately  to 
its demise, as once Gbagbo was ousted and with the FRCI effectively in control, the 
threat that had driven mobilisation amongst all but the core central ‘sleeper cell’ 
diminished, while the threat to that core remained alongside their desire for political 
influence. Essentially  this diminished the organisational capacity  of the group as they 
lost the ability to mobilise their forces.
I now address this issue of organisational capacity  of the Commandos and how it was 
affected by  control of territory  and external political events. After winning the Battle of 
Black Saturday, IC control was established over the key  Agripac checkpoint and arterial 
roads. Thereafter, IB came to PK18 from near the Ghanaian border and the approach 
of the IC  to the civilian population changed significantly. He set up headquarters in the 
Cité de Police – the relatively  grand former police residential development – and began 
work trying to leverage the success of the Commandos into realising his political 
ambitions. IB took local civilian relationships more seriously than the Commandos had 
up to that point. He set up a civilian-military  liaison committee, which started distributing 
food in the community, and public meetings were held with the local population. 
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Although the population of PK18 was hugely  diminished from its pre-crisis level, he 
was seemingly  setting out to establish some forms of local governance that might add 
to his political credibility.
Figure 4.3: Cité de Police . The red roofs and tarmaced roads of the modern police 
quarter in PK18 contrast with the iron roofs and mud roads of surrounding buildings.
Arguably  the IC became a stronger organisation at this time. They  were no longer 
threatened by Gbagbo’s forces in PK18, and IB brought with him additional 
professional soldiers loyal to him from his village, and additional forces liberated from 
the Maca prison. The appearance of Commandos in public began to be much more 
that of a formal armed force, with many more uniforms visible in images from this 
period and balaclavas no longer being worn to hide fighters’ identities. He set up a 
civilian-military  liaison committee: the IC began distributing food around this time. He 
organised regular public meetings held in front of the main villa in the Cité de Police, as 
well as press conferences. Simultaneously, the position of Gbagbo loyalist forces in 
Abidjan, and Abobo particularly, were becoming weaker as they  lost battles to the 
Commandos and as the FRCI forces advanced from the North.
Firstly, although the IC were becoming a stronger force and their territorial control was 
expanding, the FRCI arriving in Abidjan represented another, larger fighting force 
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fighting against Gbagbo. And because they were under the control of presidential 
challenger Ouattara and the Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, they  had much greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community  as well as the majority  of the 
Abidjan population opposed to Gbagbo. On 11 April, Gbagbo was arrested by  the 
Forces Nouvelles in an operation directed by  French UN troops. This changed the 
external political environment for the Invisible Commandos completely, and 
undermined the reasons that the vast majority of its members were participating.
Secondly, at around the same time, the strengthening of the IC coincided with its 
community  foundations being undermined. The leadership of IB was divisive within the 
community  and the Commandos: that the central unit of the IC  existed in great part to 
achieve IB's personal ambitions was not obvious to many  of its members drawn from 
local youth – some were unaware for much of the period that IB was involved at all. So 
IB's arrival in PK18 at the end of March, and his political statements regarding his 
intention to rule a transitional military government (so threatening Ouattara's position) 
were viewed as something of a betrayal by  those who thought they  had been fighting to 
replace Gbagbo with the electoral victor Ouattara. The junior ex-combatant interviewed 
said he felt betrayed once he realised IB was pushing for political influence, although 
he carried on fighting. Others did not:
 ...when people knew that IB’s fighting was personal many of its members 
 deserted the ranks, and IB had to bring youth from his village to help in the 
 fight.
Civilian interviewee 29 October
And thirdly, the threat to Dioula and other northerners was greatly  diminished in PK18 
with the establishment of total control there and increasing FRCI and IC control in other 
areas of Abidjan. Hence the protective role of the IC was no longer relevant for any  but 
the core central group of the IC. For those close to IB, the FRCI being in control under 
Guillaume Soro was perhaps as great a threat as they  faced with Gbagbo still in 
charge due to the long-standing rivalry  between IB and Soro. At this time, the existence 
of the Commandos as a significant fighting force was perhaps necessary to keep IB 
and his associates alive, so the callls on IB to disarm the Commandos were met with 
hesitation.
Once Gbagbo was arrested, the tension within the IC led to its swift demise. By  the 
time of the 'Autonomous Republic of PK18', IB was claiming to the media that the IC 
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comprised 5,000 men, though he had clear incentives to exaggerate his own influence 
and other estimates from within the commandos were closer to 3,000 at the peak. 
Associated Press journalists' own estimates in mid April were that fewer than 1,000 
men were present. Once Gbabgo had been deposed, there was no reason for most of 
these men to fight the FRCI. This left a relatively  small group of IB's close affiliates 
quite exposed in PK18 with the sparse local population largely  indifferent to his 
presence. 
After the arrest of Gbagbo, Ouattara's new regime had been calling on IB to disband 
the Commandos and join the new national army, the FRCI. IB had resisted these calls, 
stalling disarmament, and was holding out for a direct meeting with Ouattara. A stand-
off emerged, and on 20 April, Forces Republicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI, former 
Forces Nouvelles) troops had attacked PK18 and were repulsed after a short battle. 
They  returned the following week and IB was shot dead by the FRCI on 27 April 2011 
in the evening.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a framework to understand the range of strategic options 
available to civilians. This framework is built around the theory  of threat outlined in the 
previous chapter, and the strategic options available to civilians are rooted in the 
characteristics of the particular threat being addressed. So the disaggregation of 
wartime threats and protection strategies may  help  to support the development of an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which wartime violence affects civilian welfare. 
The chapter has provided a detailed description of a context in which civilians 
managed co-existing, competing direct threats to various assets of the household, and 
in which direct threats also competed with the indirect threats of access and availability 
of essential goods and services. The analysis also suggested that the effectiveness of 
protection strategies are dependent on the physical and human protection resources 
available to households. So household selection of strategy  is based on effectiveness 
of that strategy  in reducing threat, which is a function of threat characteristics and 
protection resources. But strategy effectiveness is not the only  consideration, trade-offs 
also impose (asset) costs, indirect threats and increase in other threats. These create 
dilemmas in managing competing threats. 
Finally, the chapter linked back from the micro to meso level with a description of 
mobilsation as protection strategy  in PK18. For people with varying degrees of ties to 
entrepreneurs of violence, gathering together in one place, and attaining weapons, was 
a strategy  for reducing identity  and behaviour based threats. But this mobilisation was 
shown to be fragile to the removal of threat, and political motivations of such groups 
may be jeopardised by changes in the threat environment.
So selection of protection strategies has implications not only  for civilian welfare but 
also - potentially  - for macro political outcomes. Consideration of the forms of threat 
and protection advocated here may inform the as yet under-developed theoretical 
models in the rational choice displacement literature, a theme I shall develop in 
Chapter 6. More broadly, further work is needed to build a greater evidence base of 
strategic dilemmas and protection strategies in order to develop deeper understanding 
of civilian decision-making in conflict and of the mechanisms by which conflict has 
impact on civilian welfare.
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Chapter 5:
Time to Split? Disaggregating Wartime 
Displacement Decisions
Abstract
Recently, a literature has emerged that analyses from a rational choice perspective the 
determinants of variation in the displacement decision. This shifts the focus from the 
displaced to the observation and explanation of the difference between the displaced 
and the non-displaced, so moves from the question ‘why leave’ towards ‘why stay’. Yet 
there is little conceptual or empirical understanding of the decision-making process that 
results in the observed differences between the displaced and non-displaced.  
This chapter describes important characteristics of displacement decisions in PK18 in 
isolation with the aim of coming to a better understanding of how intra-household 
displacement choice functions as a protection strategy. It provides an understanding of 
the displacement process that  is leveraged in the next chapter. Three main contributions 
of the chapter are as follows: first, it looks inside the household ‘black box’ for 
displacement decisions; second, it  illustrates that both the process of displacement and 
eventual outcome are important, which has implications for the use of binary  outcome 
variables; and third, it describes differences between displacement groupings according 
to the main socio-economic variables that have been used in research to date. I provide 
more detail on each of these in turn.
The results show that the process of displacement matters; that actions as well as 
outcomes describe important heterogeneity  in displacement decisions. The nature of 
displacement decisions are very  different  according to wealth, to household size, to age 
of household head, and to ethnicity. The displaced are a very  heterogenous group, and 
by  disaggregating according to process of displacement as well as outcome important 
aspects of this heterogeneity  can be revealed. Finally, the findings suggest that 
households are actively  managing threat rather than responding passively; and support 
the assertion of the rational choice displacement literature (Adhikari 2013) that - even in 
situations of extreme violence - there is agency  in the decision. In conclusion, the results 
demonstrate that socio-economic factors may  not drive only  whether people displace, 
but how they displace, and how they make decisions about displacement.
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5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter outlined the range of civilian strategies during conflict, and 
analysed the nature of some of these relationships between threats, impacts and 
strategies. I now move on to analyse one strategy in particular - that of displacement. 
Wartime displacement is one of the most visible and widespread impacts of conflict, 
and one that is subject to significant policy  effort to help mitigate its impacts as well as 
research effort to understand the nature of those impacts both for the displaced and 
their hosts. Recently, a literature has emerged that analyses from a rational choice 
perspective the determinants of variation in the displacement decision (Davenport et al. 
2003, Moore and Shellman 2006, Engel and Ibáñez 2007, Czaika and Kis Katos 2009, 
Steele 2011, Bohra-Mishra and Massey  2011, Adhikari 2012, Adhikari 2013, Brück et 
al. 2012). This shifts the focus from the displaced to the observation and explanation of 
the difference between the displaced and the non-displaced, so moves from the 
question ‘why  leave’ towards ‘why  stay’. Yet there is little conceptual or empirical 
understanding of the decision-making process that results in the observed differences 
between the displaced and non-displaced.  
This chapter describes important characteristics of displacement decisions in PK18 in 
isolation with the aim of coming to a better understanding of how intra-household 
displacement choice functions as a protection strategy. It provides an understanding of 
the displacement process that is leveraged in the next chapter. Three main 
contributions of the chapter are as follows: first, it looks inside the household ‘black 
box’ for displacement decisions; second, it illustrates, in line with Zetter et al. (2013), 
that both the process of displacement and eventual outcome are important, which has 
implications for the use of binary outcome variables; and third, it describes differences 
between displacement groupings according to the main socio-economic variables that 
have been used in research to date. I provide more detail on each of these in turn.
Lischer (2014: 325) concludes in her analysis of research on the ‘root causes’ of 
displacement that: “Rationalist studies could fruitfully  use the family or household as 
the unit of analysis in addition to or rather than the individual.” She provides two 
reasons, that decisions to flee may be a communal or family  choice, and that threat 
may vary  between family  members: that is to say, dynamics within the household are 
important. Brück and Schindler (2009) also argue that groups other than households 
are important in wartime decision-making more generally, both groups within 
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households and groups beyond the household. This chapter goes beyond rational 
choice displacement studies that so far either treat the household unit as a ‘black box’ 
or focus on individuals.
The methodology detailed how  this study gathered survey  data at the intra-household 
level on displacement groups. This is the first data of its kind and it is not immediately 
intuitive how to classify  non-binary  displacement, i.e. when displacement groups do not 
correspond exactly  to the household unit. The nature of the displacement decision 
process is explored in depth and four possible classifications of displacement proposed 
that encompasses variation in process of displacement and/or outcome of 
displacement. This forms the conceptual contribution of the chapter, which is also 
supported by empirical evidence from PK18 about how decisions were made.
The main empirical section of the chapter focuses on the differences between the four 
proposed categories of displacement. Six socio-economic variables are selected for 
further descriptive analysis of the importance of classification. They  are selected based 
on their salience in the literature and in this PK18 context. The analysis is focused, 
however, not on these right hand side variables but on the left hand side variable, the 
displacement classification. The argument is simply  to demonstrate that inclusion of 
process and outcome in displacement decisions reveals significant socio-economic 
differences that are associated with the four-way classification. 
In short, this chapter seeks to justify  the use of the four-outcome dependent variable 
selected for Chapter 6 with three arguments: that it is justified by  conceptual analysis of 
the decision, the nature of the decision, and the characteristics of those making the 
decision. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the rational 
choice displacement research literature, the contribution of this paper and empirical 
findings to date. I then present analysis of the characteristics of displacement decisions 
in PK18. The fourth section discusses the socio-economic variables and categorisation 
of displacement decisions, and the fifth concludes. 
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5.2 Literature
Lindley (2009) identifies three theoretical frameworks for understanding agency  in 
forced migration decisions. Zolberg et al. (1989) focuses on the link between types of 
social conflict and migration patterns, giving a focus on how structural contexts dictate 
migration. Richmond (1995) and, following Richmond, Van Hear (1998) propose 
models of forced migration that vary  along continua between involuntary and voluntary, 
or alternatively reactive and proactive, migration. But as Turton (2003) notes, such 
continua suggest an artificial distinction between people supposedly  with or without 
agency: even those ‘without’ agency may  choose whether, when, where and how to 
move. What Adhikari refers to as 'rational choice displacement research’ treats 
displacement as being a choice made under some level of constraint, rather than a 
forced outcome of violence in which civilians lack agency to make decisions. 
This paper follows this view of displacement as a constrained choice, and may  be 
distinguished from migration by the presence of some perceived threat of violence to 
human or capital assets of the household. However that is not a distinction that is 
always easy  to make empirically: the presence of violent events at some level of 
aggregation does not necessarily  indicate that that violence presents a direct threat to 
any particular household. What is clear is that violence affects the operation of 
markets, and harms returns. It is challenging, then, when using aggregated violence 
measures, to distinguish between situations in which violence enhances financial push 
factors for migration (reduced returns), and situations in which violence causes direct 
or indirect threat to human and capital assets of the household, or indeed from 
situations where the violence has actually impacted the household. 
Nevertheless, this challenge is undertaken by many  of the papers in the emerging 
empirical literature on displacement heterogeneity. This literature studies the causes of 
variation in displacement outcomes at several levels of analysis: the individual level 
(Brück et al. 2012, Bohra Mishra and Massey  2011, Adhikari 2013); the (unitary) 
household level (Engel and Ibáñez 2007, Ibáñez and Velez 2008); the community  or 
village level (Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009, Brück et al. 2012); and the regional level 
(Adhikari 2012). The findings  generally  indicate a role for both socio-economic factors 
as well as violence in causing displacement, but because of the issue of isolating the 
effect of aggregated violence, and because research contexts often involve rural 
violence and ongoing rural-urban migration, it is difficult to isolate causal mechanisms 
or to interpret all results clearly. Compounding this problem is a lack of understanding 
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of the displacement decision itself, and it is to this area that this chapter seeks to 
contribute. The lack of understanding stems from at least three sources: the limited 
contexts researched; the individual or unitary  household focus; and the focus on 
outcomes not processes. 
Displacement has to date been modelled based in contexts of selective violence or 
identity-based violence, mostly  in Nepal and Colombia. Only  one systematic 
displacement study  exists in an African context - Lindley’s (2010) paper on Somalia19 - 
and there are no quantitative studies from  any  African or Middle Eastern context. 
Conducting research in a new  continent is interesting, but more significant is that 
Lindley’s qualitative study is also the only  displacement research set in a context of 
widespread spatially-targeted violence, and the only  one in a wholly  urban setting, and 
is the only  one researching massive-scale displacement20, yet has been largely 
overlooked by the micro-economists studying displacement. 
So the analysis of displacement is heavily  influenced by  the context: how violence is 
targeted and the duration and location of that violence has a strong impact on how 
displacement is manifested. For instance, violence in Colombia (Engel and Ibáñez 
2007, Ibáñez and Velez 2008) and Nepal (Adhikari 2012, 2013, Bohra-Mishra and 
Massey 2011) is located often in rural areas, and displacement is often long-term and 
intertwined with processes of rural-urban migration. The ethnic riots in Kyrgyzstan, in 
contrast, caused short term displacement of 1-6 weeks (Brück et al. 2012). A context of 
short, intense violence, displacement and swift return is clearly  one in which medium or 
long term returns to labour are not likely  to be a significant factor decision-making. This 
narrows their research focus to threat variation and socio-economic characteristics of 
the households that impact on decision-making. Also, displacement in such contexts of 
intense violence has been under-researched to date, so the chapter makes a 
contribution in the understanding of civilian response to intense fighting.
This chapter builds on this and seeks to narrow the focus further, through selection of a 
context in which, like Brück et al. (2012), relative returns to labour are not a salient 
feature in decision-making, but also one in which threat is more homogenous and 
violence allocated randomly. This permits the main analysis to focus on the socio-
economic characteristics of the household that shape displacement choices. In other 
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19 Lubkeman (2008) also focuses on issues of wartime mobility, as do other anthropological 
works including Utas (2005)
20 Two thirds of the population left Mogadishu during 2007-8 (Lindley 2010)
contexts, these characteristics may also determine returns to labour at destination, as 
well as determining the probability  of the threat of violence (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). 
So here, rather than analysing the relative roles of economic incentives and threat 
incentives for migration during wars, I seek to investigate the socio-economic 
characteristics of the household that contribute to heterogeneity  in displacement 
choice. To narrow the focus in such a way  helps in the interpretation of the effect of 
these factors in a context in which theoretical models have not been well established.
The selective contextual focus of the literature has perhaps contributed to the salience 
of migration theories in displacement, and the relatively weak theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the role of violence in decision-making. Migration theories are strong 
because they rely on contexts where there is no violence affecting decision-making. To 
make progress in improving understanding on the side of response to violence, it 
makes sense to research contexts where existing rural-urban migration incentives are 
absent and violence is intense. The first step  is to understand how displacement 
decisions are made in such contexts, and the sub-household level represents a strong 
starting point. Analysing not just displacement outcomes but the process that leads to 
these outcomes provides valuable insight into displacement decision-making, and thus 
the nature of displacement itself. 
So, moving on from the context, a second novel aspect of this paper is the 
methodological focus on the household and sub-household units, rather than the 
individual or village levels which predominate thus far in the literature. This level of 
analysis has theoretical justification. Migration theory presents the foundation for much 
of the work on displacement decisions. Neo-classical models of migration emphasised 
individuals’ incentives to maximise returns to labour as the driving force behind 
migration (Todaro 1976). Household economics theories emphasised the importance of 
placing these individuals within household units, and suggested that rather than 
individual motivations, decisions may be made at the household level and the 
members of the household unit allocated to various labour markets in order to increase 
returns and reduce overall risk exposure of the household (Stark and Bloom 1985), an 
approach that has been seen to be particularly  relevant for developing economies. 
Analysis of displacement decisions has in many  cases focused on whole households 
moving. This focus on whole households (Engel and Ibáñez 2007) or individuals is 
attributable either to research design, which I shall discuss below, or homogeneity in 
household displacement outcomes making analysis of intra-household variation 
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impossible21. One quantitative paper has studied the intra-household level. Brück et al. 
(2012) report causes of individual-level as well as community  level displacement 
decisions in Kyrgyzstan, although intra-household results are not reported. 
Third, the chapter addresses a new dependent variable. The dependent variable is 
usually  binary  displacement choice, which is determined by  the choice of sampling 
method. With case-matching research (Adhikari 2013, Engel and Ibáñez 2007) this 
binary dependent variable is integral to the sampling method, with households selected 
from displaced person recipient areas matched with households from displaced person 
source areas. Cross-national studies (Moore and Shellman 2004) and some national 
studies (Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009), which use net annual refugee flows, of course do 
not capture any complexity  in displacement within households. Even where the data 
permit analysis of intra-household complexity, the dependent variable is still binary: 
Brück et al. (2012) capture individual level within households data but do not report 
intra-household level outcomes. As such, displacement decisions are treated as binary, 
whether that be at the household or individual level. But, following the household 
economics migration models discussed above, displacement patterns at the intra-
household level may  be important. This is the first study  to differentiate between those 
households who displace in whole or in part, or not at all, analysing the process of 
displacement rather than just outcomes. 
Empirical evidence 
The literature on displacement decisions focuses on simple unitary  displacement 
outcomes. Such approaches necessarily  obscure complexity in the displacement 
decision. But does that matter? The empirical section of this paper investigates 
whether and why it does by  analysing socio-economic differences between the various 
categories of the displaced. The paper then goes on to propose that complex 
displacement outcome is the most suitable categorisation of the displaced. First I 
outline the empirical evidence to date on categorisation of displacement, and socio-
economic distinctions between the categories. 
Studies have found contradictory evidence on the role of various socio-economic 
factors in displacement decisions. This paper selects six variables for analysis of how 
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21 the scarcity of detailed data on displacement within wartime contexts makes it difficult to 
establish what intra-household variation in displacement exists
classification of the dependent variable is important, and how binary outcomes used to 
date may  obfuscate important differences between displaced groups. The six variables 
are: wealth, education, age of household head, household size, ethnicity  and religion. 
The first three are selected due to their salience in the literature on migration and 
displacement particularly, and the latter three for their particular relevance at the intra-
household level (household size) and in the conflict context at hand (ethnicity  and 
religion), and hence their importance at least as controls. It is important to re-
emphasise that this chapter does not seek to model displacement or test the 
importance of these variables in driving displacement; that is left for Chapter 6. The aim 
here is simply  to illustrate the importance of disaggregating displacement decisions by 
process as well as outcome by  presenting descriptive statistics and regressions on 
different possible constructions of the left hand side variable with the same set of right 
hand side variables. I now outline the findings in individual and household-level binary 
outcome displacement research22. The four main papers are Engel and Ibáñez (2007), 
with similar results from the same data presented in Ibáñez and Velez (2008), Adhikari 
(2013), Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) and Brück et al. (2012). 
Wealth and Assets
The role of assets in wartime displacement choice is complex, primarily  because in 
some contexts assets are an indicator of probability  of being targeted as well as 
indicating (at least) the costs of displacement, the ability  to cope with financial conflict 
shocks, the affordability  of displacement and the possible benefits of moving. Ibáñez 
and Velez (2008) find that households were targeted because of their asset holdings. 
Adhikari (2013) similarly  finds that land holdings promote displacement, which is 
interpreted as being due to associated increased threat (although perceived threat is 
also in the regression). Bohra-Mishra and Massey  (2011) investigate a range of asset 
types, finding that thy  generally reduce propensity  to migrate. Brück et al. (2012) find 
that being relatively  wealthy  compared to others in the community decreases 
propensity  to displace, which is interpreted as being due to the ability  of these 
individuals being able to invest in more effective protection strategies (buying fences or 
stronger doors). In general, at the household level, there is a contrast between 
interpretations that put asset holdings as a reason for a household to experience threat 
and so displace, and interpretations that suggest they  are better able to protect 
themselves in situ due to greater wealth.
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22 Bohra-Mishra and Massey (2011) is a multinomial outcome, but these represent different 
destinations of displacement and I consider them to be binary outcomes
Education
Engel and Ibáñez (2007) expect that education, following migration models, will be 
supportive of displacement due to the ‘standard of living’ effect, but with mixed 
information effects depending on the nature of the situation at destination. Bohra-
Mishra and Massey  (2011) find that education and occupational skill both increase 
propensity  to migrate during the war in Nepal. However Engel and Ibáñez’s (2007) 
empirical findings suggest that higher level of education suppresses displacement 
when households face high levels of violence. Their interpretation is that more 
educated people in their Colombian case had lower expectations of the financial 
situation of the displaced at their destination, attributable to the better information 
available to the educated. Where there is a lower level of violence, there is a positive 
(but insignificant) association between education and displacement. Ibáñez and Velez 
(2008) find that the better educated are less likely  to displace, with the same 
interpretation. Adhikari (2013) includes education as a control but finds no significant 
relationship with displacement when other variables are included in the model. Brück et 
al. (2012) find that respondents with a university degree are less likely  to be displaced, 
and those with basic education are more likely to be displaced. So here the conflicting 
effects are human capital and information access. Both may change economic 
expectations at destination, in opposite directions, and both may affect threat.
Age of household head
Engel and Ibáñez (2007) find that having an older household head (HHH) has a 
significantly  negative impact on a household’s propensity  to displace, which they 
attribute to longer planning horizons and fewer ties to the origin on the part of younger 
household heads. Similar explanations are given for the same finding in Bohra-Mishra 
and Massey  (2011) and Brück et al. (2012), though Adhikari (2013) includes age as a 
control, and the impact is not significant.  
So overall there is empirical agreement on the effect of age, but education and assets 
have mixed findings and diverse explanations using a binary  outcome variable in 
contexts of rural-urban wartime migration or displacement. The intention in the second 
empirical section will be to establish whether the reclassification of the variable used to 
measure displacement using intra-household displacement decision processes to 
create non-binary  measures can shed some light on these mixed findings, as well as 
help to justify the use of non-binary outcomes in displacement research. 
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5.3 Concepts: The Displacement Decision
Is splitting a decision in itself, or is it nested within decisions to stay  or to go? There is 
little available evidence to support nesting either way  a priori. It may  be that 
households first ask ‘should we stay  together or not’, rather than ‘should we leave or 
not’. While this chapter will not serve to resolve this question, I intend to provide 
evidence that may  support further progress. At the intra-household level, the 
displacement decision may  be modelled as a series of decisions23, here made at t0 and 
t1  (see diagram below). With each decision, households may decide between taking 
no displacement action (0) and one of two displacement actions: (1) some but not all of 
the members of the household leaving, and (2) all remaining members of the 
household leaving. If there is only  one person remaining in the household at any  given 
t, splitting is not an option. This model results in seven possible outcomes after two 
decisions: 
Figure 5.1: Displacement decision tree with homogenous time periods.
• outcome a: everyone leaves all together at t0
• outcome b: the household splits at t0 and then all remaining members leave together 
at t1
• outcome c: the household splits at t0 and then splits again at t1
• outcome d: the household splits at t0 and then takes no displacement action at t1
• outcome e: the household takes no displacement action at t0 and then everyone 
t0 t2t1
g
d
c
b
e
f
a2
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
2
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23 It may be argued that part of the displacement decision is return, but I do not 
consider return decisions here, only leaving.
leaves all together at t1
• outcome f: the household takes no displacement action at t0 and then splits at t1
• outcome g: he household takes no displacement action at t0 or at t1
What characterises these time periods t0 and t1? To answer this, we must first address 
what causes the household to make a decision whether to stay  or go. It might be 
reasonable to think that a household is caused to make displacement decisions 
according to new information regarding direct threat. Information regarding indirect 
threat may  function differently  - a household may  know how much food they have, and 
how long they  are able to go without food. However there are incidents providing new 
information regarding indirect threat: indirect threat that stems from incidents of 
violence, and incidents that provide information about availability  of essential goods 
and services. 
So do households make decisions according to universal timeframes? That is to say, 
are t0 and t1 the same across a given area, or are they  unique to each household? And 
is a decision made each time new information arrives, or at regular time periods - every 
day, or every  hour? The answer to this question is complicated by  a question over 
whether everyone staying is necessarily  a decision, as such. People leaving 
necessarily  involves a decision, but everyone staying may reflect the absence of a 
decision rather than an active decision to stay. 
One important source of threat information may  be instances of violence, which, across 
a small area, might mean that the household is reacting to the same act of violence. 
However, over a larger area it becomes increasingly  unlikely  that a single act of 
violence provokes decisions to be made at all households simultaneously. The same 
applies for other sources of threat information, although communication of threat 
through widely-accessed media may create simultaneous decisions over a larger area.
Using a household-centred timeframe, the variation between households as to when t0 
and t1 occurred is of less consequence than the action taken at t0 and t1. Thus the 
nature of the decision rather than the timing of the decision is of prime concern. This is 
broadly  the approach followed by  this paper which, in line with the literature, does not 
focus on displacement timings. A different approach might be justified with very  detailed 
information on threat and threat information. If timings vary  between households, then 
t0 is the timing of first displacement action for any  given household, rather than the 
timing of some instance of violence. This reduces the number of outcomes available 
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from seven to five, because taking no displacement action at t0 merely postpones t0 
until such a time as option 1 or 2 is taken. If displacement action is never taken, then 
option e below is the result.
Figure 5.2: Displacement decision tree with household-specific time periods
Now it is only  the action of splitting that results in additional displacement decisions, so 
a decision is only made at t2 at c. But splitting cannot be the final displacement decision 
except in artificial situations that assume no subsequent time periods. So c cannot be a 
displacement outcome: ultimately decisions to split must lead to either no further 
displacement action or everyone leaving, which if everyone left one by  one will occur at 
tn where n is the original number of people in the household. So splitting will eventually 
lead to the equivalent of outcomes b or d replicated at each of the subsequent time 
periods. This sequence is illustrated in the extended decision tree in the empirical 
section below.
So displacement may  be categorised in various ways, according to outcomes and 
actions. The most obvious is to examine the outcome once all displacement actions 
have been made. We might say that outcomes are simply  the observable outcome 
after all displacement actions: either everyone leaves the household (a and b), some 
but not all people leave the household (d), and no one leaves the household (e). These 
may be termed simple displacement outcomes. Alternatively, we might treat the 
household as a unit, and refer to households that are displaced or households that are 
not. Here, the categorisation would be displaced (a and b) and non-displaced (e), while 
t0 t2t1
d
c
b
e
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0
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d may  be considered either displaced or not. These I refer to as simple unitary 
displacement outcomes. Next, we might consider the first displacement action to be the 
important differentiator of the types of displaced, as the initial reaction to threat may  be 
particularly  significant. Here, b and d are grouped together as ‘split’, while a and e are 
simultaneous displacement and no action respectively. And lastly, we might consider 
the series of decisions by  which the outcome was created. These complex 
displacement outcomes would be at least four because a, b, d and e would be 
differentiated from each other. There could be more than four, as the equivalent of 
outcomes b and d at t3 and subsequent time periods if the household split more than 
once might be considered distinct from b  and d. The four main complex displacement 
outcomes are shown on the table below, alongside the other categorisations. 
Table 5.1: Four displacement outcomes and four displacement categorisations
Displacement 
Outcomes 
from 
Decision Tree
Simple Unitary 
Displacement 
Outcomes
Simple 
Displacement 
Outcomes
First 
Displacement 
Action
Complex 
Displacement 
Outcomes
a
b
d
e
Displacement All displaced Simultaneous 
displacement
Simultaneous 
displacement
Displacement All displaced Split Staged 
displacement
Displacement 
[OR No 
displacement]
Partial 
displacement
Split Partial 
displacement
No displacement No displacement No action No displacement
I now move on to present the data and to illustrate these decision concepts with real 
decisions made by the sample households in PK18.
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5.4 Data
Displacement here differs from the left hand side (LHS) variable used in other literature 
in three ways. First, as outlined already, displacement here is very  unlikely  to be 
conflict-related migration.  Second, displacement in this context was only  relatively 
short-term. The survey  was conducted 18 months after the cessation of violent conflict 
in PK18, and only  in the place of origin, so the displaced captured in the survey  were 
by  definition displaced and returned within 18 months. I discuss displacement not 
captured in the survey later in this section. Third, fine-grained data on timing, intra-
household groupings and destination of displacement were collected. The descriptive 
statistics reveal interesting patterns of behaviour ‘within‘ displacement that suggest 
there may  be problems creating a dichotomous ‘displacement’ outcome variable, at 
least in short-term high threat contexts.
Grouping of displacement
Because previous studies have analysed displacement outcomes, not displacement 
dynamics, they  have treated displacement as dichotomous. The survey  captured 
displacement decisions by asking respondents to specify  which of the household 
members resident at the beginning of the crisis and specified on the household roster 
left together (at the same time and day, travelling by  the same route to the same 
destination). If, for example, women and children left together and first they would all 
be ‘group 1’ and the male head of household leaving later ‘group 2’. For each 
displacement group, their defining features of date of departure, destination and route 
were gathered, as well as secondary  displacements, date of return, mode of transport 
and cost of ‘outward’ displacement travel per person24. I do not analyse destinations or 
routes here - the distinctions between a household’s displacement groupings were 
usually seen in the date of departure and not route or destination.
As has been detailed above, the data here allow us to look ‘inside’ displacement 
decisions, and classification of displacement into the usual binary  outcome is not 
straightforward. The decision tree outlined previously  is extended below to encapsulate 
the full series of decisions for households in PK18. As before, the downward sloping 
red lines reflect no displacement action taken, the horizontal amber lines are the 
decision to split, and the upward green line is everyone in the household at that time 
period leaving. 
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24 Route data were not captured systematically due to difficulty isolating the many various route 
options. See methodology chapter for more details.
Figure 5.3: Full PK18 sample displacement decision tree. 
Taking the first displacement action - around half (361) of the 715 households 
displaced simultaneously, while one eighth (88) households took no displacement 
action. This leaves 266 households that split. The table below  shows the four possible 
displacement categorisations with numbers derived from the decision tree. The table 
uses the most simple of the ‘complex displacement outcomes’, with four outcomes, to 
highlight the difference between the categorisations.  
Table 5.2: Displacement outcome categories from decision tree
Displacement 
Outcomes 
from 
Decision Tree
Simple Unitary 
Displacement 
Outcomes
Simple 
Displacement 
Outcomes
First 
Displacement 
Action
Complex 
Displacement 
Outcomes
simultaneous
staged
partial
stay
627 (or 467 if d 
classed as non-
displaced)
467
361 361
266
106
160 160
88 (or 248) 88 88 88
The table highlights the variation in displacement that is lost by  the aggregated 
categorisations of displacement. Particularly  if the data collection had recorded 
displacement only  at the household level, with partial displacement counted as 
displaced (as in Brück et al. 2012), the binary outcome suggests that for the large 
majority  of the sample displacement was homogenous. Simple displacement outcomes 
at the intra-household level, and first displacement actions both highlight some 
heterogeneity, while complex displacement outcomes encompass the heterogeneity of 
t0 t2t1
97
34
135
9
3
22
0
1
2
361
266
88
1
0
0
t5t4t3
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both first displacement action and displacement outcome. 
Also derived from the decision tree, the next table shows the number of displacement 
actions taken by households in PK18, divided according to the ‘complex displacement 
outcomes’ from the table  above. This demonstrates the heterogeneity  within the 
complex displacement outcomes, and the number of displacement actions taken 
broken down by these outcomes. 
Table 5.3: Number of displacement actions by displacement category
How do people 
displace?
  [in actions]
No 
actions 1 action 2 actions 3 actions 4 actions
Total
[outcomes
]
Stay 88 0 0 0 0 88
Partial 0 135 22 2 1 160
Staged 0 0 97 9 0 106
Simultaneous 0 361 0 0 0 361
Total 88 496 119 11 1 715
Taking no displacement action is limited to the 88 households that all stayed. The 
majority  (496) of households took one displacement action, whether that be everyone 
leaving or some leaving. The staged displaced account for the majority  of the 119 
households taking two displacement actions. Only  one household took four 
displacement actions, while 11 took three actions.
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5.5 Analysis I: The nature of the decision
This first empirical section analyses the displacement decision, describing three main 
characteristics of the displacement decision: who within the household makes the 
decision, when do they  decide, and what information do they  use to decide. The 
analysis then moves on to describe the timing of displacement decisions between the 
different categories of the displaced. 
The Characteristics of Displacement Decisions
The decision tree provokes the question as to what is the nature of each decision-
making timeframe within the household: are t0 and t1 extended periods or of very short 
duration? In the model above the displacement action and the decision to take that 
action are united within each single time period, but there may  be some gap between 
decision and action. Is the decision whether to leave made separately  from the 
decision when to leave? If they  are separate, what is the sequence: whether to leave 
may follow  from when to leave, or when to leave may  follow from whether to leave. 
Also who is making the decision? Does one actor within the household decide what all 
household members will do, or does each actor decide for themselves?
The survey questionnaire also gathered data on how displacement decisions were 
made, which sheds some light onto the nature of displacement decisions tn, specifically 
t0 as the questions were asked about the first displacement action. First, who in the 
household makes the decision to displace? The questionnaire captured information 
about the survey  respondent and a second main decision-maker in the household. This 
was in most cases the head of household and spouse. In the first round of 500 
questionnaires, questions were asked about decision-making within the household, in 
general and regarding displacement. The questionnaire enables us to establish 
whether the decisions were made jointly  between the two primary  or primary and 
(usually) secondary decision-makers, or individually. 
Respondents were asked two questions:
• Who made the decision for you to displace?
• Who generally makes decisions about household spending? 
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Their answers have been reduced to: individual, mostly individual or joint, in order to 
simplify  the great deal of complexity  in the questionnaire that was necessary  due to 
heterogeneity in the composition of households.
Displacement Decisions
Spending 
Decisions
Individual Mostly 
individual
Joint Total
Individual 193 6 16 215
% 89.77 2.79 7.44 100
Mostly individual 6 25 21 52
% 11.54 48.08 40.38 100
Joint 39 19 76 134
% 29.1 14.18 56.72 100
Total 238 50 113 401
% 59.35 12.47 28.18 100
Table 5.4: Cross-tabulation of displacement decisions against spending 
decisions.
Table 5.4 shows that displacement was usually  (59%) the decision of an individual in 
the household, mostly  one individual in a further 12% of households, and in 28% of 
households a joint decision. These correspond closely  to the proportions for spending 
decisions (though the percentages are not shown on the table - they are 54%, 13%, 
33% respectively) although there are more joint decisions in spending than in 
displacement. The cross-tabulation shows that 30%  of those making spending 
decisions jointly made displacement decisions individually, while only  7% of those 
making spending decisions individually  made displacement decisions jointly. This 
indicates that there is more likely  to be a single decision-maker for the whole 
household in displacement than in spending decisions. 
The next table investigates this further, tabulating decision-making against the complex 
displacement categories. Both spending decisions and displacement decisions are 
more likely  to be joint for households that split, whether that be partial or staged 
displacement. This relationship appears stronger for spending decisions than 
displacement decisions - for instance the 39% of staged displaced are from joint 
displacement decision-makers, and 44% of staged displaced are from joint spending 
decision-makers. Corresponding figures for partial displacement are 33% joint 
displacement decisions and 41% joint spending decisions. Almost a quarter of the 
simultaneous displaced are from joint decision making households, whether that be 
132
displacement decisions (24%) or spending decisions (25%). Though the numbers are 
small, those who take no displacement action have the lowest proportion of joint 
decisions, just 14% for displacement and 15% for spending.
Displacement Decisions Spending Decisions
category Individual Mostly 
individual
Joint Total Individual Mostly 
individual
Joint Total
stay 29 3 5 37 29 4 6 39
% 78.38 8.11 13.51 100 74.36 10.26 15.38 100
partial 53 11 32 96 45 13 41 99
% 55.21 11.46 33.33 100 45.45 13.13 41.41 100
staged 30 11 26 67 24 13 29 66
% 44.78 16.42 38.81 100 36.36 19.7 43.94 100
simult.s 132 25 50 207 159 24 60 243
% 63.77 12.08 24.15 100 65.43 9.88 24.69 100
Total 244 50 113 407 257 54 136 447
% 59.95 12.29 27.76 100 57.49 12.08 30.43 100
Table 5.5: Cross-tabulation of displacement and spending decisions against 
displacement outcomes.
The questionnaire in both rounds, so for 715 households, also captured information on 
when the decision was made relative to the time of departure, and the information that 
the decision to displace was based on. Additionally, a question asked the confidence 
people had when they left. The image below captures the relevant section of the 
questionnaire.
Section D
Q1 . En prenant votre decision, lesquels de ces facteurs 
avez vous considerez comme une raison importante pour 
se deplacer? LISEZ LES CRITERES ET MARQUEZ TOUT CE 
QUI EST IMPORTANT DANS LA COLONNE [x]
Q1
x
Q3 parmi ces raisons 
importante, quelle etait la 
plus importante NOTER 
DE 1 A 5, 1 EST LE + 
IMPORTANT
Q4 . En prenant votre decision, lesquels de ces facteurs avez 
vous considerez comme une raison importante pour ne pas 
se deplacer? LISEZ LES CRITERES ET MARQUES TOUT CE QUI 
EST IMPORTANT DANS LA COLONNE [x]
Q1
x
Q6. parmi ces raisons, 
importante, quelle etait la 
plus importante NOTER 
DE 1 A 5, 1 EST LE + 
IMPORTANT
Peur de balles perdues entrant dans la maison Peur d’etre attaqu  par les troupes en prenant la route
Peur de balles perdues pendant que vous etes dehors Peur de recevoir une balle ou un obus dehors
Peur des obus qui tombent pres de la maison Peur que la maison soit pillee si il n’y avait personne
La detresse causee par les  tirs d’obus dans le quartier Peur de violence au lieu de destination
Peur des troupes armees entrant dans les maisons peur de l’appearance de loyaute a l’un de deux camps
Q2. aviez vous d’autres raisons de vous deplacer? 
enumerez trois raisons principales
Q2
x
Q5. aviez vous d’autres r isons de vous deplac r? enumerez 
trois raisons principales
Q2
x
Section E
5
Le depart 
Q1 SVP choissez un groupe de deplacement - peut-etre celui que vous pensez 
etre le deplacement le plus important du menage
 _______ [1-6 GROUPE DE DEPLACEMENT]
_
Q2 Quand aviez vous decidé le jour ou vous alliez partir? ECOUTER ET CHOISIR 
UNE OPTION 
A : le matin meme,   B : pendant la nuit;   C : le soir avant;   D : l’apres midi avant; 
E : le matin avant;    F : deux jours avant;   G : trois jours avant;   H : avant ca 
Q3 Quand vous etes parti, quelle assurance aviez vous?  A : pas du tout confiant   B. un peu confiant   C. confiant.   D tres confiant
Q4 Quelle autres informations disposiez vous qui vous ont permis de decider 
le moment opportun [CHOISIR UNE OU DEUX INFOS]? 
A : prevenu par les CI;       B : prevenu par les FDS;      C : Vu d’autres personnes partir; 
D : informe par des amis hors de PK18;       E : informé par des amis a PK18, 
F : informe par mes voisins,       G : pas de bruit de combats
Figure 5.4: Survey questionnaire extract
So when did people decide when they would leave? Half the respondents decided the 
same morning that they  were going to leave, indicating that it was a somewhat rushed 
decision. A further 23%  of the respondents decided overnight before the leaving the 
following morning. 16% decided the day  before, and the remaining 11% two, three or 
more days before.
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Unsurprisingly  people generally had very  little confidence as they  were leaving - more 
than half (52%) of respondents said they  were not at all confident, while 41% were only 
slightly  confident. This may indicate that they were making the decision despite a great 
deal of uncertainty. The staged displaced were slightly  less confident than the other 
categories.
The uncertainty  is reflected in the manner in which people received information 
regarding when they  should leave. Almost three quarters (73%) left when they did 
because they saw other people leaving, although this was only  66% of the staged and 
84% of the partial displaced. In general though there was little variation between 
displacement categories in this regard. The second most prevalent source of 
information was the lack of sounds of fighting (22%), and the third information from 
friends outside PK18 (17%). Information from either armed group was not important to 
many households, and information from outside PK18 was more used (approximately 
double the number of respondents) than information from friends inside PK18. This 
may reflect the lack of information available to those within intense conflict areas. 
Timing of displacement
For most households there were only  two displacement actions, although for 12 
households there were three or more. Table 5.6 below shows mean date of the first 
action of each household leaving PK18. The mean is the date in spreadsheet format, 
which is ‘translated’ into the actual date in the subsequent column. The partial 
displaced left latest, although within the confidence intervals of the simultaneous 
displaced. The partial displaced also had the greatest variation in date of first 
departure, with a standard error of 1.6. The first group of the staged displaced left, on 
average, four days before the simultaneous. The second group of the staged displaced 
left, on average, nine days after the first group, and four days after the simultaneous. 
For those partial which had a second group, they left on average on 27 February, the 
day after Black Saturday. 
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Category Mean Date Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Action 
1
Partial 40598.13 24 February 2011 1.602 40594.98 40601.27
Staged 40593.02 19 February 2011 1.315 40590.44 40595.6
Simultaneou
s 40597.18 23 February 2011 0.834 40595.54 40598.81
Action 
2
Partial 40600.76 27 February 2011 0.659 40599.46 40602.06
Staged 40602.29 28 February 2011 1.114 40600.09 40604.5
Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics of date of groups 1 and 2 leaving by 
displacement outcome.
The graph below shows timing of first displacement actions for the three displacement 
outcome categories. Cumulative numbers of displaced is in the Y axis, and date on the 
X axis with vertical lines marking Monday 21 February  and Black Saturday  26 
February, which are broadly  the start and finish of the intense fighting periods. The 
curves demonstrate the suddenness and intensity  of the displacement following the 
start of the violence, with the bulk of g1 displacement actions having taken place within 
five days. It is difficult to identify  significant variation between displacement outcomes 
and departure dates from the graph, though the trend from the previous table is 
evident: that the partial displaced stayed longer until leaving suddenly  after the 21st, 
while a greater proportion of the staged displaced had left in the week running up to the 
21st.
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Figure 5.5: Timing of group 1 displacement by displacement outcome.
Figure 5.6: Timing of group 2 displacement by displacement outcome.
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The second graph to the left shows cumulative numbers of g2 displaced over time, with 
the same two date lines marked. The X axis is shorter because of less variation in 
timeframes for when any  second displacement group left. There is no red curve 
because of course simultaneous displaced have no g2. 
While 68% of g1 displacement actions had occurred on or before Black Saturday, and 
94% by  the end of the Sunday, g2 displacement actions were unsurprisingly  later. Just 
39% of g2 actions were on or before Black Saturday, and 76% by  the end of the 
Sunday. 
The timing between first and second displacement action was a mode of three days, 
with seven households in which the first and second action was on the same day. The 
histogram below shows that the majority  of second displacement actions occurred 
within four days of the first displacement. All second displacement later than 10 days 
are aggregated into one measure which accounts for 20% of the 128 households with 
at least two displacement groups. 
Figure 5.7: Histogram showing number of days between group 1 and group 2 
displacement actions. Gaps of more than 10 days are grouped with 10.
137
5.6 Analysis II: Socio-economic characteristics
This paper aims now to establish whether there is merit in a more fine-grained 
approach to displacement decisions. The analysis here focuses on whether there are 
important significant differences between the various categories of displaced outlined 
above. I seek to establish how people who displace are different from those who do not 
displace, and how this varies according to how the displaced are defined. The 
measures by  which the households are different are wealth, household size, education 
and age of household head. I also include ethnicity and religion. 
RHS variables
Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics of RHS variables.
Variable Measure Obs Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Asset 
Index
PCA index based on assets of 
the household at start of 
crisis, adjusted to 0-1 range. 
715 0.351 0.110 0 1
HH size Number of people in HH at start 
of crisis
715 4.586 1.804 1 12
Education Binary measure, 1 if 
respondent or second had 
any education
660 0.789 0.408 0 1
HHH age Age of household head 700 43.579 10.387 22 82
Southern Binary measure, 1 if respondent 
or second were of southern 
ethnicity
715 0.366 0.482 0 1
christian Binary measure, 1 if respondent 
or second were Christian
715 0.322 0.467 0 1
Six key  variables are chosen to describe variation in displacement. Four of these are 
socio-economic characteristics - asset index, household size, education, and age of 
household head. These are chosen based on findings in the literature so far, discussed 
in the introduction, as well as their being important general household descriptors. The 
other two variables are more related to identity. Chapters 3 and 4 revealed that being 
perceived a Gbagbo supporter resulted in behavioural or identity  based threat. 
Simplistically, being Christian and, especially, of Southern ethnicities were both 
predictors of supporting Gbabgo and therefore predictors of being targeted due to 
perceived allegiance with Gbagbo. 
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The asset  index was constructed using an asset portfolio list from the questionnaire, 
which identified which of a list of 16 assets the household owned at the start of the 
crisis in October 2010. The questionnaire extract below in Figure 5.8 shows the assets 
- the list of 16 assets was selected as appropriate for the area from an asset list used 
in a national survey. (For example rural and marine livelihood assets were removed.) 
Because many  households had the same five or six assets, the presence or otherwise 
of a metal door on the house was added to the asset portfolio, and an index created 
through principle component analysis to create a measure of relative wealth at the start 
of the crisis. The distribution of the resulting asset index is shown in Figure 5.9.
1
Section A
Q3. Lesquels de ces biens aviez-vous au moment des élections en Octobre 2010? 
[OUI : NON]
Q4. Lesquels ces biens ont-ils été pillés ou détruits pendant la crise? OUI : NON]
Q5. Lesquels aviez vous vendu pendant de la crise? [OUI : NON]
Q3 Q4 Q5
Bicyclette
Vélomoteur/mobylette
Voiture
Camionnette
Réfrigérateur
Congélateur
Climatiseur
Ventilateur
Cuisinière
Ordinateur
Radio
Télévision
Antenne parabolique
Lecteur VCD/DVD
Téléphone fixe
Téléphone portable
Eligibilité
Q1. Viviez-vous ici au commencement de la crise post-électorale?
1. Oui
2. Non
SI NON? TERMINEZ L’INTERVIEW ET EXPLIQUEZ POURQUOI
Q2. Y a-t-il quelqu’un de disponible dans le ménage avec qui je pourrais m’entretenir 
sur l’expérience de votre ménage durant la crise? Je voudrais parler à l’une des deux 
personnes les plus influentes du ménage.
SI IL N’Y A PERSONNE ALORS POURRAIS JE AVOIR UNE HEURE A LAQUELLE JE 
POURRAIS REPASSER
. 
SI AUCUN RDV NE PEUT ETRE PRIS DANS LE MOIS DE NOVEMBRE, DEMANDER SI 
QUELQU’UN D’AUTRE DANS LE MENAGE QUI PARTICPE A LA PRISE DE DECISION 
DANS LE MENAGE PEUT ETRE DISPONIBLE
LIRE L’OBJECTIF DE LA RECHERCHE POUR SAVOIR SI ELLE PEUT PARTICIPER
RAISON LISTE DE NON-EXÉCUTION
1. REFUS
2. LES OCCUPANTS SONT DEPLACES
3. RAISON D’EMPLOI DU TEMPS
4. AUCUNE RÉPONSE TROIS APRES TENTATIVES
5. RÉPONDANT REPORTE PLUS DE TROIS FOIS L’INTERVIEW
L’INTERVIEW SE FAIT AVEC
1 Chef de famille
2 Autre personne impliquee dans la prise de decision, preciser sa relation avec le chef de 
famille________________
Q6 Q7 Q8
Combien de pieces 
compte votre 
appartement? ECRIRE 
NUMERO
Comment percevez-vous 
votre situation financière par 
rapport à vos voisins du 
meme block? [LISEZ]
Comment percevez-vous 
votre situation financière par 
rapport à vos voisins des 
autres blocks?
1 Tres mauvaise
2 mauvaise
3 legerement mauvaise
4 pratiquement la meme ..
5 legerement mieux..
6 mieux.... 
7 beaucoup mieux?
1 Tres mauvaise
2 mauvaise
3 legerement mauvaise
4 pratiquement la meme ..
5 legerement mieux..
6 mieux.... 
7 beaucoup mieux?
NOM DE L’ENQUETEUR 
PRENOM DE L’ENQUETEUR 
Date:    __/11/2012
Heure: __:__
Numeros Nombres
No du site [1-5] Nombre de batiments / bloc
No du bloc [1-10] Nombre de menage / batiment
No du batiment [1-4] ou + (si necessaire)
No du menage [1-10]
Figure 5.8: Survey questionnaire extract
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Figure 5.9: Histogram showing distribution of values of the asset index.
Household size is a simple measure of the number of people in the household roster, 
defined in the question as people who were living in the household at the start of the 
crisis. The mean household size was 4.6.
The education level of the household head and second respondent was recorded and 
coded into no education, primary, secondary or tertiary. The highest level of either was 
coded into one variable, and, then coded into a binary  variable, with a mean of 0.79. 
(Using the categorical rather than binary  variable makes little difference to the results.) 
There were numerous missing responses in this section of the survey, perhaps 
reflecting the complexity of that module.
HHH age: as described in the earlier analysis, decisions were made by  one individual, 
and most often that was the household head (HHH). The average age of the household 
head was 44 years. 
Southern is a binary  variable based on the ethnicity  of the respondent or the other 
main decision-maker. Ethnicities were grouped into the four main groups: Akan, Voltaic, 
Kru and Mande. If either was Akan or Kru, these were ‘Southern’. Mande and Voltaic 
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groups were labelled ‘Northern’. By  this measure, 39 households were northern and 
southern, and these retain the score of 1 for Southern, making 37% of respondents 
Southern. Christian, similarly, is one if either respondent or other decision-maker 
considered themselves Christians, and otherwise 0, making 32% Christian. The 
correlation between Christian and Southern is 0.58.
Analysing variation in these six variables across the various categorisations, then, will 
illustrate the socio-economic characteristics of the categories as well as how threat 
may vary  across categories. More detailed analysis of other variables and causal 
relationships will follow in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.8 illustrates most variation between displaced and non-displaced on the identity 
variables - Christianity  and Southern. Just 18% of the non-displaced respondents were 
Christian, against 36% of the (binary) displaced. Looking at simple displacement 
outcomes reveals that 41% of the ‘all displaced’ outcome’ are Christians, and just 24% 
of the partial displaced. Complex outcomes demonstrate that 48% of the staged 
displaced are Christian.   
Ethnicity  follows a similar pattern, perhaps unsurprisingly  as 67%  of the Southern 
households were Christian, and 77%  of Christian households were Southern. Of the 
non-displaced 19%  are southern, while 31% are binary  displaced. Complex outcomes 
reveal 59% of staged displaced are southern, 42% of simultaneous, and 29% of partial.
Differences are less pronounced in the other variables between displacement 
categories, and follow different patterns. While the biggest differences in identity 
variables are between simple outcomes (the staged and simultaneous against the 
partial and non-displaced), for household size and asset index those who split in the 
first displacement action are larger and richer respectively. The staged displaced 
appear better educated than other categories, and the non-displaced older than those 
who split, and the simultaneous younger than those who split.
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Table 5.8: Means of RHS variables by displacement outcome 
categorisations, with standard errors.
I II III IV
Binary Simple Outcomes First Action Complex Outcomes
0=all stay
1=any displacement
0=all stay
1=some displaced
2=all displaced
0=no action
1=split
2=simultaneous
0=no action
1=partial
2=staged
3=simultaneous
Asset 
Index 0
1
2
3
HH size
0
1
2
3
Educatio
n 0
1
2
3
HHH age
0
1
2
3
Southern
0
1
2
3
Christian
0
1
2
3
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
0.330 0.014 0.330 0.014 0.330 0.014 0.330 0.014
0.355 0.005 0.364 0.009 0.381 0.007 0.364 0.009
0.352 0.005 0.336 0.006 0.406 0.012
0.336 0.006
4.667 0.274 4.667 0.274 4.667 0.274 4.667 0.274
4.563 0.071 5.062 0.132 5.206 0.110 5.062 0.132
4.394 0.082 4.091 0.084 5.418 0.189
4.091 0.084
0.764 0.050 0.764 0.050 0.764 0.050 0.764 0.050
0.801 0.017 0.779 0.035 0.823 0.025 0.779 0.035
0.809 0.019 0.785 0.023 0.888 0.032
0.785 0.023
46.361 1.322 46.361 1.322 46.361 1.322 46.361 1.322
42.906 0.415 44.283 0.832 44.403 0.652 44.283 0.832
42.441 0.477 41.807 0.530 44.582 1.055
41.807 0.530
0.194 0.047 0.194 0.047 0.194 0.047 0.194 0.047
0.415 0.021 0.290 0.038 0.412 0.032 0.290 0.038
0.457 0.024 0.417 0.027 0.592 0.050
0.417 0.027
0.181 0.046 0.181 0.046 0.181 0.046 0.181 0.046
0.364 0.020 0.241 0.036 0.337 0.030 0.241 0.036
0.406 0.024 0.384 0.027 0.480 0.051
0.384 0.027
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Regression Analysis
In order to understand the relationships while controlling for the effect of the other 
variables, rather than just each variable’s independent relationship, I use logistic 
regression analysis. I do not specify  a theoretical model as I am simply  investigating 
relationships between the various displacement categorisations on the left hand side 
(LHS) and a range of socio-economic variables on the right hand side (RHS). The 
empirical model may be expressed as:
DISPLACEMENT = B0 + B1 ASSETS + B2 HH SIZE + B3 EDUCATION + B4 HHH 
AGE + B5 ETHNICITY + B6 RELIGION + SITE CONTROLS + ERROR TERM
The LHS variable used varies in each outcome, with the table below (repeated from 
Table 5.2 earlier) demonstrating the four LHS variables used. In order to enable easy 
comparison of coefficients across models, the ‘all stay’ category  is used as the 
reference, as the same 88 households form that group across all categorisations of 
displacement. Because of this variation in LHS, the regression moves from a binary 
logit in the first LHS to a multinomial logit with ternary  outcome in iterations presented 
in columns II and III, and a multinomial logit with four-way outcome in IV. 
Table 5.9: PK18 displacement outcome categories
Displacement 
Outcomes 
from Decision 
Tree
I II III IV
Simple Unitary 
Displacement 
Outcomes
Simple 
Displacement 
Outcomes
First 
Displacement 
Action
Complex 
Displacement 
Outcomes
all stay
partial
staged
simultaneous
88 88 88 88
627
160
266
160
467
106
361 361
Results
The results must be interpreted with some care. Again, the focus of this analysis is not 
so much on the regression coefficients as on the variation between the models. The 
coefficients may  suffer from omitted variable bias amongst other issues, but the 
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regression allows for an illustration of correlation between the RHS and LHS variables 
controlling for other RHS variables across the four constructions of the LHS.
Asset index: The binary  outcome demonstrates that the displaced are richer than the 
non-displaced, though this is significant only  at 10%. The simple displacement LHS 
variable (column II) supports this relatively  weak relationship at least for the partial 
displaced with a slightly  increased coefficient, but no difference is found between those 
all displaced and the non-displaced. Column III shows grouping the staged with the 
partial rather than with the simultaneous increases the significance to 1%, and the 
fourth column illustrates that the strongest relationship is between staged displacement 
and wealth (coefficient of 5.8 significant at 1%), while a relationship also exists 
between. There is no significant difference between those who all displace 
simultaneously  and those who do not displace. Grouping by  outcomes that do not 
include actions (I and II as opposed to III and IV) clearly  obscures the strength and 
nature of this relationship between displacement and wealth. 
Education: No significant relationship exists between the binary  measure of education 
and displacement at any  level of categorisation.  The same is true if the four-level 
categorical measure of education is used. The sign of the relationship, though, is 
negative for all groupings relative to ‘all stay’, except for staged, contrasting with the 
descriptive statistics suggesting the lowest education for the ‘all stay’ category. 
Age: Column IV shows all displacement categories are younger than those taking no 
displacement action, with negative coefficients. Unsurprisingly, then, this appears in all 
aggregated measures of displacement.
Household size is significant and positive in columns III and IV, which suggests that, as 
with the asset index, displacement actions seem to have a relationship with household 
size that may  be hidden by looking only  at simple displacement outcomes. The 5% 
significant finding in column III appears to be driven by the staged displaced being 
larger than the households that all stay. 
Ethnicity: The binary  outcome (column I) suggests that more of the displaced are of 
southern ethnicity, yet the complex outcomes reveal the association is with 
simultaneous and staged displacement, and not partial displacement (column IV).  This 
interesting finding that the partial displaced are no more likely  to be of southern 
ethnicity  than those that all stay is obscured if looking only  at the first displacement 
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action, but is also evident in the simple displacement outcome. Complex outcomes 
reveal the coefficient is more than double for the staged displaced relative to the 
simultaneous displaced.
Religion: Column I suggests that the displaced are more likely  (at 10% sig.) to be 
Christian than the non-displaced, but Column IV suggests that only  the Simultaneous 
displaced are more likely to be Christian than the base outcome of all stay.
The goodness of fit tests are difficult to evaluate for multinomial models, but especially 
for comparing between different LHS variable constructions. The count R2 is high for 
the first, binary  regression and reduces as more outcomes in the LHS are introduced. 
This does not indicate a reduction in goodness of fit, as the count R2 is based on the 
difference between predicted outcomes and actual outcomes, and the more possible 
outcomes there are, the lower the count R2.  
The results overall demonstrate significant heterogeneity  between the complex 
displacement outcomes that supports their being treated as separate categories. But 
why  does it matter that the categories are different? People end up displaced and the 
binary regression largely  picks up the overall differences between displaced and non-
displaced. The main reason is that still relatively  little is known about the causes of 
heterogeneity  in displacement decisions. Much more work is required theoretically  and 
conceptually  to develop  models of why  people displace. Importantly  for this thesis, and 
for other work on displacement choice, disaggregating displacement helps in 
understanding the micro-foundations of displacement decisions. Stark socio-economic 
distinctions between the various categories of displaced groups based on process and 
outcome suggests that, to date, important factors may have been missed theoretically 
and empirically in the analysis of displacement choice. 
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Table 5.10: Regression results for four different displacement dependent variable 
constructions.
I II III IV
Binary Simple Outcome First Action Complex Outcome
Base outcome (0) is the 88 households that All Stay
1 Par., Sta. & Sim. Partial Staged & Partial Partial
Asset Index 2.717* 3.226* 4.420*** 3.518** 
HH size 0.061 0.173 0.259** 0.193
Education -0.044 -0.061 0.067 -0.038
HHH age -0.040*** -0.038** -0.046*** -0.040** 
Southern 0.856*** 0.534 0.975*** 0.551
Christian 0.583* 0.195 0.394 0.199
Constant 3.681*** 1.477 1.180 1.340
2 Staged & Sim. Simultaneous Staged
Asset Index 2.502 1.340 5.763***
HH size -0.005 -0.151 0.390***
Education -0.039 -0.163 0.384
HHH age -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.057***
Southern 0.990*** 0.774** 1.658***
Christian 0.731* 0.741* 0.656
Constant 3.778*** 4.682*** -1.081
3 Simultaneous
Asset Index 1.444
HH size -0.146
Education -0.150
HHH age -0.038***
Southern 0.782** 
Christian 0.747* 
Constant 4.638***
Observations 646 646 646 646
Count R2 0.89 0.67 0.61 0.56
BIC -3740.7 -3065.8 -2980.6 -2620.6
* p<.10, ** p<.05,*** p<.01 - standard errors clustered at block level.
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5.7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has simply  been to describe the displacement decision rather 
than to explain it. I have described how decisions may  comprise a process of actions 
that lead to outcomes, and proposed categorisations on the basis of actions as well as 
outcomes. I also described how decisions were made within the household - who was 
involved and what information households used in deciding when to leave. These 
factors appear to vary between the proposed displacement categories.
The results show that the process of displacement matters; that actions as well as 
outcomes describe important heterogeneity  in displacement decisions. The nature of 
displacement decisions are very  different according to wealth, to household size, to 
age of household head, and to ethnicity. The study of the causes of displacement is still 
in relative infancy  as an academic field, and it is still important to know  what it is we are 
trying to understand. The displaced are a very  heterogenous group, and by 
disaggregating according to process of displacement as well as outcome important 
aspects of this heterogeneity  can be revealed. Data on heterogenous displacement 
process would be quite easy  to collect in survey  research, and it may be worthwhile 
doing so. Finally, the findings suggest that households are actively  managing threat 
rather than responding passively; and support the assertion of the rational choice 
displacement literature (Adhikari 2013) that - even in situations of extreme violence - 
there is agency in the decision25. 
In conclusion, the results demonstrate that socio-economic factors may  not drive only 
whether people displace, but how they  displace, and how they  make decisions about 
displacement. And understanding how people displace may  help in understanding why 
they displace, an issue to which I now turn in Chapter 6.
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25 The existence of the splitting phenomenon has implications for the theoretical understanding 
of displacement decisions. It is suggestive that there are various displacement thresholds for 
different household members, as I discuss in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6:
Flight into the Danger Zone: 
Explaining displacement 
decision variation
Abstract
What explains variation in displacement  outcomes? Previous studies have 
analysed the importance of violence and of socio-economic factors. Perceived 
threat  has rarely  and only recently been analysed as a cause of variation in 
displacement decisions, and its measurement  presents some empirical 
challenges. This paper uses a novel measure  of various perceived threats using 
ranking of perceived relative importance. Additionally, the chapter uses a novel 
dependent  variable for displacement  research, and analyses the relationship 
between these complex displacement  outcomes and three possible causal 
mechanisms: perceived direct  threat, indirect  threat, violence impact, as well as 
the mediating protection factors. The chapter further represents a rare 
investigation into causal mechanisms underlying displacement  decisions using 
a dataset  in which traditional migration forces in the displacement  decision are 
very limited.
Overall, the results demonstrate that all three  channels - direct threat, indirect 
threat, and impact  - are related to displacement outcomes. As expected, the 
complexity in the production of these through the actions of armed groups, the 
households in question and in other household and market  responses makes 
establishing the causal mechanisms very difficult. The protection resources of 
wealth and household adults were shown to be correlated with staged 
displacement, and the protection ‘liabilities’ of young children were similarly 
positively  associated with staged displacement. The same is true  of the partial 
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displaced, except that  wealth is not  significant  and the coefficients are smaller 
for the other protection factors. So even where migration factors are not  likely to 
play any role, socio-economic characteristics of the household are  important 
factors due to their role in facilitating protection strategies. 
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6.1 Introduction
So if, as found in the previous chapter, it is useful to distinguish between four 
displacement decision categories, what is it that explains these household choices? 
The literature has tended to ask whether it is migration factors or threat that drives 
displacement decisions. This paper takes a step backwards and asks instead how 
violence affects displacement decisions. From the descriptions analysed in the 
previous chapter we already know a little about some of the socio-economic 
characteristics of those in each of the four displacement decision categories. In this 
chapter I present a model of why  households might follow different displacement 
decisions, generate hypotheses about the relationships between threat, indirect threat, 
impact and displacement, and test these hypotheses using the PK18 data. 
Explaining variation in displacement outcomes is a small, expanding area of civil wars 
research. Similar findings have been reached across papers regarding the role of both 
socio-economic and threat factors in the displacement decision, rooted in the work of 
Engel and Ibáñez (2007) use of  adapted migration models. The literature suffers from 
two main weaknesses. Causal inference is usually  not attempted due to the inability  to 
exclude endogeneity  issues. Second, generating hypotheses and interpreting results is 
difficult because of the various conflicting roles of socio-economic household 
characteristics. Both of these problems are caused at least in part by  the insubstantial 
theoretical foundations on the side of threat and the impact of violence. The aim of this 
paper is to address the reasons for variation in displacement choice using the 
comprehensive micro-foundations for displacement decisions built in the other chapters 
of the thesis. 
The previous chapter described the relationship of some important household 
characteristics with the displacement decision. Variables that also related to threat 
were included, but were not the focus of the analysis. This chapter seeks to explore in 
more depth the measurement of threat, and the impact of threat on displacement. I 
have already  explored  in some depth the types of threat in PK18 in the conceptual 
chapter previously. To reiterate from the previous chapters: violence is the imposition of 
asset cost, and direct threat is the prospect of such a loss. Indirect threat is the 
prospect of asset losses (including household members) through lack of access and 
availability  of essential goods and services. Chapter 4 illustrated how threats are 
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multiple and competing. This chapter discusses these issues with a more quantitative 
empirical focus, and then moves on to analyse the role of different forms of threat in 
driving displacement decisions.
As Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) have noted, if displacement had a simplistic 
relationship to incidence of violence, then it would always be homogenous. And so 
because heterogenous displacement outcomes are observed, then at least two 
possible causes exist: non-random allocation of violence; and socio-economic factors 
in the decision. Rational choice displacement research seeks to explain displacement 
heterogeneity, examining the causal role of these two factors. But there are conceptual 
challenges in distinguishing between socio-economic factors and violence. There are 
two main reasons for this. As Engel and Ibáñez (2007) suggest, in certain contexts 
socio-economic factors may  determine the allocation of threat – for example the 
targeting of wealthy  households. The other reason is the complexity  of the relationship 
between violence, socio-economic welfare and civilian response. The introduction and 
subsequent chapters have sought to clarify  these relationships, and this chapter 
represents the application of a clear conceptual understanding of the causal 
mechanisms to a dataset in which traditional migration forces in the displacement 
decision are very limited.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, three mechanisms by  which violent acts may 
lead to displacement are outlined: direct threat, indirect threat (access and availability), 
and impact. I explain that the levels of these are driven not only  by  violent acts but also 
by  civilian protection responses on the part of the household in question and other 
households and firms. This creates additional complexity in each of the three 
mechanisms, making empirical and conceptual distinction between ‘economic’ and 
threat drivers of displacement difficult. The literature is discussed and empirical 
evidence to date presented before a model of displacement decisions is presented. 
The subsequent data section describes the construction of variables, hypotheses and 
descriptive statistics. The fourth section presents the empirical analysis and results, 
and the fifth concludes. 
6.2 Concepts and Literature
Endogeneity issues in displacement research
I reiterate from the introduction that violence has two direct effects: it is a direct cost 
imposed on the household through the destruction of assets; and it represents 
communication about the nature of direct threat (targeting criteria, targeting capacity 
and propensity  to use violence). Violence has two additional indirect effects. The 
household itself may  respond with asset protection strategies (described in Chapter 4) 
and others in the area may  follow their own protection strategies. These protection 
strategies may  lead to indirect threat to households through lack of access to and lack 
of availability  of goods and services needed to provide for the human assets of the 
household. But this model described previously in Chapter 1 operates under the asset 
protection assumption: that threat is sufficient that households focus solely on the 
protection of assets. In reality, in many  contexts and when a conflict goes on for a long 
period of time, fluctuations in violence intensity  over months and years means people 
are not likely  to be making decisions under that assumption. That is to say  they  will 
also focus on returns to labour and returns to capital, not just preventing their 
destruction or degradation. Where returns to assets are part of the decision, this may 
be referred to as conflict induced migration. Where the decision is wholly  focused on 
protecting assets from direct or indirect threat, this is displacement. The studies below 
do not exclude the possibility  of conflict induced migration, except for the as-yet-
unpublished Brück et al. (2012).
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1 Action Violent Action
2 Result
Costs imposed on 
households by 
acts of destruction 
or removal
GOAT STOLEN 
BY ARMED 
GROUP
Change perception 
of direct threat
INCREASED 
FEAR OF 
VIOLENCE
Access indirect 
threats (stemming 
from impact)
CASH STOLEN 
SO CANNOT 
BUY FOOD
Availability 
indirect threats 
(stemming from 
impact)
FOOD TRUCK 
STOLEN SO 
SUPPLIES 
DISRUPTED
3 Action Protection Action 1
4 Result
Asset costs either 
directly self-
imposed by 
households, or, 
imposed by 
indirect threats
GOAT SOLD TO 
BUY RICE, or, 
GOAT DIES DUE 
TO LACK OF 
MEDICINE
Change perception 
of direct threat
REDUCED FEAR 
OF VIOLENCE
Access indirect 
threats (stemming 
from protection)
REDUCED 
EARNINGS  AND 
HIGHER PRICES 
SO CANNOT 
BUY FOOD
Availability 
indirect threats 
(stemming from 
protection)
SUPPLIERS 
STOP SENDING 
FOOD TRUCKS 
SO SUPPLIES 
DISRUPTED
5 Action Protection Action 2
Figure 6.1: Five step model of causal mechanisms from violence to protection 
actions, with examples in capitals (derived from conceptual figure in 
introduction)
Taking only  the actions of armed groups without civilian protection response, there are 
three channels from violence to displacement: impact, direct threat and indirect threat 
(access or availability). These are represented respectively  in orange, green and yellow 
in the diagram above. The effects of violence are manifested in one or more of these 
three ways, which may  lead to a protective response by  civilians. (This may  be more 
easily  interpreted with reference to the conceptual diagram in Chapter 1.) The same 
channels exist following on from a civilian protection response, but the three factors are 
then subject to influence by  the violent action, and by  the protection response of 
households, and by the protection response of others. 
Displacement research seeks to understand the specific protection action of 
displacement. It does this by observing whether displacement ever forms one of the 
series of protection actions taken by  civilians. Observed displacement is a protection 
action that may be part of a long series of protection actions, and so the possible 
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causal channels from various acts of violence over time create a complex range of 
channels from violence to displacement. 
The two main empirical challenges that result from this complexity  are distinguishing 
between ‘economic factors’ and violence as drivers of displacement, and (relatedly) 
distinguishing between impact and direct threat effects of violence. Economic factors, 
or migration factors, are essentially  reduced earnings, which under the asset protection 
assumption are considered only  as indirect threat, but in less intense, longer, rural 
conflicts that form the bulk of the literature they are important drivers of conflict-induced 
migration. Violence data at the household level is a measure of the impact of violence 
(as distinct from direct or indirect threat) but impact is endogenous to displacement due 
to threat, while violence data at the aggregate level is a better exogenous measure of 
direct threat, but says little about the complex mechanisms by  which violence leads to 
displacement. I have discussed this second problem already  in Chapter 5, so I turn 
now to discuss in some depth the conflation of direct threat and impact.
Conflation of direct threat and impact
Distinguishing empirically  between threat of violence and incidence of violence is 
difficult. There are two main strategies that have been used to attempt to distinguish 
between them. Adhikari (2012) measures perceived (civilian-side) threat by  including a 
survey  question asking people about their fear of violence at the time of displacement. 
This represents a clear step forward in attempting to distinguish between impact and 
direct threat, but is problematic in that it is only  subjective perception of threat that is 
distinguished from incidence of violence. The other strategy is to include measures of 
objective (armed group side) threat: that is, some measures of how violence was 
targeted, and whether households fit into the targeting criteria of the armed groups 
present. This is included in Adhikari (2013). To the extent that this strategy  still relies on 
some measurement of violent incidents it also has the challenge of potentially 
conflating the economic consequences and threat of violence. It is possible that if the 
area of study  is sufficiently  small, this latter problem may  be avoided because market 
failure stemming from conflict will affect a wide area, even if, as with direct threat, 
people's ability to mitigate varies.
In evaluating the causal role of violence in displacement decisions, the issue of 
endogenous relationships between violence and displacement are important. Broadly, 
the endogeneity  may be caused by two factors: reverse causality and/or simultaneity 
(co-determination by  some third factor). Reverse causality  is an issue with respect to 
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physical assets of the household: if people leave their physical assets are more likely 
to be looted. But they  are less likely  to be harmed themselves as people flee from 
danger to relative safety, or at least intend to. An increase in displacement therefore 
increases probability of looting and decreases probability  of violence to household 
members. So threat26  determined by armed groups is the third factor that co-
determines both displacement and violence. There are two parts to this endogenous 
relationship, the duration of exposure to threat in a given area, and the variation of 
allocation of threat.
We should expect if violence is allocated randomly  in space 1, and no violence exists in 
space 2, that those who move to 2 quicker are less likely  to suffer violence. 
Additionally, as Schaeffer (2010) suggests, the presence of fewer targets at the origin, 
once some households have displaced, may  augment this impact depending on the 
process for randomly  selecting targets. But if violence is allocated non-randomly  in 
space 1, then those who perceive that they are more likely  to suffer violence are more 
likely  to displace. We may  refer to these causes of endogeneity  as threat exposure 
(those who move are less likely  to experience violence) and target variation of threat 
(those who are inclined to move are so inclined because they  are more likely  to 
experience violence) respectively.
This has covered the human side of households. When violence is in the form of 
looting of capital assets, the sign on threat exposure is reversed: those who move are 
more likely  to be looted due to absence of protection, assuming random allocation of 
looting. The sign of the target variation endogenous relationship remains the same, but 
the reason is reversed: displacement may increase propensity  for targeting of empty 
houses when looting is non-random.
So measuring incidence of violence, or realised threat, may be problematic. The nature 
of the problem depends on the nature of the threat as discussed here, but also on the 
level of aggregation in measurement. The next section discusses the measurement of 
threat and violence in the literature.
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26 This is objective (militia-side) threat rather than perceived threat. This threat is not 
represented on the conceptual diagram, but it is this threat that drives the allocation of violence 
- the actual probability of being affected rather than the perceived probability that drives 
response.
Measurement of threat or violence in the literature
Rockmore (2011) makes the point that for the majority  of the population experiencing 
war it is the threat of violence that drives behaviour change. Yet the threat of violence is 
difficult to measure, so many  of the studies use measures of violence either as a proxy 
for threat (Davenport et al. 2003) or as an alternative to threat. Of course violence has 
a relationship with threat of violence, but the precise nature of that relationship is 
dependent on, as argued previously, the targeting criteria, targeting capacity  and 
violence propensity, as well as the scale at which violence is measured. In summary, if 
violence is measured by  direct experience at the household level it represents a cost 
imposed and a threat communication.
Household measures
Adhikari (2013) presents pioneering measures of threat at the household level. A 
survey  of households asked respondents to say  on a scale of 1-4 (not important-very 
important) how they  perceived six threats: physical threat to harm the respondent; 
threat of political coercion or curtailed political freedom; forced recruitment; threat of 
murder of a family  member; threat of physical or mental torture; threat of sexual 
humiliation. Broadly  these correspond with the definition of direct threats here (with 
only  political coercion probably  excluded). Adhikari also measures violence. For human 
assets, a binary  variable is coded one if any of a similar range of abuses as in the 
threat section actually  occurred to the individual. For capital assets, crop or animal 
loss, destruction of the home, and loss of land are measured and all have a positive 
association with displacement, which is explained as a push factor but may  well in fact 
additionally be a consequence of displacement. 
Engel and Ibáñez (2007) and Ibáñez and Velez (2008) use questions about whether 
the household received a death threat as a measure of direct threat, and whether the 
household knew about violent events in the hometown or a nearby  town as a measure 
of indirect threat. A similar measure is used by  Brück et al. (2012: 10), although their 
questions are phrased “Do you know someone who experienced...?” Their indirect 
threat measure has the merit of stemming from the perception of the household.
Receiving a death threat is clearly  time variation endogenous with displacement, 
though this will only  result in underestimation of the importance of threat. In the Brück 
et al. (2012) context of displacement and return, knowing someone who experienced 
certain forms of violence does not necessarily  mean that this knowledge was formed 
before displacement when information access may have been poor. It does, though, 
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suggest that violence was occurring in the social networks of the household in 
question. Because the information may  have been gathered before, during or after 
displacement, this measure is not time variation endogenous but it may correspond 
less well to perceived threat if knowledge was formed ex post. The main benefit of the 
household measures is the ability  to distinguish to some extent between threat and 
cost impacts of violence. This is exploited by  Adhikari (2013) but less so by  Brück et al. 
(2012) and Engel and Ibáñez (2007) - indeed as discussed in previous chapters the 
latter do not include direct threats in the regression due to endogeneity concerns.
Community measures
Adhikari (2013) measures whether any  industry  present (an ‘industry’ is such if it 
employs more than 10 people in the village) was destroyed in the community. This, like 
the individual measures specified above, has a positive relationship  with displacement. 
Again, the direction of causality is unclear, though this is perhaps less likely  than 
household losses to be caused by displacement, and may  be clarified with further 
information27. Czaika and Kis-Katos (2009) measure conflict at the village level - a 
binary variable coded one if the village head reports occurrence of conflict in the 
previous year28. This does not necessarily  imply  either violence or threat of violence, 
and the definition of conflict was left to the respondent village heads to decide. 
Violence data  (casualty  estimates) were collected by  the same means but are not 
used in the chapter. The variable includes a time dimension, but the conflict out-
migration may  have occurred at any  time in the previous three years, while the conflict 
variable is only for the previous one year.
Regional and district measures 
Bohra-Mishra and Massey  (2011) use an index of incidents of violence (bomb blasts, 
casualties from bomb blasts, and casualties from major violent incidents) each 
measured in the district and in surrounding districts. Time is the main component of 
their study, as they  have these violence data by month, combined with migration data 
from a monthly panel survey, so they  analyse the impact of violence in time t on 
migration in t+1. The endogeneity  concerns are reduced but the study  says nothing 
about the mechanisms by  which violence causes displacement, and unfortunately 
variation in wages across time is not captured. The intensity of violence however has 
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27 No information is available in the paper or supplementary material  on the measurement of industrial 
destruction.
28 in addition to their community measures, Czaika and Kis-Katos  (2009) use a conflict cluster 
variable which is set to one if at least 20% of villages within a subdistrict report conflict. 
interesting impacts, which I shall return to below.   
Adhikari (2012) studies cross-sectional violence and displacement measures for the 75 
districts of Nepal aggregated over the whole period of the war. The violence measures 
are the total number killed and the total number abducted in each district, and the 
destruction of public infrastructure. Economic factors are captured by  the economic 
empowerment index of each district. Engel and Ibáñez (2007) also include indirect 
threat measures at the regional level, with dummies for presence of subversive groups 
and other military forces to approximate perceptions of safety.
District-level studies avoid the endogeneity  problems of household measure studies 
because the measurement of violence is separate from the measurement of 
displacement. But in doing so it becomes almost impossible to differentiate between 
conflict induced migration and displacement, as defined here. Nor is it easy  with such 
data on violence rather than threat to make progress in determining the causal 
mechanisms at play due. 
Two main areas for progress are clear at the micro end of the measurement spectrum. 
First is that types of threat have not been differentiated - where measurement of threats 
differentiate these were aggregated into one index variable. This allows for the possible 
complexity in how threat may  be driving displacement. Rather than a blanket measure 
of threat severity  at origin as in Adhikari (2013), threat may  vary  in terms of how it is 
targeted and where at origin it is targeted, two issues that are addressed here. Second, 
violence against assets has been treated as an economic driver of displacement rather 
than a potential consequence, with potential confusing impacts on the interpretation. 
The data here is supported by  qualitative evidence (presented in an earlier chapter) 
that strongly  suggest violence against assets was a consequence of displacement, so 
it is analysed as such. 
Threat measures in PK18
As I have discussed in previous chapters, the context here was one in which violence 
was targeted spatially, collectively and behaviourally. I refer to collective and 
behavioural violence as selective violence here as the data do not permit distinctions to 
be drawn. The opportunity  exists here to discriminate between the nature of the threats 
people thought were important in their decision rather than the existing options of: 
subjective perceived severity  of the threat; incidence of death threat; knowledge of 
incidence of violence; or aggregated measures. As I shall illustrate in the next section, 
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the data will allow for establishing, for the individuals in the household, whether the 
prospect of spatially-targeted violence or selective violence were important factors in 
displacement decisions; and for the physical assets of the household whether they  said 
the possibility  of looting was important in their displacement decision. The capacity  of 
these measures to avoid some of the endogeneity concerns will be discussed. 
Modeling displacement 
Scholars in displacement or conflict induced migration research model displacement in 
two ways: relative utility  displacement models (Engel and Ibáñez 2007), or threshold 
displacement (Bohra-Mishra and Massey  2011). The threshold model has yet to be 
articulated, but is supported by  empirical findings, as I shall describe below. Relative 
utility  models are similar to migration models in that the costs and benefits of staying 
are weighed against the costs and benefits of leaving to a particular destination, and 
displacement occurs once utility  at the destination is greater than at the origin. They 
differ from migration models in that some measure of threat or violence is included in 
the model as a cost at origin and destination. Threshold displacement models, on the 
other hand, assume that people do not leave unless a certain level of threat is reached 
in situ. Or: “There is a cost associated with one’s decision to stay put, such that the 
individual will rather flee than stay  once the perceived cost (of staying) outweighs 
attachment to home” (Adhikari 2012: 594). Bohra-Mishra and Massey  (2011) find 
support for a threshold model in their analysis of displacement in the Chitwan province 
of Nepal. The effect of violence is curvilinear, with violence having a negative effect on 
out-migration at low to moderate levels, and increasing out-migration at higher levels. 
Morrison (1993) finds a similar threshold effect in Guatemala. 
In reality  these models are very  similar, but in threshold models the benefits associated 
with the destination are not considered (i.e. they are held constant across households). 
So much of the supposed distinction may  be found in the poorly  articulated difference 
between displacement and conflict induced migration. There are at least two possible 
distinctions: whether relative factor returns are included in the decision, and time 
horizons. The former I have discussed already  with reference to the asset protection 
assumption. The latter has been discussed with reference to Engel and Ibáñez’s idea 
of two forms of displacement: reactive and preventative. The former is an impulsive 
decision to avoid death at origin, the latter a more considered decision of risks at lower 
levels of violence. Arguably time horizons and consideration of factor returns represent 
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the same distinction29. In any  case the possibility  of displacement and conflict induced 
migration co-existing may be removed through appropriate selection of context30.
Thresholds, then, are important. But what are they? Adhikari’s (2013) description 
quoted above of the threshold model focuses on the costs of displacement - people do 
not want to leave because of attachment to home. In other words, the reduction of 
threat resulting from displacement is weighed against the costs of displacement. But 
another (non-exclusive) possibility, supported by  the qualitative work earlier in this 
thesis, is that there are threats outside the home. This alternative possibility  forms the 
bulk of the interpretation of Bohra-Mishra and Massey  of their findings, which is worth 
articulating in full:
In sum, our results thus support a threshold theory of migration and violence. 
Apparently, only in situations characterized by high levels of violence do people see no 
option but leaving. Under conditions of extreme violence, threats to safety are 
perceived to exceed the risks of travel to a new and unfamiliar destination. At lower 
levels of violence, however, the risks of movement outweigh those associated with 
staying home for a variety of reasons. First, levels of violence may be much higher in 
other parts of the country, and by staying home, people avoid elevated risks elsewhere. 
Second, actions taken by insurgents and the state often create unsafe traveling 
conditions owing to a proliferation of strikes, protests, blockades, security checks, 
curfews, and roadblocks. Third, civil conflict is often associated with a breakdown of 
formal authority, creating a dangerous public sphere through which people must travel, 
one in which robbery, looting, assault, kidnapping, and other violations are common. 
For these reasons, unless violence reaches certain levels, people are more likely to 
confine themselves to the safety of their homes, family networks, and surroundings 
they know and trust.
(Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011: 422-3)
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29 Over time, as conflict ebbs and flows, a growing proportion of people will be concerned with 
making money and not just protecting themselves from violence.
30 Threshold and relative utility models are not only theoretically similar. Indeed the empirical 
observation of violence threshold effects on ‘displacement’ may be explained by homogenous 
relative benefits of conflict-induced migration across households. This may on first consideration 
appear unlikely, but over time the effect of certain levels of violence may spread across markets 
through the accumulated protection strategies of businesses and households, rendering 
economic sectors unviable. Hence, relative utility models may explain the observation of 
threshold effects. 
So threat in situ may  be weighed against the costs of displacement, and against the 
threats en route to a refuge. Given the prevalence of the finding of thresholds in the 
literature, and the conditions in PK18 described previously, there are grounds to 
attempt to formalise a model of displacement that takes into account these two 
possible thresholds. The model outlined below has three zones: inside the home or 
other local shelter; surrounding that is the ‘danger zone’; and beyond that is a third 
zone of refuge.
Figure 6.2: Three zones in the displacement model.
Origin
The origin is the home or other indoor shelter (for example, church or air raid shelter) in 
the vicinity  used to provide protection from threats. Inside there may be food and water 
as well as shelter. Armed actors and other civilians may know  where you are if inside, if 
they have access to information, which may influence the level of threat at origin. 
Generally  being inside is safer than the danger zone but in certain situations being 
inside may be higher threat than being outside - if buildings may  collapse, or if 
personally  targeted in a known location, or if certain structures are targeted, or if a 
building is set on fire. The threat at origin to the household human assets is expressed 
as TOi. 
Danger zone
Danger zone is outside the home or other shelter, and before reaching refuge or going 
back inside. The danger zone is uncertain, especially  outside the immediate 
Refuge
Danger
Origin
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environment surrounding the home. There is less protection from spatial targeted 
violence, and the chance of identification or misidentification. 
Without displacement, entry  into the danger zone is occasionally  required to overcome 
indirect threats to the household (access to and availability  of goods and services to 
maintain human assets). This threat to those household human assets entering the 
danger zone if staying is expressed as TZis. Passing through the danger zone is 
required  by all human assets displacing. In that case, TZid is the danger zone threat to 
household human assets displacing.
Refuge
The refuge is another shelter beyond the danger zone. Perceived threat here TRi is 
expected to be lower than the threat inside the origin. 
The Danger Zone in the Abidjan Crisis
Although this threshold model of displacement is rooted in empirical findings in the 
literature, it also reflects the reality  of war zones as represented in qualitative work 
such as Lubkemann (2008) and in news reports from war zones from Gaza to Syria 
and beyond. Two brief examples may  illustrate the applicability  of the model in Abidjan 
particularly. 
My research assistant lived quite far from PK18 in another commune of Abidjan, where 
pro-Gbagbo militias patrolled the streets. He stayed throughout the crisis. He lived on 
the third floor of a building with small windows facing onto the street but with limited 
visibility  due to other buildings. The back of the building faced open scrubland. If he 
wanted to go out, he would first look to see if anyone was in the streets. He would then 
call to his neighbours in the adjacent rooms with a view to the scrubland to check if that 
was clear. On passing to the rear walkways and staircase, he would call down to 
neighbours on lower floors with a better view of the street to see if it was safe. Only 
then would he cautiously go to the main entrance of his own building. 
The building I stayed in during the research fieldwork was in Adjame, yet another 
commune of Abidjan. It had four floors, and I was on the top floor. The landlady  lived in 
large rooms on the ground floor behind solid metal gates, and her daughter in law’s 
family  lived adjacent to me on the top floor. The open communal walkways and 
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staircase here fronted the hilltop building and looked across the valley and over the 
lagoon. Bullet holes were still visible in the front of the top floor rooms. The daughter in 
law  remained living in these rooms until one day  she found a bullet on her bed when 
she went upstairs to sleep in the evening, crawling along the balcony walkway  to her 
room. Thereafter, the whole family remained on the ground floor.
These two examples from areas of Abidjan where fighting was much less intense 
demonstrate how the boundary  between the danger zone and the home is not entirely 
clear cut - parts of the home may  become the danger zone and the shelter reduce to 
just one or two rooms of the household. Second, it illustrates the care by  which civilians 
gather threat information before proceeding into the danger zone, a point that I return 
to in later analysis.
Displacement dilemmas
This section incorporates the qualitative findings articulated in chapter four into the 
model. Using the three-zone model of threat, some other definitions may be made:
• The asset protection assumption holds when TZi is sufficient to make people stop 
seeking returns to labour.
• TZis  + TOi is the anticipated localised threat (ALT): expected threat levels in origin 
that include journeys outside into the danger zone to alleviate indirect threat. 
• Households have a preference to leave when TZis  + TOi is greater than the costs of 
displacement. 
But displacement does not necessarily  occur despite a preference to leave, as I shall 
return to later. I turn now to two of the protection dilemmas related to displacement 
covered in the previous chapter. 
Violence en route
For some, threat at origin TOi is greater than TZid, and in those situations there is no 
‘en route’ displacement dilemma - it makes sense to leave. But, given the house 
provides some protection, in many  cases TZid > TOi. As TOi rises, the desire to be in the 
refuge grows, but this benefit of threat reduction in the medium is weighed against the 
immediate increase in threat required. All else being equal, and ignoring TZis for 
simplicity, displacement thresholds could be a function of one, two or three of the zonal 
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threats.
(2)
(3)
(4)
In the first case, there is some limit of threat that the household will tolerate in situ 
before leaving. This might be rational if there is no knowledge of threat conditions 
outside the house, or when TOi is intolerable regardless of TZid. More likely, the 
displacement threshold is a function of threat at origin and in the danger zone, perhaps 
when TZid = TOh. Third, the household might consider whether the reduction in threat 
attained from moving to the refuge TRi - TOi is worth the rise in threat of passing 
through the danger zone TZid - TOi. In further iterations of the model below I shall 
assume the second is the case - that two zones are considered.
Direct vs Indirect
Movement outside the home is required to access essential goods and services in 
order to prevent indirect threats. So entering the danger zone is required just once for 
displacement but perhaps occasionally  for physical access to food31. For food access 
the number of occasions and the duration of movement outside will depend on the 
availability  of food, but only  one person per household or even per several households 
is required to collect food. For water more people may be required due to the weight, 
and for services such as healthcare the specific person may  need to relocate. For 
displacement, all people displacing clearly must move outside the home. 
The implications for displacement are as follows: if entering the danger zone is 
required in any case to access food or other goods and services, households may 
decide to carry  on to a refuge. The likelihood of this will depend on the extent to which 
TZid > TZis.
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31 And, if required, to work for financial access to food if returns to labour are available without 
displacement. I ignore this possibility for now.
Human Assets vs Capital Assets
To discuss the third dilemma, I introduce two new elements. First, the threat to capital 
assets, which are assumed to be immobile at origin, is expressed as TOc. Second, the 
household also has protection resources Pi that may be allocated to the reduction of 
threat to human assets and capital assets. These refer to human protection resources - 
the protection resource of the building is inferred in TOi. Pi may  be allocated to reduce 
TOi, TOc, or TZid. Depending on the endowment of Pi, it may  be allocated to one or 
more of these simultaneously. Protecting TOh and TOc may  be easier to achieve 
simultaneously  with a lower endowment of Pi as they are in the same location - a 
dilemma exists when trying to protect TOic and TZid with low  levels of Pi as they are in 
different locations.
The model
Engel and Ibáñez (2007), an early  and influential paper in the literature, proposes a 
displacement model based on migration models with the inclusion of a threat function. 
For a household i at location n considering moving to destination d, the probability  of 
displacement is a function of the perception of safety  at the origin Sin and the 
perception of safety  at a possible destination Sid, the economic status of the household 
at origin Yin, and destination Yid, , migration and information costs Ci , and household 
characteristics that influence migration preferences, Zi .
(5)
Economic status is not defined in detail beyond ‘income and quality  of life’; while 
migration costs include ‘loss of goods at the place of origin or family  ties at the receptor 
location’; and household characteristics are defined as ‘socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household (that) determine the household’s preference 
structure ...(that) determines how the household evaluates the trade-offs between the 
increased security  from violence and the riskiness of living conditions after 
displacement’ (2007: 342). 
The challenge outlined above is differentiating impacts of violence at any location j on 
Sij from impacts of violence on Yij,. As I have said, this chapter attempts to deal with 
this by excluding Sij  and Yij from the analysis, narrowing the focus to the roles of Ci , 
and Zi in determining displacement choice. The further benefit of this approach is that 
Yi, Ci and Zi may  be co-determined, and this presents a particular difficulty  in 
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interpretation due to the relative paucity  of both theoretical work and empirical 
evidence. I return to the empirical strategy in a later section.
I have argued that the context here allows for controlling for threat, or what Engel and 
Ibáñez call the perception of safety. The basis for this argument is that PK18 was 
shelled heavily, and there was intense street-to-street gunfighting. The context of 
violence is very  different to most other studies of displacement choice. Engel and 
Ibáñez model the threat of violence as being selectively  allocated, so those who were 
not selected faced little threat. And while violence in Nepal was in some cases random 
(bombings), the intensity  of fighting over the areas being studied was lower. Overt 
fighting had not at that time commenced in other areas of Abidjan, nor across much of 
the rest of the country.  Abobo had been declared a ‘red zone’ and Gbagbo officials had 
said it would be wiped off the map. PK18 was the site of an intense four-day  battle 
between the Gbagbo side and the Invisible Commando rebel army  based in PK18. 
With such intense, random violence inside PK18 and relatively  little outside, it may be 
argued that serious threats to life existed for everyone in PK18, which could be avoided 
at that time outside PK1832. So while controlling for threat variation is challenging, the 
nature of the violence in PK18 suggests that there was some homogenous level of 
threat faced by  everyone that made the perception of safety  at origin less than the 
perception of threat at a destination for all households.
   n is an element of N(0,1,2,3)
(6)
So, in the PK18 context, for a household i, the probability  of displacement outcome n is 
a function of the degree of threat to the household in PK18, the costs of displacement, 
and household characteristics that determine displacement preferences. Displacement 
will occur when perceived threat reaches a certain threshold, shaped by  Ci and Zi. I 
return to the nature of the displacement outcome - defined here as a four-way  outcome 
- in the empirical strategy section below. 
Specification of the displacement threshold may  then be extended to be expressed as 
a function of the above, but as this study is empirical, and focuses on intra-household 
displacement decisions that make articulation of a single threshold overly  complex, I 
shall return to define the model according to displacement decisions. Starting from the 
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32 This ignores for now the targeted threats outside PK18 which made staying preferable for 
some of ‘northern’ ethnicities, and targeted threats inside PK18 that made leaving more urgent 
for some of ‘southern’ ethnicities.
model used in the previous chapter, and based in Engel and Ibáñez (2007):
(7)
Three further adaptations are made to the Engel and Ibáñez (2007) model. First, the 
way  that threat to human life varies spatially  according to people’s movements is 
different. There are two zones of threat, and the refuge is not in the model. (Capital 
assets are assumed to be immobile33.) Second, threat is not homogenous to the 
household but is specific to individuals in the household and capital assets in the 
household. Third, other options for managing threat in situ are allowed, which are 
captured in TZhis and Ph. 
The perception of safety  in Engel and Ibáñez’s (2007) more general conception of the 
origin may  be replaced by  the threat to the household at origin, the threat to the 
household human assets if displacing through the danger zone, the threat to the 
household human assets in the danger zone if staying. The costs of displacement are 
separated into the threat to capital assets at origin (which may  be mitigated by Ph) and 
other costs of displacement (which may  not). Household characteristics are separated 
into human protection resources of the household and other characteristics. So:
n is an element of N(0,1,2,3)
(8)
For household i, the probability  of displacement outcome n is a function of the threat at 
origin to the individuals of the household, the threat in the danger zone to the 
individuals of the household if displacing, the threat in the danger zone to the 
individuals of the household if not displacing, the threat to the household physical 
assets at origin, the costs of displacement, the protection resources of the household, 
and other characteristics of the household that affect preferences.
Comparing this model to the channels by which violence leads to displacement 
discussed already. direct threat is included in all formulations of threat. Indirect threat is 
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33 This is in line with the data collected here. Questions were not asked about jewelry, cash and 
other mobile high value assets, but about fridges, fans and so on (see previous chapters). 
Mobile phones were the only important portable asset. Livestock ownership data were not 
collected, so the possible complication of distinct displacement agency amongst sheep and 
chickens is avoided.
not included in TOic because time horizons and household technologies in this context 
are not sufficient for household physical assets to degrade. It is anticipated that in the 
PK18 context the importance of indirect threat as a component of TZ is minimal as the 
duration of passing through the danger zone is insufficient for access to food and water 
during this period to be a significant factor34. The impact channel is included in P if 
protective assets are degraded (for instance house destroyed or adult killed), or in Z if 
impact changes the risk preferences of the household.
168
34 Where displacement entailed, for instance, extended passage on foot through a desert or 
unpopulated rural areas to reach safety, the importance of indirect threat to TZ would be much 
greater.
6.3 Data
The data used come from the survey  of 715 households in PK18, using a reduced 
sample of 540 households. The right hand side variables and hypotheses are outlined 
according to the three main channels by which displacement may  be caused: impact, 
direct threat and indirect threat, as well as protection variables and controls. The 
previous chapter used six variables commonly used in the literature, and these are 
included as controls or as protection factors here. Wealth (asset index) is included as a 
protection resource and protection liability. Household size is similarly  included in 
protection, but split into three variables - the presence of young children and the elderly 
as protection liability  and number of adults as protection resources. Education is 
discounted due to the lack of strong theoretical reason for inclusion, the decrease in N 
due to missing education data for some households35. Ethnicity  and religion are 
included as threat controls. I discuss impact and direct threat in some detail, before 
moving on to explain the reduced sample and describe the left hand side variable.
Direct Threat
I reflected in the introduction to this chapter on some of the difficulties in measuring 
threat, and these difficulties were not avoided by the choice of context here. Rather 
than asking people to assess the severity  of the threat faced, which is open to various 
forms of bias, the focus was on the importance and relative importance of various 
forms of threat in their displacement decision. The survey  included a module on 
subjective threat assessment [module D in Appendix I and Appendix II]. Respondents 
were asked which of five pre-determined36 push factors played a role in their decision 
to leave or stay, and which of five pre-determined obstacles to displacement for 
displacement played a role. These are presented in Figure 6.3 below. There was also 
space for three additional factors relevant to the decision that the respondent could 
specify. Of the five-eight important factors in the decision, the respective importance of 
each in the decision was then ranked. To summarise the questionnaire response 
‘process’ for push factors and then for obstacles:
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35 Household head age is also discounted in the specification presented here, although it 
represents an indication of protection preferences of the household. The specification used in 
robustness checks in Appendix VI includes household head age, where it is found to be positive 
and significant for those who all stay relative to the simultaneous displaced. Other results are 
unaffected.
36 Based on semi-structured interviews with households and key informants.
• Mark which of five listed issues were important
• Add up to three additional issues that were important
• Rank from 1-5 (or fewer if there were not five important factors)
The relative importance of different types of direct threat in different locations in 
determining displacement choice has not been gathered before through survey 
research. The data provide the opportunity  to construct variables for TO. Clearly  the 
usual measure of threat severity  or intensity  cannot be assessed, but the relative 
importance of threats may  be compared on the basis of their targeting criteria, and both 
inside the home and in the danger zone. The threats may  be categorised as spatially 
targeted or selectively  targeted, and as TOh, TZhd,or TZhs. The push factors all fall into 
these categories, the obstacles do not, with looting (TOc) being one, violence at 
destination (TRh) another, and  a fear of ‘appearance of loyalty’ that does not 
necessarily  represent a threat of violence. The latter is discounted for the purpose of 
the analysis, as is the violence at destination which has no indication of targeting 
criteria. The responses to those marked in bold are used to create variables for TOh, 
TZhd and TOc.
Push factors Threat type Obstacles Threat type
Fear of stray bullets 
entering the house
TOi spatial Fear of being 
attacked by troops 
en route
TZid selective
Fear of stray bullets 
when outside
TOi spatial Fear of being shot or 
shelled outside
TZhd spatial
Fear of shells falling 
close to the house
TOi spatial Fear of the house 
being looted if 
empty
TOc
Distress caused by 
the firing of shells in 
the quartier
TOi spatial Fear of violence at 
destination
TRh (discounted 
here)
Fear of armed 
troops entering the 
house
TOi selective Fear of appearance 
of loyalty to one of 
the two sides
discounted here
Figure 6.3: PK18 threats categorised as spatial or selective 
Clearly  the evaluation of threat levels during war is a new field in survey  enumeration, 
and this is a new strategy  - perhaps only the second systematic attempt to undertake 
such work after Adhikari (2013), which had not at the time been published. Generally 
the section was filled out quite well, but there were some issues. While it seemed clear 
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during training and in the pilot, this particular module proved quite complex for some of 
the enumerators. There was variation between enumerators in how the section was 
completed. Some enumerators would often mark and rank all of the options, while 
others would mark and rank relatively  few. This is not an issue here, as we are looking 
at which are the most important. Occasionally  ranking was not undertaken, which is 
more problematic. But the main problem was that in some cases, for households that 
all left the obstacles to displacement were not listed, and for households that stayed 
the push factors were not listed. It is not clear whether the enumerators did not pose 
the question, or whether respondents did not understand, though the former seems 
more likely. Appendix V gives more information on the process by  which the data were 
treated for the purpose of the analysis here, but in summary: if it was clear whether a 
factor was important to the household, it is treated as such, and if importance was 
ambiguous the household was dropped.
Compared to the previous chapter which used the full survey  sample of 715, this 
chapter uses a reduced sample which loses a quarter of the respondents due to 
insufficient data in those cases as outlined above. The reduced sample is 540 
households. Proportionally, the exclusions are mostly  in the ‘no displacement’ category, 
which loses 45% of households. Partial displacement exclusions are only 10.6%. The 
largest number of losses are in the simultaneous displacement category, which loses 
93 households. It would be expected that category  0 and 3 lose most households as 
these were less likely  intuitively to have both ‘obstacles’ and ‘push factors’ for 
displacement. The greater proportion of losses in category  0 may  be due to site 2 being 
the site of a high proportion of category  0 displaced as well as: first, the site of some 
difficulties in collecting data, as detailed in the methodology, and second, conducted 
prior to initial oversight of responses that was conducted after the second day.
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Table 6.1: Sample exclusions on including threat measures 
Displacement Outcome Excluded Included Total
0: No displacement 40 48 88
% 45.45 54.55 100
1: Partial 17 143 160
% 10.62 89.38 100
2: Staged 25 80 105
% 23.81 76.19 100
3: Simultaneous 93 269 362
% 25.69 74.31 100
Total 175 540 715
% 24.48 75.52 100
The main threat variables are constructed then simply from whether the household 
perceived selective threats to human assets to be an important factor both at home 
and in the danger zone. Perceived threat to capital assets is a third factor. The table 
below shows how many times each was ranked as being important, and the size of N. 
Losses are smaller in N for TOip and larger for TZ and TOc as it was the obstacles to 
displacement were more often missed.
Table 6.2: Selection of ranking for relatively important threat
Ranking Yes % N
TOi Selective Important Ranked 1st 49 7.4 659
Ranked 1st or 2nd 129 19.6 660
Ranked 1st, 2nd or 3rd 206 31.1 662
TZid Selective 
Important
Ranked 1st 97 16.9 576
Ranked 1st or 2nd 221 38.0 581
Ranked 1st, 2nd or 3rd 336 56.1 599
TOc Important Ranked 1st 269 46.7 576
Ranked 1st or 2nd 403 69.3 581
Ranked 1st, 2nd or 3rd 486 81.1 599
 
In this chapter I want to establish whether or not the threat was important to the 
household relative to other households. As such the proportion ranking that threat as 
top one, two or three is considered in choosing which ranking to choose for the 
analysis. The variables chosen are those in bold in the table above. The intention was 
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to try  to achieve an approximately even and similar split between yes and no 
responses across the three variables. This necessitates taking first, second or third for 
selective violence at home (31% yes), and first only  for looting (46.7%). For selective 
danger zone threat, first and second (38%) or first, second or third (56%) could be 
chosen, and I chose the former as it is closer to the proportions in the other two 
variables37. When these variables are combined, the non-missing sample is 540, 
reflected in the tables above.
Perceived relative importance of selective threat at origin should have an impact on 
how threat is managed through displacement for at least three reasons. First, the 
targeting criteria are more likely  to be known for selective violence (for example, 
ethnicity  or being in armed forces), creating certainty  about the threat. Qualitative 
evidence suggests verbal and other warnings may have been given in some cases. 
Second, the house provides little protection from a selective threat, unless people are 
able to hide effectively. And third, remaining in the house may  in fact assist in targeting 
human assets given sufficient local information, and others in the house who are not 
the primary target may be identified by their co-habitation with the target. Hence:
H1: if the threat violence allocated selectively at the home is perceived to be relatively 
important, this is likely to have a positive association with simultaneous displacement 
and staged displacement. 
First, the ‘patterns’ or ‘rhythms’ of violence that make threat somewhat predictable over 
time for spatial violence (for example, lulls in fighting in the mornings) may  not occur for 
selective violence. Second, selective violence might be more predictable spatially  if it 
occurs at checkpoints, but lack of information regarding troop movements and 
presence for the whole route may  make threat highly  uncertain. Finally, men may  have 
been particularly at risk at checkpoints. So:
H2: The perceived threat of selective violence in the danger zone may be positively 
associated with staying (partial displacement and no displacement). 
Splitting the household is considered likely, based on previous chapters, to be a 
strategy to defend against looting. Hence:
H3: Higher perceived threat of looting will be associated with higher propensity to split.
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37 The results of the full regression using other constructions of what constitutes an ‘important’ 
threat are included in Appendix VI. The results are largely robust to other constructions, with the 
exception of selective threat at home, which lost significance on using 1st, or 1st and 2nd only. 
These represented only 7.4 % or 19.6% of the responses respectively. 
Impact
The roster section of the survey  recorded whether any  pre-crisis household member 
was killed, injured or assaulted during the crisis38. The measures of violence are 
combined into a binary  measure reflecting whether any individual in a household was 
killed, injured or assaulted. Relationships to threat and displacement are unclear, but 
certainly household protection assets may  be affected, injury  may  require medical 
treatment increasing unmeasured indirect threat, and risk preferences may  be affected. 
While staying longer may  increase likelihood of experiencing violence, once violence 
occurs some form of displacement action may be more likely. For these reasons: 
H4: Incidence of violence is likely to be positively associated with higher propensity for 
staged or simultaneous displacement, and negatively associated with all stay.
Indirect threat
Indirect threats are measured through analysis of the answers to three questions in the 
survey  beginning: ‘In PK18, during the crisis..’. Food access is measured by  the 
response to: ‘...did you have enough food in your house?’. Food availability  is 
measured by  ‘...was there food available in the quartier’. And water availability is 
measured by  ‘...was water cut off in your house for long?’. The response to each was 
recorded as ‘no’ or ‘pas evident’ or ‘yes’. These were coded into three categories 0,1 
and 2 with 2 being highest threat.
As with impact measures, these are clearly  endogenous to displacement. People who 
stayed throughout the crisis in an area affected by  violent conflict, which became an 
enclave controlled for a significant period by  the Invisible Commandos, may  be more 
likely  to experience food access problems, food availability  problems and water 
shortages. But all three may  also promote displacement, and the open-ended 
questions revealed that many  left PK18 because of the lack of food. Generating 
hypotheses is therefore problematic, but it may  be anticipated there is a significant 
association with displacement outcomes.
Protection resources
The protection resource of the building is considered here, as well as the human 
protection resources of the household. Taking the latter first, household human assets 
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38 Looting impact is not included here because of the very strong correlation between houses 
being empty and being looted. Asset sales impact is also not included here.
are divided into ‘protectors’ and ‘protectees’. It is difficult to do this exactly  without far 
greater knowledge of each household, the individuals within them and possible 
‘protective’ relationships, but for the purpose of the analysis here those 70+ are 
considered elderly  (binary variable if any  elderly  present at the household level) and 
those 12 and under are considered young children with the same variable construction. 
13-17 teenagers are discounted as it is unclear what role they  might fulfil. Then the 
number of adults (18-69) in the household is a categorical variable from 1-4, one being 
0 or 1 adults, 2 being 2 adults, 3 being 3 adults and four being four or more. So adults 
is a measure of human protection resources, and elderly  and young children 
protectees. It is difficult to predict the role of protectees, as they  may  make 
displacement both more difficult and more desirable. But for protectors, we may 
expect:
H5: A larger number of protectors should allow for household to split and protect capital 
and human assets, so adults should be positively associated with staged and partial 
displacement.
The second protection resource is the building the household lives in. Many 
households in PK18 are ‘cour commune’ - that is to say  they  share a communal 
courtyard that is private to those households and a separate gate opens to the street. 
Such an arrangement may  allow sharing of protection resources, including adults, 
threat information, food and water without entering the danger zone. These might allow 
people to stay, but on the other hand if others in the building leave this may  promote 
others leaving too, so it is difficult to predict the relationship.
An asset index was used to measure wealth as in the previous chapter. To the extent 
that this measures cash resources or access to cash, this is likely  to give people the 
flexibility  to buy tickets to displace. On the other hand, more assets may  mean a 
greater loss of capital assets if the house is looted when empty, and it may  indicate the 
ability  to afford expensive food, protection money  or other possible costs of staying. I 
therefore do not suggest any hypothesis here, although significant relationships have 
been established in the previous chapter.
Controls
Education is not included in the regression as it further reduces N (due to poor 
response rate to the education question) without a clear theoretical connection with 
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threat and protection, and with no significant findings in the previous chapter. Basic 
threat controls of block mean estimates of distance to shelling, household ethnicity  and 
household religion are used, as well as the five site level controls.
Splitting hypotheses
Taking these together, it is possible to suggest two overarching explanations for non-
unitary  displacement outcomes at the household level. First is intra-household threat 
and impact variation imposed externally  - essentially  that external forces (the armed 
group and nature) drive the decision to split. For instance, boys may  be targeted in 
homes, so they  alone leave. Or men are targeted at checkpoints so they alone stay. 
Alternatively, impact of, say, malnutrition or exposure to warfare may  be more severe 
for children than for adults, leading them to be sent away. Or one person might be 
injured, leading them alone to leave to seek medical treatment. These may be seen as 
structural causes defined by the direct and indirect threat environment at the place of 
origin and en route.
The second is that threats and impacts do not vary  amongst household members, and 
splitting represents threat management strategy, an attempt to allocate scarce 
protection resources amongst the dependents and other assets that need protection. 
This, then, is agency: civilian-side attempts, by  household decision-makers and 
protectors, to manage threat in situ. This might include allocating limited cash to 
transport tickets for dependents, or sending half the family  away  to save food rations, 
or sending children away  so that protectors can focus their efforts on protection of just 
capital assets rather than simultaneously  having to protect both children and capital 
assets. Broadly  these ‘agency’ explanations may be divided into protection 
opportunities and (non-threat) protection constraints that prevent households following 
their preferred protection strategy. These two over-arching explanations for splitting will 
be discussed in the results section alongside the main hypotheses.
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for RHS variables
Variable Description Obs Type Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Selective Direct 
Threat at Home
perceived threat to human assets 
at home. 1 if perceived selective 
threat ranks top three of push 
threats.
540 Bin. 0.33 0.47 0 1
Selective Threat 
in Danger Zone
perceived threat to human assets 
in danger zone. 1 if perceived 
selective threat ranks top two of 
obstacles to displacement.
540 Bin. 0.37 0.48 0 1
Looting Threat perceived threat to capital assets if 
human assets leave the house. 1 
if perceived threat ranks top one of 
obstacles to displacement.
540 Bin. 0.49 0.50 0 1
Violence 1 if any death, injury or assault to 
household members during crisis
540 Bin. 0.08 0.28 0 1
Adults categorical measure of adults in 
hh
540 Cat. 2.46 0.91 1 4
Young Children 1 if any children under 12 540 Bin. 0.67 0.47 0 1
Elderly 1 if any adults over 70 540 Bin. 0.04 0.18 0 1
Indirect Threat: 
Water  
Availability
measure of indirect water 
availability threat. 2 if more serious
537 Cat. 0.85 0.90 0 2
Indirect Threat: 
Food Availability
measure of indirect food 
availability threat. 2 if more serious
534 Cat. 1.46 0.54 0 2
Indirect Threat: 
Food Access
measure of indirect food access 
threat. 2 if more serious
538 Cat. 1.20 0.71 0 2
Communal 
Court
1 if building has communal 
courtyard
540 Bin. 0.57 0.50 0 1
Asset Index PCA index based on assets of the 
household at start of crisis 
540 Cont. 0.35 0.11 0 1
Southern 1 if any southerners in hh 540 Bin. 0.38 0.49 0 1
Shelling 
Distance
measure of distance to shells 
landing. mean block estimates in 
km
530 Cont. 0.32 0.18 0.075 0.75
Christian 1 if any christians in hh 540 Bin. 0.34 0.48 0 1
Site 1 Dummy site 1 dummy 540 Bin. 0.47 0.50 0 1
Site 2 Dummy site 2 dummy 540 Bin. 0.08 0.27 0 1
Site 3 Dummy site 3 dummy 540 Bin. 0.14 0.34 0 1
Site 4 Dummy site 4 dummy 540 Bin. 0.15 0.36 0 1
Site 5 Dummy site 5 dummy 540 Bin. 0.16 0.37 0 1
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Descriptive Statistics
Left hand side variable
Following from the previous chapter, there are four possible displacement outcomes: 
(0) everyone stays, (1) one or more of the household stay  throughout while others 
leave, (2) everyone leaves but not all together, and (3) everyone leaves together. The 
descriptives of this LHS variable are reproduced below  with reduced sample 
information to compare to the full sample.
Table 6.4: LHS variable categories with numbers and proportions comparing 
reduced sample for Chapter 6 with total sample used Chapter 5.
Displacement Outcome Reduced Sample Total Sample
0: No displacement 48 88
% 8.89 12.31
1: Partial 143 160
% 26.48 22.38
2: Staged 80 105
% 14.81 14.69
3: Simultaneous 269 362
% 49.81 50.63
Total 540 715
% 100 100
With the exclusions, the proportion of category  0 displaced has reduced from 12.3%  to 
8.9%, and the proportion of category  1 displacement increased from 22.4% to 26.5%. 
Otherwise, the proportions of displacement categories are more or less the same as in 
the previous chapter.
Right hand side variables
Direct  Threat: Table 6.6 shows the highest importance is attached to selective threat 
at home by  the staged displaced, more than half of whom thought the threat of 
selective violence at home an important reason to leave. Less than 20% of ‘all stayed’ 
thought the same, and around 30% of the other categories. Simultaneous and staged 
both had around 40% ranking selective violence en route as being an important 
incentive against leaving, against 31% of partial and 33% of all stayed.
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Impact: The table below  shows the descriptive statistics broken down by  type of 
violence (mean values to 2dp for the whole sample of 715 households), alongside the 
household violence measure which was included in the regression. These are 
presented in full here as the numbers are quite low, so only  the composite figure is 
used in the regression analysis.
Table 6.5: Violent incidence by displacement outcomes
0: None 1: Partial 2: 
Staged
3: 
Simultaneous
Total
killing (full sample) 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02
injury (full sample) 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.06
assault (full sample) 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02
household violence 
measure (for 540 
households)
0.04 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.08
In the full sample, 11 households experienced the killing of one household member, 
and one household two household members (2% of households). Some relationship 
with displacement is clear from many  of the testimonies, which will be analysed in the 
discussion section of this paper, although the reasoning is not explicit. All of the 12 
households who suffered displaced entirely  except for one household where the one 
person remaining in PK18 was the father - a combatant who was killed in PK18.  Four 
households displaced in stages and seven simultaneously.
The injury of household members was more prevalent than killing. 41 of 715 
households experienced injury  of a household member, including three households 
with more than one household member injured, and three households where a different 
household member was also killed. In addition, the survey  revealed 16 assaults 
reported against household members, with none of these being multiple assaults in 
one household. 10 of those assaults did not correspond with reported injuries, while 6 
were in households that also experienced one or more injuries. 
Overall, 8% of households in the reduced sample suffered some form of physical 
violence; the rates were highest amongst the partial and staged, and lowest amongst 
the ‘all stayed’.
Indirect  Threat: Table 6.6 shows water availability  seems to be related to 
displacement, with the simultaneous reporting lower incidence of water cut-offs than 
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those who all stayed. Food availability  does not vary  much with displacement, while 
food access was less of a problem for the staged than the others, and more of a 
problem for the simultaneous than the others.
Protection: The lowest score of the adults categorical variable were amongst the 
simultaneous, and the highest amongst the staged. Young children were more 
prevalent for the splitting households - partial and staged - with more than three 
quarters of these households having young children, against 54% of the ‘all stayed’ and 
61% of the simultaneous. Communal courtyards were least prevalent amongst the 
staged (44%), while they formed the majority  of other categories with the maximum 
being 67%, of the ‘all stayed’.
Controls: Ethnicity  and religion vary  greatly  by  displacement outcome, with almost 
60% of the staged being southern, 40% of the simultaneous, 30% of the partial and 
20% of the ‘all stayed’. The pattern is similar for Christianity, though the numbers are 
around 10 percentage points lower for both staged and partial. 
Table 6.6: Cross tabulation of independent variables with the dependent variable
Variable 0: None 1: Partial 2: Staged 3: Simultaneous Total
Selective Direct Threat at 
Home
0.19 0.29 0.51 0.32 0.33
Selective Threat in Danger 
Zone
0.33 0.31 0.39 0.41 0.37
Looting Threat 0.29 0.68 0.51 0.42 0.49
Violence 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.08
Adults 2.56 2.57 2.91 2.24 2.46
Young Children 0.54 0.78 0.76 0.61 0.67
Indirect Threat: Water  
Availability
1.25 0.90 0.91 0.74 0.85
Indirect Threat: Food 
Availability
1.46 1.39 1.45 1.49 1.46
Indirect Threat: Food 
Access
1.17 1.13 0.97 1.30 1.20
Communal Court 0.67 0.61 0.44 0.58 0.57
Southern 0.19 0.29 0.58 0.41 0.38
Shelling distance 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.31 0.32
Christian 0.19 0.22 0.48 0.40 0.34
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6.4 Empirical Analysis and Results
As described previously, the displacement decision analysed includes complex 
displacement outcomes. Based on the finding in the previous chapter, displacement 
decisions made by each household combine to make displacement outcomes, which 
reflect the final outcome of displacement prior to return while encompassing 
heterogeneity  in decision making up to that point. The dependent variable therefore 
has four possibilities that may not be ranked. A multinomial logit is again used here, as 
in the last chapter, but here the base outcome is simultaneous displacement. This is 
chosen as it is the largest category  and everyone leaving together might best be 
considered the expected outcome of severe threats of violence. Here there is no 
comparison between models that made choice of the consistent category  of ‘no 
displacement’ expedient in the previous chapter. The empirical model is as follows:
(9)
Table 6.7 on the next page shows the count R2 statistics, which suggest that the model 
fit is reasonable: 50%  of outcomes are correctly  predicted using only  measures of 
perceived threat, increasing to 60% with the full specification.  
Direct threats
Column 1 shows that threat perception is a significant predictor of all displacement 
outcomes relative to all leaving together. Those who all stay  have negative coefficients 
on each of the selective human asset threats as well as negative coefficient for looting. 
Perceiving selective threats to the human assets of the household within the home and 
threats to capital assets are associated with all staying, significant at 10%, but only 
capital assets retain significance on inclusion of controls (column 3) and in the full 
specification (column 8).
Perception of threats to capital assets is significant too for partial displacement: here 
the coefficient is positive and significant at 1%, robust to inclusion of all controls. 
Staged displacement, on the other hand, has no relationship with perceived threats to 
assets but is significantly  associated with higher levels of perceived selective threats to 
human assets within the household. In the complete model (column 7) with site 
controls, selective threat to the household human assets at origin has a significant 
positive relationship at 1% with staged displacement relative to everyone leaving 
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together.  This reduces to significance at 5%  on inclusion of objective threat controls, 
which probably reflects the role of ethnicity in selective targeting.
So perception of selective danger zone threats as being relatively  important is a not 
significant predictor of displacement outcomes relative to all leaving together. Should 
this be a surprise in the context? I return to the possible overarching logics of splitting 
outlined earlier. 
First, if direct threat varies between household members this may  affect propensity  to 
split. So in that case, perceived selective danger zone threat might be expected to 
affect propensity  to split if targeted based on gender or age; targeting based on 
ethnicity, assuming ethnic homogeneity  within the household, would not cause variation 
in splitting. The significant result found for perceived selective threat to the household 
at origin for the staged displaced is interesting. These households split and eventually 
all leave, and some of the reasoning for this decision may  be attributable to their 
greater fear of selective violence in the household. It may  be that the selective threat 
was heterogenous between household members, certainly  there were allegations of 
sexual abuse during the crisis. Or, extending this logic further to incorporate subjective 
valuation, when facing an objectively  equal threat to all household members, it may  be 
rational to have most desire to protect children, whose welfare may be subjectively 
valued above other household members. 
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Table 6.7: Multinomial regression results [LHS is complex displacement 
outcomes].
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0: All stay
Sel. Threat Home -0.719* -0.712* -0.449 -0.537 -0.418
Sel. Threat D. Zone -0.529 -0.514 -0.544 -0.528 -0.641*  
Looting Threat -0.643* -0.645* -0.784* -0.651 -0.859*  
Violence -0.441 -0.054 0.2 -0.039
Adults 0.363** 0.356** 0.404* 0.364*  
Elderly 0.821 0.608                
Young Children -0.142 -0.086 -0.16 -0.305
Communal Court 0.693** -0.178 -0.304
Water  Availability 0.436** 0.633*** 0.589** 
Food Availability -0.056 0.288 0.467
Food Access -0.141 -0.222 -0.152
Asset Index -0.973 -0.603
Constant -1.121*** -1.104*** 0.306 -2.235*** -2.261*** -1.142*** -1.568 -1.129
1: Partial                
Sel. Threat Home -0.212 -0.228 -0.08 -0.071 -0.016
Sel. Threat D. Zone -0.107 -0.122 -0.191 -0.077 -0.135
Looting Threat 1.068*** 1.068*** 1.114*** 1.043*** 1.000***
Violence 0.535 0.667 1.006** 0.975*  
Adults 0.549*** 0.548*** 0.550*** 0.530***
Elderly 1.588*** 1.480***                
Young Children 0.979*** 1.001*** 0.986*** 0.987***
Communal Court 0.096 0.127 0.12
Water  Availability 0.136 0.192 0.134
Food Availability -0.255 -0.176 -0.146
Food Access -0.302** -0.148 -0.176
Asset Index 1.94 1.763
Constant -1.115*** -1.151*** -0.46 -2.898*** -2.573*** 0.144 -3.404*** -3.018***
2: Staged                
Sel. Threat Home 0.796*** 0.785*** 0.674** 0.860*** 0.755** 
Sel. Threat D. Zone 0.139 0.131 0.024 0.325 0.208
Looting Threat 0.374 0.37 0.366 0.299 0.212
Violence 0.649* 0.719 1.000** 0.930** 
Adults 0.868*** 0.830*** 0.924*** 1.034***
Elderly 0.536 0.45                
Young Children 1.007*** 1.115*** 1.445*** 1.666***
Communal Court -0.768*** -0.289 -0.143
Water  Availability 0.187 0.309 0.293
Food Availability 0.204 0.097 0.015
Food Access -0.691*** -0.414* -0.447** 
Asset Index 3.542*** 3.476***
Constant -1.771*** -1.821*** -1.855*** -4.162*** -3.396*** -0.701 -5.988*** -7.082***
3: Together Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
Outcome
Base 
OutcomeControls Thr included included
Controls Site included included included included included
Count r2 0.498 0.500 0.545 0.516 0.527 0.509 0.582 0.587
Observations 540 540 530 715 715 700 533 523
* p<.10, ** p<.05,*** p<.01 - standard errors clustered at block level
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A second explanation is based in the concept of ‘threat elasticity’ outlined in previous 
chapters. If a threat is of personal violence conducted by known parties it may  more 
easily  be negotiated through persuasion, behaviour change or similar low-cost 
strategies. Additionally, the process by  which one becomes aware of the threat may  be 
more subtle than the noise of proximate shelling. It may be through rumours passed 
through the community, or the look in the eye of a combatant or neighbour passed in 
the street. The cost of violence threatened may  be uncertain, whereas for shelling the 
cost of violence is unambiguous and it is the probability  of violence that contains high 
uncertainty. Given such a situation of identity  or behaviour based threat, it may  be 
possible for protective assets of the household to negotiate - perhaps literally  - threats 
to their own life or lives through behaviour change or other strategies. They are more 
mobile and have fewer liabilities in place if the non-protective human assets - 
especially  children - are protected through displacement. That ultimately  the Invisible 
Commandos gained control of PK18 may explain the eventual departure of all 
household members for some of the staged displaced households - there was no 
longer the immediate prospect of FDS forces regaining control and providing 
protection, and total control is likely to have increased IC targeting capacity through the 
familiar Kalyvas (2006) mechanisms.
Scarce protection resources may  also account for splitting on the part of the partial 
displaced. These households were more fearful of looting of capital assets if they  left. 
Even if they did not perceive selective violence against household members, they 
could still allocate human protective resources to defending the household capital 
assets while protecting other household human assets through partial displacement. 
Determination to defend capital assets of the household might explain their remaining 
in the household throughout the crisis.
I now investigate in more detail the significant relationship found between the 
perception of capital asset threat and displacement outcomes, focusing on the 
relationship with wealth based on the asset index. The graphs below show predicted 
probabilities39  of outcomes 0 (no displacement) in the first graph, and 1 (partial 
displacement) in the second graph, as the importance rating of perception of threat to 
capital assets varies between 0 (blue line) and 1 (red line) given all the covariates. The 
analysis here then analyses amongst those who stayed (in whole or in part) the 
relationship between different motivations for staying and wealth. 
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39 predicted probability calculated by average of probabilities
The first graph shows that as perception of threat of capital assets (TOc1 on the graph 
label) goes from being not most important (0) to most important (1) of the obstacles to 
displacement there is no significant difference between the probability  of people all 
staying relative to people all leaving together. The downward curve suggests that the 
likelihood of no displacement is negatively correlated with wealth.
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Figure 6.4: Predicted probability of no displacement by perception of threat to 
capital assets
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Figure 6.5: Predicted probability of partial displacement by perception of threat 
to capital assets
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The second graph shows that as perception of threat to capital assets goes from being 
not most important to most important, for those with an asset index between .07 and .
55 there is a significant difference between the probability  of partial displacement 
relative to people all leaving together. The majority of the respondent population is in 
this range on the asset index (see histogram in previous chapter), so the lack of 
significant difference between the curve outside these boundaries may  be explained by 
larger standard errors stemming in part from smaller population. The largest gap 
between the standard error plots is at around the mean value for the asset index 0.35 
(the s.d. is 0.11).
So for the majority  of the population, especially  those around the mean asset index, 
there was a higher propensity  for a member of the household to stay, while others left, 
if they  perceived asset threat to be the most important obstacle to displacement. The 
upward trend on the curve suggests that the propensity  for partial displacement 
increases slightly with the asset index. For those who all stayed, the opposite 
relationship was found, with poorer households more likely  (though not significantly  at 
10%) to be worried about looting. It is difficult to establish the mechanism of causality 
though: does having more assets drive perceived threat just because of having more 
assets? Two other factors might be confounding: if greater objective threat based on 
having more assets drives perceived threat, or if wealth is more important to someone 
they will rate threats to assets as more important and have spent more effort in wealth 
accumulation.
Violence
The regression results (column 2) show that violence experienced by  the household 
has relatively  little relationship with displacement outcome (relative to simultaneous 
displaced) when included alongside only perceived threat factors. That is that staged 
displaced are more likely  to be the victims of violence (significant at 10%). The 
inclusion of objective threat controls in column 3 removes this significance. However in 
the full specification of the model in columns 7 and 8 show a strong significant positive 
relationship with displacement outcomes 1 and 2 - partial and staged - relative to 
simultaneous. 
Returning to the conceptual framework, there is no clarity  as to how incidence of death 
or injury  would determine displacement outcomes. Incidence of violence to any 
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household may  be endogenous with staying longer in PK18, but following incidence it 
is likely  that at least part of the household will leave either due to the reevaluation of 
threat levels at origin or due to the requirement to treat injury. Given the weak 
relationship found in the regression, it is instructive to consider some of the evidence 
from open-ended questions in the survey. A more comprehensive table of open 
responses from those affected by  violence is presented in Appendix IV , but I now 
analyse in detail three of the violent incidents that led to the death of a household 
member:
 We were at the house on Black Saturday and a shell landed in our bedroom, 
 which caused  the death of my younger brother. I fled to take refuge in a foyer.
Survey respondent
Here the shell landed on the respondent’s house, killing his brother. The impact is the 
death of his brother and the damage to the house, which is a shelter and a place to 
hide. The immediate flight reflects either the impact or the re-evaluation of direct threat. 
The removal of protective assets such as shelter, through the impact of violence, 
changes the overall ability to protect against threat. 
 The shooting got worse, and my daughter was shot in the neck and died on 
 the way to the hospital.
Survey respondent
Here the violence link to displacement is clearer. The hospital is outside PK18, moving 
their daughter to the hospital required moving through the danger zone, so the indirect 
threat to the daughter resulting from the impact of violence outweighed the increase in 
threat of leaving the house. It is not clear whether there was also a role of re-evaluation 
of threat following their daughter being shot.
 We left because they came and killed my son in front of the courtyard.
Survey respondent
As in the first case it is not clear from this respondent whether the departure was 
attributable to the increase perception of threat attributable to the act of violence. But 
clearly  in this case the violence was allocated according to behaviour or identity, rather 
than spatially  as in the previous two cases. Still, the mechanisms are unclear. The son 
may have been an important protective member of the household either through ability 
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to access food and water, access protection networks or deliver protection himself. He 
may have been a decision-maker who had been inclined for his family  to stay. The 
need to leave may  stem from the need to deal with funeral arrangements, or from the 
increased perception of direct threat - indeed he may have been killed in part 
deliberately to threaten the rest of the family.
The responses of the injured households above often reveal a combination of possible 
increase perception of targeted threat as well as and the indirect injury  threat, both 
stemming from violence, as well as indirect food-related threats.
 I received a bullet to my foot, there wasn’t anything left to eat, nor any water 
 and my wife had a miscarriage caused by the firing.
Survey respondent
 My nephew was attacked and also the problem of ethnicity.... And there was 
 no food.
Survey respondent
Just three households which reported injury  did not displace, and none where 
someone was killed. None of the testimonies from those three households reveal how 
the injury  was managed without displacement, only  that the reasons for not displacing 
were quite serious. For instance:
 We wanted to leave because of the shelling, the stray bullets. There wasn’t any 
 food, there were dead bodies in the streets, but there was no route to leave.
Survey respondent
 There was the neighbour who had tried to leave but who was raped and killed. 
 Because of that I decided that no one would leave.
Survey respondent
Overall the testimonies reveal a relationship between displacement actions and acts of 
violence, with a displacement action often following violence, but it is difficult to link 
these with the four displacement outcomes due to the issue of time endogeneity  and 
the lack of a direct link with any  particular one of the three displacement outcomes 
involving displacement actions.  
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Indirect Threats
The responses analysed above demonstrate the importance of indirect threats in 
displacement decisions. Returning to the regression results outlined in Table 6.7, it 
seems clear trends may  be identified between different indirect threats and 
displacement outcomes. First, lack of water availability  is associated with households 
all staying (column 6). This would intuitively  be attributable to endogeneity, but then it 
would be expected that the partial displaced, like ‘all stayed’, would experience the 
problem of water being cut off. It may  be driven by  sub-site level geographical 
difference in water availability, or it may be that respondents in partial households who 
were not the ones that stayed were unaware of water cut-offs. It may  also be that the 
partial displaced were more able to access water despite cutoffs, perhaps due to 
greater wealth or mobility, and so did not report it. Food availability did not vary 
significantly  between displacement outcomes, which is perhaps surprising: it might be 
expected that those staying for longer in PK18 would experience issues with food 
supply. The absence of food access indirect threats, on the other hand, is associated 
with partial and staged displacement, and in the latter case remains significant at 5% 
on inclusion of the full specification with controls. This may be attributed to some 
association with greater wealth that is not controlled for by  the asset index, enabling 
greater food stocks and financial access to food despite higher prices. It may  also be 
endogenous to the displacement outcome. Returning to the logics of splitting, there 
may be intra-household variation in origin indirect threat factors, such as insufficient 
food supply at origin, or lack of baby supplies or medical supplies.
So because households have split, they  require less food, so in situ food access 
becomes less of a problem. That the result is significant with controls for the staged 
displaced would fit with this logic: if the whole household leaves then access is less 
likely to be a problem.
Protection 
The results here effectively replicate those found in the previous chapter which 
described some socio-economic factors in displacement outcomes. All categories of 
displacement are associated with higher numbers of adults when compared to the 
base outcome of simultaneous displacement. The relationship is strongest, and the 
coefficient largest, for staged displacement, then partial displacement, and finally  ‘all 
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stay’, which has a coefficient of 0.3 and is significant only  at 10% on inclusion of all 
controls. The presence of numerous adults in the household may  be relevant to 
splitting either due to the greater ability  to overcome protection dilemmas in situ, or due 
to displacement cost or destination factors40  such as insufficient finances for all 
household members to leave, insufficient space for the whole family  at destination, or 
relationship problems between, say, the HHH and the in-laws.
Similarly, children and the elderly may promote splitting due to greater protection 
dilemmas or due to destination factors41. The findings in this chapter unsurprisingly 
echo those findings, with both partial and staged displaced found to have more adults 
and be more likely to have young children than those who leave all together. Those 
who did not displace at all also have more adults than the all together displaced, 
although with a lower coefficient and significant at 10%  rather than 1% in the case of 
partial and staged. 
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40 Additionally, other decision-makers may be present in the household which is not a logic of 
splitting as such, but a reason it may happen.
41 The elderly are dropped from the full regression as there are only 19 households with 
members over the age of 70.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter started by describing three links between violence and displacement, 
before outlining an adapted model of displacement choice. It then moved on to test, for 
the first time, these three links as determinants of non-binary  household displacement 
outcomes. 
Overcoming some of the problems with existing measurement of the role of direct 
threat, the relative importance households attached to selective threats was used to 
assess how displacement actions function as a protection strategy. Relative to those 
who all left simultanously: (1) the staged displaced were more likely  to say  that 
selective threats at home were an important reason for displacement; (2) the partial 
displaced were more likely  to to say  that looting was important reason for staying, and 
(3) the ‘all stay‘ were less likely  to say that looting or selective threats en route were 
important in their reason to stay. Examining the role of wealth in these outcomes, 
analysis using predicted probabilities suggests that for the partial displaced, wealth has 
a significant positive relationship  with fear of looting, while no such relationship exists 
for those who all stayed. 
Indirect threats also have important relationships with displacement outcomes. 
Households that split (partial or staged) were less likely  to face food access threats. 
This might be due to having fewer people together in the area of food scarcity, or to 
being richer and having more food stocks available. Alternatively, it might be that food 
access threats promote simultaneous displacement, while those who all stayed were 
more likely  in time to experience such threats. The latter were also more likely  to 
experience water cut-offs. 
Experience of direct impacts of violence has a complex relationship with displacement. 
The numbers here are too small to reach any  firm conclusions regarding the different 
types of impact of violence. Experience of any type of violent impact is positively 
related with splitting, but the range of possible interpretations  is quite wide, and more 
research targeted at specific victims of violence and their response would help in 
understanding displacement effects. 
Overall, the results demonstrate that all three channels - direct threat, indirect threat, 
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and impact - are related to displacement outcomes. As expected, the complexity  in the 
production of these through the actions of armed groups, the households in question 
and in other household and market responses makes establishing the causal 
mechanisms very  difficult. The protection resources of wealth and household adults 
were shown to be correlated with staged displacement, and the protection ‘liabilities’ of 
young children were similarly  positively  associated with staged displacement. The 
same is true of the partial displaced, except that wealth is not significant and the 
coefficients are smaller for the other protection factors. So even where migration 
factors are not likely  to play  any  role, socio-economic characteristics of the household 
are important factors due to their role in facilitating protection strategies. 
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusions
This conclusion discusses three interrelated themes within the area of displacement, 
and two in empirical displacement research. The three displacement themes are the 
nature of the displacement decision, the distinction between protection and coping, and 
the return decision. The empirical issues are the development of threat measurement 
in future displacement research, and further work in ‘nano-level’ research using whole 
population sampling. Before moving on to these, I first summarise the conclusions of 
the thesis outlined already.
Chapter 3 was about the composition of direct threat, and looked at how armed actors 
in PK18 shaped the threat environment within which civilians made decisions. An 
articulation of the concept of direct threat was set out, using the existing related 
literature, as comprising targeting criteria, targeting capacity  and propensity  for 
violence. These components of ‘objective’, armed-group side direct threat, are shaped 
by  the organisational capacity  and the location and motivation of the armed group. 
Following the conceptual framework, threat may  be produced by  violent actions or by 
non-violent communication actions, and the chapter analysed four types of actions in 
PK18 that produced threat. The chapter then went on to analyse how groups in PK18 
also reduced threat by  non-violent communication and violence against armed actors. 
So at least these two of the four actions may have both threat-producing and threat-
reducing effects. 
Chapter 4 was about how civilians respond to the threat conditions formed by  armed 
actors. Using primarily  crime and humanitarian policy  literatures, the concept of civilian 
self-protection was outlined as comprising three strategies, avoidance, compliance and 
instrumental strategies. Using the data from PK18, the chapter analysed how civilians 
used these three strategies to reduce threat, but also how their use of these strategies 
produced indirect threats and even created impact on household assets. Three threat 
dilemmas that this created in PK18 were outlined, before a discussion of mobilisation 
highlighted the possibility  of civilians becoming armed actors in order to help overcome 
194
threat dilemmas. This section on participation in PK18 analysed the links between 
micro, meso and macro factors in the Abidjan crisis, highlighting how protection played 
a role in mobilisation at various levels of the organisation, and how changes in the 
macro environment split the unifying protection motivation of the Commandos and led 
to their downfall. 
Chapter 5 then moved on to the specific protection strategy  of displacement. The main 
contribution of the chapter was to categorise how displacement functions at the intra-
household level using unique data from PK18. A decision tree for intra-household 
displacement specified at least four possible displacement outcomes that included both 
the process of displacement and the outcome. An important part of displacement 
process is splitting the household in order to manage threat dilemmas. Using PK18 
data, the chapter then described the nature of displacement decisions, including how 
the decisions were made within the household, the number of displacement actions 
taken, the timing of the displacement decision relative to the displacement action, and 
the timing of displacement actions. The nature of displacement was found to vary 
between complex displacement outcome categories. I then analysed variation in socio-
economic characteristics of the household between the various possible 
categorisations of displacement, and the regression results indicated that the way 
displacement is categorised is important, and much of the variation between 
households may  be attributed to process of displacement not just outcome. Particularly, 
wealth appeared to be associated with the displacement process of splitting more than 
to simple displacement outcomes.
Then Chapter 6 analysed the reasons behind the variation in displacement decisions. 
A model of displacement was introduced that incorporated threat in the ‘danger zone’, 
the area around the house and en route to, for instance, food suppliers or displacement 
destinations that households have to negotiate. The regression investigated the 
relationship between displacement choice and the three channels by  which wartime 
violence might affect protection strategies - impact, indirect threat, and direct threat, as 
well as the mediating factor of protection resources. For direct threat, a measure of 
perception of selective threats as being important relative to other factors in the 
decision to leave or stay was used, along with perception of looting threat as being 
relatively  important. Perceived relative importance of selective threats within the home 
were found to be positively  associated with staged displacement (relative to 
simultaneous), and looting threats positively  associated with partial displacement. The 
presence of both human protection resources (more adults) and human protection 
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liabilities (young children) were positively  associated with splitting, and with larger 
coefficients for staged than partial. The findings of the chapter also suggested that 
wealth functions both as a protection resource and liability. 
So what is displacement? I have argued throughout this thesis that displacement is a 
protection strategy, part of a portfolio of actions households may take to protect their 
lives and their physical asset when under threat. This is not in contrast to scholars who 
include migration forces in their analysis of displacement, but it does suggest that 
distinguishing between what I have referred to as ‘conflict-induced migration’ and 
displacement as protection may be both useful and possible. Indeed this is relatively 
easy  at the ‘nano’ scale - especially  when people move away  from urban areas that are 
usually  recipients of migrants, and return to those areas on cessation of hostilities. But 
when data give no indication of time horizons in the decision (during an extended 
conflict), and displacement patterns correspond to likely rural-urban migration patterns, 
the task of distinguishing these is problematic. This has been the case in the literature 
to date, and demonstrating the coexistence of these forms of displacement has been 
part of the objective of that literature. The provision of evidence from contexts where 
displacement is purely  protective may  help  to build the conceptual and empirical 
foundations to assist in researching conflict-induced migration. This thesis has outlined 
conceptual foundations for displacement as protection, and provided evidence that 
points to why households make certain displacement decisions.
So what is protective displacement? There are at least two types of protective 
displacement. (So at least three types of ‘displacement’ defined as elsewhere to 
include conflict-induced migration). Some households try to manage threat to their 
various individuals and physical assets using mobility  and in situ protection resources. 
Other households respond to threat by staying together. Chapters 5 and 6 suggested 
that this process of managing threat is characterised by the relatively  wealthy  with 
more human protection resources as well as more wealth. The perception of threat to 
assets and of selective threat to household members in the home drive the complex 
(process-inclusive) displacement outcome. So both threat perception and capacity  to 
manage threat shape the process and outcome of displacement. Amidst the binary 
displaced of other displacement research will be households who have managed threat 
in quite different ways. Policy-makers and researchers may do well to investigate these 
processes so as to bring in an understanding of the two types of displacement to their 
work. The simultaneous displaced and the non-displaced do not go through the 
process of splitting, and this indicates they, for some reason, do not attempt to manage 
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threat differentially across household members. This may  be because they lack human 
protection resources, or financial protection resources. They  may  have closer ties and 
fewer decision-makers within smaller family units. 
But importantly, both these types of households are responding to very  high levels of 
threat. There are not pre-emptive and responsive households as in Engel and Ibáñez’s 
(2007) classification, there are just households responding to threat in different ways. 
But of course there may  be some level of objective threat variation between these 
households that is not captured by the threat controls used here. We know that the 
staged displaced have their first group leave earlier- this may  be due to lower 
displacement thresholds for these first groups (usually women and children) in staged 
displaced households. Otherwise it is due to variation in the timing of the threat faced - 
these households perceive higher selective threats that may  (a) be predicted with more 
certainty  and (b) have been faced sooner before the intense shelling began. Resolving 
this question is not possible, but what may be concluded is that different households 
may have various thresholds for displacement for different people within the household, 
and thresholds for people who serve a protective function will be determined by the 
assets or individuals they wish to try  to protect. If certain adults wish to stay  to protect 
assets, or to quickly  return to earning money on cessation of hostilities, this might be 
facilitated by permitting safe, protected passage for adults and children leaving and in 
need of protection en route. If enough of the economically  active can remain, this might 
slow down the ‘synchronisation’ of coping and protection motivations and the mass-
exodus of entire households. It might also permit speedier economic recovery following 
the conflict, and result in fewer households facing asset losses.
A second avenue for further analysis is the distinction between protection and coping 
strategies. Asset protection and self-protection generally  appears to have been 
neglected in the literature on development micro-economics generally  and in wartime 
specifically. For the very  poor, who live at the margins of viable existence, coping and 
protection (from indirect threat) may be equivalent on a day-to-day  basis. But for most, 
significant degrees of threat will be required to shorten time-horizons such that they 
engage solely in protection strategies. Different protection strategies will have varying 
impacts on longer-term economic coping strategies. Protection through displacement is 
likely  to make coping much more difficult. Cash is spent on transport, assets are 
abandoned, Social networks are left behind, along with employment opportunities and 
local information about threat variation. Protection in situ should make coping easier 
when the threat has passed as long as asset losses were not too serious. Over time, 
197
strategies may  be adopted that make coping easier. Planting crops that require little 
maintenance, for example, reduces indirect threat to the crops if they  cannot be 
tended.    
This is where group effects are important. While the majority  are managing the threat in 
situ using protection strategies other than displacement, markets are ‘paused’ but not 
destroyed. But if a household’s social networks and employment opportunities are also 
leaving the area, protection and coping become aligned. Where the most effective 
short term protection strategy  is to leave, and the most effective medium-term coping 
strategy  also becomes to leave, this should create a situation where each household’s 
displacement decisions are compounded very  quickly  into massive-scale displacement. 
This process, and the intersection of protection and coping decision-making, merits 
research attention. So it is likely  that temporal fluctuations in threat drive associated 
fluctuations in protection or coping decisions. And it may be supposed that in extended 
conflicts, the predictability  of the threat variation over time and space drives the 
feasibility of coping in situ. 
These point to the third theme, that of return. While I have emphasised the importance 
of return in creating a beneficial setting for displacement research, I have not analysed 
return decisions in PK18. But return is a fascinating decision in itself, and observed 
variation in return in other contexts may provide some insight into the prior 
displacement decision, and important household characteristics. Additionally, return or 
non-return may comprise part of the initial displacement decision, as well as being in 
part a separate decision. Take for example the Palestinian refugees of 1948, who keep 
their front door keys as symbolic of their intention at the time to leave only  until the 
violence died down, and yet remain displaced 65 years later42. So within the initial 
decision there may be intention to return (or at least some hope to return) or some 
certainty  that this departure may  be permanent. This may  have implications, due to 
factors such as the nature of the living situation at destination and the amount of assets 
taken to the destination, for the ability  to cope if what was intended to be short-term 
displacement becomes long term. It would also be interesting to research whether 
relative intention to return comprises some part of the difference between conflict-
induced migration and displacement. 
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42 Jewish refugees to Israel from Europe in the preceding years had for the most part no such 
intention to return - many were going to Israel in order to build a new state as well as to avoid 
violent European anti-Semitism. The case of Israel also points to state-building as the ultimate 
protection strategy.
Two areas of further empirical development are raised by  this thesis: on the 
measurement of threat, and the whole population sampling in ‘nano-level’ research. I 
address each of these in turn. Relative threat measurement presents an opportunity for 
assessing threat that excludes some of the challenges of existing approaches. The 
absolute level of objective threat may  only  be assessed with time-controlled data on 
violent events that probably requires an even more localised context than that 
presented here, or abstraction back to some level of aggregation which - I would 
suggest - may not be very  helpful until the causal mechanisms are better understood. 
Barring either of these possibilities, we are left with subjective threat assessment by 
households or their neighbours. Ranking of relative threat may  be a better way  to 
understand differential displacement response than just the perceived threat 
assessment (not serious to very serious, for example). 
However the move to a still more localised level would be promising for displacement 
research. In this PK18 context, the displacement picture was complicated by  the co-
existence of selective and spatial threats to life, and threats to assets. While this 
provides interesting opportunity  to analyse different threats’ impact on displacement 
choices, the attribution of causality  would be better served by  a context where, for 
instance, a single shell landed and households responded differently to the threat 
communication of that single act of violence. This would enable analysis of the way 
threat perception is determined by  objective threat (in a more detailed and 
comprehensive way  than that in Adhikari (2013), as well as how households respond in 
terms of their movement. 
This more localised research method would still be best conducted using whole 
population sampling. A context of displacement and return demonstrates convincingly 
the exclusion of migration factors, and so much the better if the violence is even 
shorter-term and less likely  to affect markets. Whole population sampling is better 
suited to such situations. These may also be situations of mass displacement, contexts 
that are under-researched and perhaps unsuited to the case-matching methods used 
elsewhere in the literature. The whole population strategy is yet to be implemented at 
the national or regional level using household data, yet data exists that might permit 
such research to be undertaken. If date-specific datasets continue to emerge that 
enable establishment of sequence from violence to displacement, this will allow the 
relatively  straightforward development of more evidence on the relationship  between 
displacement and violence. The evidence presented in this thesis will provide guidance 
on some additions that would make ongoing and future data collection efforts more 
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useful for rational choice displacement research. 
Finally, in conclusion I would like to emphasise the importance of the concepts of threat 
and protection. The concepts are borrowed from terrorism and crime literatures - 
clearly  we in the West protect ourselves from the threats we face. Meanwhile the Ebola 
virus is spreading through West Africa: how people respond to the threat of infection 
may not be theoretically  dissimilar to the way  they  respond to the threat of violence; 
although different protection strategies are of course required, it is a situation in which 
there is agency in the production of catastrophic threat to life. Threat and protection are 
very  important in the lives of people in the developing world too, and this should be 
reflected in international development research.
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